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An analysis of President Bush's new national security
strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990,
involving a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces,
and General Colin Powell's Base Force. If implemented, the new
strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground
and air forces to the continental U.S. where most would be demo-
bilized. In the event of a major crisis, the U.S. would rely on
active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was
done for Operation DESERT SHIELD. The new national security
strategy is based upon the 2 5% budget cut negotiated with Con-
gress, and a revised Soviet threat and new international security
environment which assumes two-years warning of a European-
centered global war with the USSR. During this period, the U.S.
and NATO would reconstitute additional military capability.
Outline of the sources of new strategy and force structure, the
Base Force, transportation requirements, and whether or not the
U.S. will retain a unilateral capability for overseas interven-
tion. Discussion of parallel NATO and Soviet initiatives. Discus-
sion of major issues resulting from this new proposed strategy
and force structure, including: is the new strategy real, defin-
ing new goals and objectives in both programming and war plan-
ning, the effect of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM,
new requirements for intelligence, requirements for decision-
making, setting technological requirements, research and develop-
ment, investment strategy and industrial conversion, reconstitu-
tion, stockpiles, impact upon DoD organization--including the
Navy and Marine Corps, a transition period, arms control, and new
requirements for military operations research and analysis.
Conclusions: there are four major critical factors upon which the
new strategy depends; (1) , the behavior of the USSR, (2) , the
behavior of allies and the Congress, (3) , the ability of the
intelligence community to meet new challenges, and (4), the
ability of industry to meet new demands. Even if it can be shown
that industry cannot meet new demands, the strategy may still be
useful--this area developed fully. The new strategy is not
simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy but
rather a fundamental revision to the way the U.S. has approached
defense since 1945.
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Introduction
On August 2, 1990, President George Bush unveiled a new
national security strategy in a speech at the Aspen Institute
entitled "In Defense of Defense." That title is misleading.
Far from defending the U.S. military establishment from the winds
of change, Bush proposed a dramatic restructuring of U.S. forces
and defense policy in response to the decline of the Cold War.
This report examines the crucial elements of Bush's new national
security strategy and some unanswered questions that surround it.
The new national security strategy calls for recasting U.S.
defenses around four major principles: deterrence, forward
presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The first three
of these principles sound familiar. However, beneath the super-
ficial similarity to past U.S. principles, important differences
exist. Deterrence, for example, used to be primarily based on
U.S. forces in being. Under the new national security strategy,
deterrence of the Soviet threat will largely be based upon a
capability to build forces if, and when, they are ever needed.
The strategy calls for maintaining a much smaller active and
reserve forces primarily focused on presence and worldwide major
contingency operations—not a Europe-centered global war with the
USSR. This shift from a focus on the "worst-case" threat to the
"most-likely-case" will have major programming and strategy
implications in both the near term and the long run.
If forces are required to fight a major war against the
Soviet Union, the U.S. assumes that there would be sufficient
time to reconstitute them. Specifically, the President has
apparently accepted the consensus of his intelligence community
that the Soviet Union would need "at least one to two years or
longer to regenerate the capability for a European theater-wide
offensive or a global conflict." 3 The U.S. assumes, therefore,
that it will have two-year's warning for a Europe-centered global
war with the USSR.
The most important factors which drove this shift in defense
planning are the collapse of the Cold War military threat from
the Soviet Union, and (given that collapse) the decision to. cut
at U.S. defense spending by at least 25 percent from fiscal years
1991-1995. This reduction is not simply the low end of a periodic
cycle of fluctuating defense expenditures— it is a recognition
that the total resources devoted to defense need not be as high
so long as the current political climate remains. Given the
changes inside the Soviet Union following the August 1991 coup
attempt, the need for a new post-Cold War national security
strategy is even more apparent. As Clausewitz wrote, war has
"...its own grammar, but not its own logic." The old political
logic and lexicon of the Cold War has changed— it is now time to
change the military grammar.
This report first sets the stage for the many issues that
deserve careful analysis. The manner in which the strategy was
announced tells the story of a major review and change in Admin-
istration policy done by a few individuals at the top rather than
with the full participation of the vast federal bureaucracy.
Next to be examined will be the essence of the strategy, as
revealed in official documents, speeches, and testimony. Associ-
ated with the change in strategy is a significant restructuring
of American military forces. This new force structure and asso-
ciated roles and missions are examined next.
The next section of the report deals with parallel initia-
tives with the NATO Alliance and the Soviet Union. The Soviet
threat is examined with implications for the West. The next
section deals with issues that must be discussed: how real the
new strategy is, changes in planning, the impact of Operations
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, new requirements for intelligence
and decision-making, industrial and technology aspects of the
strategy—including reconstitution, the impact of the new strate-
gy on stockpiles, arms control, and military operations research.
The report contains a major assessment of the impact of the
strategy on the Navy and Marine Corps. The final section of the
report contains an assessment of the strategy's critical success
factors and whether this is defense business as usual.
Notes
(1) The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not
necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Navy. This section is based upon my chapter
"The New National Security Strategy and Base Force" in Reconsti-
tuting National Defense: The New U. S. National Security Strategy ,
James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton, Eds. (New York, NY: Prae-
ger, 1992 - forthcoming)
.
(2) "Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium"
(as delivered) , Office of the Press Secretary (Aspen, CO) , The
White House, August 2, 1990, 6 pp.
(3) Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the
President and the Congress . January 1991, p. 3.; and Department
of Defense, 1991 Military Forces in Transit ion . September 1991,
pp. 12-13, 17.
(4) Karl von Clausewitz, On War , trans, by O.J. Matthijs Jolles
(New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1943), Book VIII, Chapter VI,
p. 596.
Sources of the New Strategy 1
Instead of a single or even a few documents which describes
the new national security strategy and its associated force
structure, a series of speeches, articles, and reports must be
consulted to gain a full understanding of Bush's proposal. To
understand these documents, they must be read in sequence to see
how the concepts evolved over time. Since publication dates
differing from dates on which some articles were written, they
are placed in chronological sequence. This section provides the
proper chronology and full documentation for all primary source
documents
.
Although the President first outlined the new strategy in
his speech at Aspen on August 2, 1990, important details were
gradually revealed by official spokesmen in the following months.
Generally ignored by media due to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on
the same day, the New York Times covered the new strategy and
force structure in depth on the same day, but based its story on
leaks of a confidential briefing of the plan to the President in
late June 1990, and subsequent briefings to the Defense Policy
Resources Board (DPRB) . Aviation Week & Space Technology cov-
ered the new national security strategy and force structure in
depth— in their August 13, 1990 issue. The strategy was also
covered in Europe. Interestingly, Aviation Week & Space Technol-
ogy reported on significant forthcoming cuts in forces prior to
the Presidents 's Aspen speech.
General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) , described key elements of the new national
security strategy and associated force structure in two speeches
to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) 6 and the American Legion,
late in August 1990. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney spoke at
the 32nd Annual Conference of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS) on September 6, 1990 and explained that
the new strategic concepts outlined in Aspen would form the basis
of programming documents to be made public in early 1991.
Cheney noted that a series of Congressional and other briefings
were to have followed the Aspen speech, but that he and General
Powell were able to meet only once, on August 2, 1990 with the
chairman and ranking members of the four major Congressional
armed services committees. Cheney's IISS remarks were followed
by I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Strategy and Resources) , who provided additional de-
tails.
Moscow's Pravda reported Cheney's remarks at the Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies meeting and that President
Bush had ordered changes in American security strategy. ° Cheney
followed up his IISS address with a similar speech at the Corn-
stock Club/Air Force Association (AFA) in Sacramento on September
13, 1990 at the Bay Area Council in San Francisco on September
14, 12 another briefing to AFA on September 17th, an address to
the National Association of Business Economists on September
26th, and a talk to the Pittsburgh World Affairs Council on
October 30th. 13
The former Joint Staff Director for Strategic Plans and
Policy (J-5) , Lieutenant General George Lee Butler, U.S. Air
Force, gave additional detailed information late in September
1990 at the National Press Club. The essence of this speech
appeared subsequently in the Spring 1991 issue of Parameters
,
15
the journal of the U.S. Army War College. From the tenor and
content of Lieutenant General Butler's address and article, it
appears that he had a major hand in developing the new national
security strategy or force structure.
Secretary Cheney's visit and remarks in Moscow in October
1990 about the new national security strategy and future force
structure, were widely covered by the Soviet press but general-
ly not reported in the U.S. General Powell authored an article
in the October 1990 issue of The Retired Officer . This arti-
cle, however, was based upon his presentation at the National
Press Club immediately preceding the Iraqi takeover of
Kuwait—hence it should be placed ahead of the Aspen speech.
Similarly, General Powell's February 1991 article in the magazine
of the Reserve Officers Association should be read from the
perspective of currency through October 1990.
General Powell gave two December 1990 speeches: one to the
Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), 20 the
other at the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Associa-
tion (AFCEA). 21 The Chairman's RUSI remarks also appear in the
Spring 1991 issue of The RUSI Journal but these should be read
assuming a December 1990 currency with superficial updating for
the obvious. 22
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David E.
Jeremiah, U.S. Navy, echoed General Powell's concepts in another
December 1990 speech to the President's National Security Tele-
communications Committee. 23 The Commander-in-Chief (CinC) , U.S.
Space Command, General Donald J. Kutyna, U.S. Air Force, told a
San Diego Space Day audience in January 1991 that General Powell
had asked each of the CinCs to examine their forces and present




Only limited commentary about the new national security
strategy or force structure appeared in the U.S. media, other
than the reports in the New York Times and Aviation Week & Space
Technology , until the February 1991, Department of Defense testi-
mony to the Congress. The U.S. press had been otherwise engaged
in major defense-associated reporting of events in the Middle
East. In 1991, the testimony to the Congress by the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff preceded
the delivery of the annual Department of Defense report to the
Congress
.
The first Congressional testimony was presented by the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on Febru-
ary 7 , 1991. Their second testimony was before the House
Appropriations Committee on February 19th. Two days later, on
February 21st, t^Y testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) . Following this testimony, the 1991 Secretary
of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress was
actually issued, although it is dated January.
^
y This report
specifically addresses the new national security strategy and
provides a force structure designed for budgetary and political
give and take. For those who still did not understand that
national strategy and force structure were changing, a copy of
the President's Aspen speech was appended.
In mid-March 1991, "Scooter" Libby30 and Admiral Jeremiah31
appeared before the House Armed Services Committee and provided
the first unclassified details on future force structure. 32
Later in March, Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, also appeared before the House Armed Services Commit-
tee and testified with General Butler, now Commander-in-Chief of
the Strategic Air Command (SAC) , on the strategy and how it would
affect strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces. 33
Secretary Cheney prepared an address on the new national
security strategy for delivery at the Georgetown University.
By the end of March 1991, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued their
1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) which included a Fore-
word by the Secretary. On April 3, 1991
(
, General Powell once
again spoke on the new national security strategy and force
structure in an address to the American Defense Preparedness
Association (ADPA) . Powell also made some remarks on reorgani-
zation in mid-April, reported in Army Times. The Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the force structure associated
with this new national security strategy, the Base Force, the
centerpiece of his testimony before the Defense Base Closure
Commission at the end of April. 38 April also saw major recogni-
tion of the Administration's efforts by a Soviet academic writing
in Kommunist .
In his May 29, 1991 commencement address at the U.S. Air
Force Academy, President Bush mentioned his previous announcement
of a shift in defense focus, but did not expand on his original
vision. 40 "Scooter" Libby41 returned to Congress in early June
1990, accompanied by the Deputy Director for Force Structure,
Resource, and Assessment Directorate on the Joint Staff (J-8)
,
Brigadier General William Fedorochko, Jr., U.S. Army. 42 Both
testified further on details of the strategy and force struc-
ture. Later that month, Major General John David Robinson, U.S.
Army, Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment
Directorate on the Joint Staff (J-8)
,
gave a similar presentation
to the 59th Symposium of the Military Operations Research Socie-
ty. 43
General Powell made note of the Base Force and reconsti-
tution forces in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee in July 1991. * The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff also outlined the new strategy and Base Force to the
Soviet military in a July presentation in Moscow45 and a Septem-
ber 1991 presentation at Harvard. 46 The Department of Defense's
Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Con-
gress . published in July, makes specific reference to the new
national security strategy and links it to the Gulf war. July
also saw a direct criticism of the strategy and associated force
structure in the conservative Soviet press. In August 1991,
Admiral Jeremiah spoke to another Armed Forces Communications and
Electronics Association gathering and once again outlined the
Base Force and gave an interview to Jane ' s Defence Weekly ,
where he discussed changes in the Unified Command Plan (UCP)
.
s "
The White House's March 1990 edition of the National Securi-
ty Strategy of the United States should have been revised about
the same time as the initial series of speeches were made about
the new national security strategy. This document ought to have
appeared at least at the time of the Administration's initial
testimony on the strategy before Congress and release of the
Secretary of Defense's annual report. The revised version of the
National Security Strategy of the United States , incorporating
the new national security strategy, finally appeared in August
1991. This publication, a major source document for the new
strategy, codifies what had been said previously by others, and
added a few new details. 52
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are preparing a follow-on docu-
ment, termed the National Military Strategy for the 1990s , that
should be available before the end of the year. 5j The JCS Na-
tional Military Strategy will be based upon President Bush's:
Aspen speech, National Security Strategy of the United States ,
and further explanations of what is meant by the "new world
order." This new JCS document is being prepared in consultation
with the commanders of the various unified and specified com-
mands. 54
General Powell addressed Base Force and strategy issues in
his remarks to the City Club55 of San Diego and in an interview
in The San Diego Union and Tribune in mid-September 1991. 5 ° The
final primary source available at the time of preparation of this
report was the September 25, 1991 testimony by General Powell on
the Future of U.S. Military Bases before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee. After an extensive prepared presentation, Gener-
al Powell spent more than an additional hour fielding Con-
gressional concerns regarding the Base Force.
On the evening of September 27, 1991, President Bush ad-
dressed the nation on national television. 58 He addressed na-
tional security policy and nuclear forces. Bush outlined the new
strategy and Base Force and the reasons for them. The President
then announced major initiatives to reduce nuclear forces, our
nuclear alert status, expand strategic arms control agreements
with the USSR, and to provide for limited defenses against bal-
listic missile attack. The next morning Secretary Cheney and
General Powell held a pews conference in the Pentagon and provid-
ed additional details. 59
Reviewing the list of primary source documents, a number of
implications emerge. First, there appears to be a very "top-
down" re-direction in defense strategy and force structure. °
From the public record, there were only a handful of individuals
who orchestrated the new concepts and there were few authorized
spokesmen. The usual indicators of a debate were absent--
discussion by other senior military officials does not appear
until well after the new concepts were articulated in public.
The second point is that, despite their obvious concern with
Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were simul-
taneously fashioning the new national security strategy and force
structure. The Secretary has stated repeatedly that there were
two major elements underway with defense in late 1990 and early
1991—the military buildup in Saudi Arabia and the new national
security strategy and force structure. Secretary Cheney and
General Powell were two of only a few people who were involved in
both.
A third matter is that the new national security strategy is
nameless. Inside the Washington beltway, the strategy is known
as the "new strategy," the "new Defense Strategy," the "Presi-
dent's strategy," and "the U.S. military ' s ,new regional contin-
gencies strategy." It has also been referred to, informally, as
the "Aspen Strategy," the "reconstitution strategy," "U.S. Na-
tional Defense Policy," and "the strategy for the new world
order," but it appears that the Administration will let academia,
or the press, select the title that will appear in the history
books. In this paper, the strategy is uniformly referred to as
the "new national security strategy."
Although it took some time, the new national security
strategy and force structure eventually appeared in the oral and
written testimony and other writings of additional officials in
the Pentagon. For example, Christopher Jehn, Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) appeared before
Congress on April 9, 1991 and used General Powell's concept of
four-force package with four supporting capabilities. 62 Similar-
ly, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood expanded upon the
Aspen speech in his address to the American Institute of Aeronau-
tics and Astronautics (AIAA) on May 1, 1991. 63
Air Force Chief of Staff, General Merrill A. "Tony" McPeak,
made public reference to consolidating air forces into the new
Base Force structure. 64 The U.S. Army Posture Statement reflects
a thorough understanding and support of the new national security
strategy. 65 Similarly, H. Lawrence Garrett III, the Secretary of
the Navy, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) , and General Al M. Gray former Commandant of the Marine
Corps jointly authored an article in the April 1991 U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings that makes specific mention of the Aspen
speech and the new national security strategy. 66 Admiral Kelso
also made specific reference to the Aspen speech and strategy in
his April 1991 Sea Power article. 67
Perhaps the reason the National Security Strategy of the
United States did not appear until August 1991 and the fact that
the strategy still lacks a formal name, is that the internal
debate and discussion within the Administration has not ended. 68
Rather than a "bottom-up" product of endless hours of staff
work, involving all the major defense and industrial partici-
pants, the new national security strategy is analogous to recent
shifts in military doctrine in the USSR—with perhaps even more
debate in the USSR that has yet occurred in the U.S. By the end
of September 1991, enough details of the President's new strate-
gic concepts were available to make an in-depth assessment of the
new national security strategy's impact.
Notes
(1) This section draws upon my article "America Promises to Come
Back: The President's New National Security Strategy," Security
Studies . Vol. I, No. 2, Winter 1991/1992, p. 173-234; and my
chapter "The New National Security Strategy and Base Force" in
Reconstituting National Defense: The New U. S. National Security
Strategy . James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton, Eds. (New York,
NY: Praeger, 1992 - forthcoming)
.
(2) Michael Gordon, "Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan," New York
Times . August 2, 1990, p. 1. According to this year's Department
of Defense annual report to Congress, the Defense Planning and
Resources Board apparently played a role in reviewing the new
strategy.
(3) John D. Morrocco, "New Pentagon Strategy Shifts Focus From
Europe to Regional Conflicts," Aviation Week & Space Technology .
Vol. 133, No. 7, August 13, 1990, pp. 25-27. This article has
depth similar to that found in Michael Gordon's article in the
New York Times . The President's Aspen speech and the Base Force
were also reported, but without a great deal of depth, in the
Washington Roundout section of Aviation Week & Space Technology .
Vol. 133, No. 6, August 6, 1990, p. 15.
(4) "The Defence Budget: Choice Cuts," The Economist . Vol. 316,
No. 7667, August 11-17, 1990, pp. 28-30.
(5) John D. Morrocco, "Cheney's 25% Force Reduction Plan Could
Spur Further Spending Cuts," Aviation Week & Space Technology .
Vol. 132, No. 26, June 25, 1990, pp. 24-25.
(6) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, at the National Convention of the Veterans of
Foreign Wars, Baltimore, Maryland, August 23, 1990," as deliv-
8
ered, 13 pp.
(7) "Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, at the 72nd Annual National Convention of the
American Legion, Indianapolis, Indiana, August 30, 1990," as
delivered, 21 pp.
(8) "Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney,
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The President's New National Security Strategy
Among General Powell's most frequent themes in discussing
the new national security strategy over the past year were endur-
ing and emerging realities. According to Powell, the two major
emerging realities that prompted the new national security
strategy were the end of the Cold War and declining defense
budgets. Powell identified a number of enduring and emerging
realities addressed by the new strategy: persistent Soviet mili-
tary power, vital interests across the Atlantic, in Europe and
the Middle East, and in the Pacific, and the unknown threat—the
crisis that no one expected. The new national security strategy
and the associated Base Force are designed to meet these chal-
lenges by providing a less Soviet/European-centered and more
flexible military capabilities which will meet America's security
requirements as we enter the next Century.
Reconstitution Against the Soviet Union
Secretary Cheney said shortly before his departure from
Moscow in October 1990, that "We are changing our strategy and
our doctrine as a result of changes in the Soviet Union and
changes in Europe. We no longer believe it is necessary to us to
be prepared to fight a major land war in Europe..." The shift in
focus from the Soviet threat and a European-centered global war
is a major change in both program and war planning. The Armed
Services must now attempt to justify procuring defense programs
for reasons other than those routinely used since the end of
World War II. Already, the Services and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have begun reviewing existing war and contingency plans for
their responsiveness to the new political realities.
A fundamental component of the President's new national
security strategy is that, assuming a two-year warning of a Eu-
rope-centered global war with the USSR, the U.S. can generate
wholly new forces—rebuild or "reconstitute" them if necessary.
Specifically, current forces deemed unnecessary will be disband-
ed, not put into the reserves, since the risk is deemed accept-
able. Reconstitution is the ability to restore a global war-
fighting capability against the Soviet Union. It includes mobi-
lizing manpower; forming, training, and fielding combat units;
and reactivating the defense industrial base.
Reconstitution is not the same thing as mobilization or
regeneration—it is more like what the United Kingdom had planned
during the interwar years, when it assumed that up to ten years
of strategic warning would be available. New defense manufactur-
ing capability and new forces and military would be built essen-
tially from the ground up. Preserving this capability means
protecting our infrastructure and the defense industrial base,
preserving our lead in critical technologies, and stockpiling
critical materials. Preserving our alliance structure is another
element of our ability to reconstitute a more significant for-
ward-based military presence when, and if, it is ever again
required.
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The estimated two-year warning is predicated upon the as-
sumptions that all Soviet ground and air forces will withdraw to
the homeland, that a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)-
like parity will exist from the Atlantic to the Urals, that the
Soviet Union will remain inwardly focused, and that NATO and its
members intelligence services are functioning. After events in
the Soviet Union during the Winter of 1990-91, Secretary Cheney
adopted a more cautious note on expected Soviet behavior. The
failed Soviet coup of August 1991 certainly suggests further
caution, until the USSR (or whatever becomes of it) achieves
greater political stability.
Initial reports from Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhni-
kov, the new Soviet Defense Minister indicate that he supports
the existing defensive defence doctrine and sufficiency. 3 Howev-
er, if national military forces leave newly independent border
republics, and if these republics do not field large offensive
national guards, and if strategic nuclear forces are reduced to
minimal deterrent levels, then the 1990 Soviet threat envisaged
by the framers of the new national security strategy will be
excessive and obsolete for U.S. planning purposes.
In his February 21, 1991 Senate Armed Services Committee
written statement, General Powell tied the removal of a "short-
warning attack by massive Soviet conventional forces" to the
ratification of the CFE Treaty. This was repeated during his
July 1991 Senate testimony and in the August 1991 National Secu-
rity Strategy of the United States . With the shift in government
in the Soviet Union, CFE ratification will, become more trouble-
some if the overall level of military forces in once-USSR terri-
tory increases due to the new republican national guards and the
transfer of Committee on State Security (KGB) border troops to
the Ministry of Defense. In the meantime, Soviet forces are
slowly being withdrawn to the homeland, conventional arms control
agreements have been signed drawing down forces drastically, and
the USSR remains inner-focused.
Deterrence
The cornerstone of American defense strategy will remain
deterrence of aggression and coercion against the U.S., its
allies, and friends. Should deterrence fail, the strategy calls
on the U.S. Armed Forces to defend the nation's vital interests
against any potential foe. Deterrence is achieved by convincing
a potential adversary that the cost of aggression, at any level,
exceeds any possibility of gain.
To achieve this goal, the U.S. will continue its moderniza-
tion of strategic nuclear forces and associated command, control,
and communications capabilities. The U.S. is committed to improv-
ing its strategic nuclear defensive capabilities. One new area
for strategic nuclear warfare will be to respond flexibly to
lower levels of aggression. Strategic defenses can be effective
in countering the growing threat of ballistic missiles from
nations other than the USSR.
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Deterrence is often thought to involve only nuclear weapons
and has been focused on the Soviet Union, but under the new
national security strategy, we should expect to see further
investigation of deterrence of conventional warfare without the
explicit threat to use nuclear weapons. The U.S. nuclear de-
terrence strategy will remain committed to fostering nuclear
stability, an environment in which no nation perceives a compel-
ling advantage in using nuclear weapons in a first-strike.
One of the paradoxes of our times is that we have generated
a great number of views about deterrence theory but, despite all
the discussion, we must recognize deterrence for what it is—
a
theory that cannot be objectively proven as the reason that we
have not fought wars. Further more there is no agreed upon con-
crete formula that quantifies exactly what it is that we must do
to deter and we constantly get ourselves confused with how much
is enough in our own minds instead of considering what will
affect the minds of the leadership of the nation we intend to
deter. If there were no confusion, we would know exactly what
combination of offensive nuclear missiles, bombers, submarines,
and defenses to build and deploy under the President's new na-
tional security strategy. Some elements of the complex nature of
nuclear deterrence need to be further developed.
For example, conventional military forces used often to
enhance the performance or survival of nuclear forces. The bulk
of the Soviet Navy is expected, during a war, to deploy in bas-
tions where they will defend ballistic missile submarines from
attacks by Western antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces. Similar-
ly, non-nuclear ballistic and cruise missile defenses can be used
to defend one's own nuclear forces from attack. As the numbers
of nuclear delivery vehicles are reduced, due to arms control
agreements, the importance of these conventional military forces
will increase since the value of each nuclear warhead will be
relatively greater.
The dispersal of nuclear-armed bombers, mobile missiles, and
the fleet from known peacetime locations can be used by govern-
ments during a crisis to send a message of political resolve.
Nations should be careful not to make their nuclear forces even
more vulnerable. For example, the dispersal of nuclear forces to
less capable bases may eventually result in lower alert rates due
to the lack of supporting infrastructure. Dispersal bases are
also often more easily accessible to an enemy's special opera-
tions forces or attack by sabotage. With fewer nuclear warheads
expected in their arsenals in the future, the superpowers must
consider such issues more seriously than when they had over
10,000 warheads to manage.
Attrition of dual-use forces such as cruise missile carriers
and tankers is likely during future contingency operations. Such
attrition will have an impact on nuclear deterrence. As the
numbers of dual-use forces come down, it is more likely to make
such highly capable forces "magnets" for attacks or, at least,
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the continued object of high priority research and development
(R&D)
.
Conventional and nuclear warfare are probably intertwined in
ways that the average tactician or strategist may not normally
fully appreciate. The tendency by some to separate armed conflict
into general warfare and nuclear warfare is an artificial one
that can lead to erroneous thinking and possible catastrophic
errors during the execution of military operations. By failing
to deal with these intricacies, politico-military planning has
often been unavoidably and erroneously bifurcated into separate
nuclear and nonnuclear compartments resulting in less than satis-
factory planning for the execution of military operations in
support of deterrence.
Given that each of the two superpowers concedes the possi-
bility of an extended contingency operations, thorough prewar
planning must be undertaken to not "blunder" into unwanted esca-
lation (of any type) . The complex interactions between conven-
tional and nuclear forces must be understood so that threats to
continued nuclear deterrence are understood.
Crisis Response
There is a risk that the end of the Cold War may bring an
increased risk of regional conflicts and greater unpredictability
in the international security environment. Today's crises are
extremely dangerous due to the proliferation of advanced weaponry
and weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biologi-
cal) and the demonstrated willingness of Third World nations to
use them. General Powell reminded Congress in February 1991
about Operation DESERT STORM where: "We are clearly at the 'high
end' of technology in a conflict with a so-called 'Third World'
nation [Iraq] .
"
High technology weapons in the hands of Third World nations
include: modern tanks, ballistic missiles and artillery, air
defenses, tactical air forces, cruise missiles, and diesel attack
submarines. These make conflict in the Third World increasingly
destructive and lethal. U.S. crisis response forces will provide
presence and the ability to reinforce with adequate forces to
prevent a potentially major crisis from escalating or to resolve
favorably less demanding conflicts.
The U.S. crisis response strategy will focus on limiting
vertical and horizontal escalation as well as escalation over
time; i.e. swift termination and containing the conflict to the
theater of origin. Obviously, actions outside the affected
theater will be considered if they are necessary to ensure suc-
cess for a military operation. Prior to committing U.S. forces,
the U.S. military will want to ensure that there is a clear and
present risk to U.S. vital interests and that some military
objective is actually attainable.
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Moreover, the support and participation of U.S. allies in
such conflicts will often be essential. Although the strategy
acknowledges solidarity with existing allies, the U.S. is likely
to have enduring interests with perhaps more ad hoc coalitions
and friends than inflexible alliances. Such coalitions or allies
are vital for the reintroduction of formidable American military
power overseas.
For ease of budget discussion, the U.S. often has used an
illustrative planning scenario. Any planning for contingency
responses by the U.S. should include the ability to react to more
than one "canned" predicament or a single scenario. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff have now developed a family of likely (and per-
haps even unlikely) events for which the U.S. may elect to commit
military forces. Any regional crisis that has the potential to
escalate into a global conflict should, and will, receive priori-
ty.
The conventional conflict scenarios now used by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff are contained in the 1991 Joint Military Net
Assessment . They range from peacetime engagement to war escalat-
ing from a European crisis with full mobilization. Contingencies
include: (1) counter-insurgency/counter-narcotics; (2) lesser
regional contingencies, with two sub-cases (2,000 and 6000 nauti-
cal miles from the U.S.); (3) a major regional contingency in
Korea; and (4) a major regional contingency in Southwest Asia.
These contingencies are graphically depicted in Figure 1—U.S.
Military Planning Schematic 1991.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that not all crises will
evolve in the same manner. The 1991 Joint Military Net Assess-
ment outlines four possible types of crises: (1) a slow-building
crisis; (2) a fast-rising crisis; (3) imminent conflict; and (4)
conflict. The length and intensity of combat, for planning
purposes, is assumed to be 4 50 days for counter-insurgency/coun-
ter-narcotics, 90 days of low-mid intensity for lesser regional
contingencies, 120 days of mid-high intensity for major regional
contingencies, and more than 50 days of mid-high intensity for a
war escalating from a European crisis.
Responses to these contingencies are contained in a series
of measured response options. Responses could include a flexible
minimal force deterrent response, a major deterrent response
(Operation DESERT SHIELD) , and more "worst-case" responses where
combat begins soon after the insertion of troops or simultaneous-
ly. This program of contingency types and measured responses
appears to be a building-block and force sequencing approach to
crisis management. Rather than requiring the deliberate planning
against a single and known threat, the post-Cold War era will be
need more flexible adaptive planning.
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The most complex military operation outlined for planning
purposes in the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment is a war
escalating from a European crisis. The August 1991 National
Security Strategy of the United States speaks of a "potential
threat to a single flank or region" and a "limited, conventional
threat to Europe." This planning scenario is not the old Euro-
pean-centered global war with the USSR but rather something less,
handled by existing active duty and reserve forces, and not
requiring reconstitution.
Peacetime Engagement
According to Secretary Cheney's February 1991 Congressional
testimony, the U.S. will also devise a dynamic "peacetime engage-
ment" strategy to deter low intensity conflict and support inter-
national stability. The August 1991 National Security Strategy
of the United States says that the U.S. "...cannot be the world's
policeman with responsibility for solving all the world's securi-
ty problems." Indeed, America's crisis response role under the
new national security strategy should not be akin to that of a
policeman but rather a fireman. The U.S. armed forces will
22
participate in that strategy largely in the form of overseas
presence.
In his Aspen speech, the President alluded to maintaining a
forward presence by exercises. General Powell stated at the
Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, in December
1990, that forward presence includes military assistance pro-
grams. In his February 1991 testimony to Congress, General Powell
expanded his definition of presence to include, but not be limit-
ed to: stationed forces, rotational deployments, access and
storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian
assistance, port visits, and military-to-military relations. The
1991 Joint Military Net Assessment adds combined planning, na-
tion-assistance, peacekeeping efforts, logistic arrangements,
supporting lift, and exchanges to the list of forms of military
presence. The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the
United States includes training missions and prepositioned equip-
ment. Other pronouncements include forces afloat and intelligence
sharing and cooperation. These expanded definitions should be
viewed as attempts to ensure that all planned future activities
will satisfy the requirement to maintain an overseas presence
with a smaller force.
Changes in Military Art
Another element in the new national security strategy is an
emphasis on technological breakthroughs that will change military
art. Secretary Cheney first addressed this in his February 1991
remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee." Changes in
military art occurred during the inter-war years with the devel-
opment of blitzkrieg , carrier-based strike naval air, and amphib-
ious warfare capabilities. The Soviet military has long dis-
cussed the "Revolution in Military Affairs" that occurred after
World War II and the advent of nuclear weapons and long-range
means of delivery. Senior Soviet military officers have been
warning of another "revolution" in the near future. Indeed, this
subject was mentioned in their November 1991 draft military
doctrine. After the splendid performance of U.S. weapons during
Operation DESERT STORM, it appears that their worst fears were
justified. General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, NATO's Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) , apparently agrees. In a Febru-
ary 1991 address, he remarked after discussing Operation DESERT
STORM that "...precision weapons have changed the whole face of
battle. The coming revolution will present enormous challenges
and opportunities in doctrinal and strategy development.
The new National Security Strategy of the United States
declares that regional crises along with forward presence
"...will be the primary determinant of the size and structure of
our future forces." After assessing the military threats and the
recommended defense program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the
1991 Joint Military Net Assessment conclude that "...the Defense
Program provides minimum capability to accomplish national secu-
rity objectives." The Base Force is that minimum defense pro-
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gramming force structure necessary to meet America's enduring
needs. It is to this program that we will now turn.
Notes
(1) This section draws upon my article "America Promises to Come
Back: The President's New National Security Strategy," Security
Studies . Vol. I, No. 2, Winter 1991/1992, p. 173-234; and my
chapter "The New National Security Strategy and Base Force" in
Reconstituting National Defense: The New U. S. National Security
Strategy . James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton, Eds. (New York,
NY: Praeger, 1992 - forthcoming)
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1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-029, February 12, 1991, p. 5).
(3) Moscow Interfax report in English, 1700 GMT, August 26, 1991
(FBIS-SOV-91-167, August 28, 1991, p. 69); and Interview with
Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov, "Revive the Prestige of
the Army," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, August 31, 1991,
1st Ed., p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-91-170, September 3, 1991, pp. 55-58).
(4) Albert Carnesale, Acting Dean of Public Policy and Adminis-
tration at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, takes the analogy one step further. In a July 31,
1991 address at the Naval Postgraduate Schopl, Carnesale charac-
terized the logical outcome of the strategy as the U.S. shifting
from policeman, to fireman, and eventually becoming a hermit.
Remarks entitled "U.S. Security in the 1990s" delivered at the
Sixth Annual Conference on Crisis Stability and the Offense/
Defense Relationship: New Challenges for Strategic Programs.
(5) "On the Military Doctrine of the USSR (Draft)," Moscow
Voyennaya Mysi in Russian, Special Issue, signed to press Novem-
ber 30, 1990 (JPRS-UMT-91-001-L, January 3, 1991, p. 16).
(6) See: "Transcript, SACEUR's [Supreme Allied Commander Eu-
rope's] Remarks, International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Commonwealth House, London, United Kingdom, 21 February 1991,"
IISS.DR, p. 7.
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The Base Force 1
Although details of the President's new national security
strategy are still being debated, active duty and ready reserve
forces are likely to decrease significantly. According to the
initial report in the New York Times , the "bottom line" numbers
discussed in June 1990 at the White House were: Army, 12 active
and 6 ready reserve divisions (currently 18 active and 10 re-
serve) and 2 "cadre" or reconstitutable reserve divisions; Air
Force, 25 active and reserve tactical air wings (currently 36)
;
Navy, 11-12 aircraft carriers (currently 14) ; and Marine Corps,
150,000 personnel (currently 196,000).
Subsequent reports in the media and the recommended force
levels delivered to the Congress by the Administration are
slightly higher, and reflect budgetary negotiations that parallel
the developing new national security strategy. Force levels
discussed in the most recent (September 1991) reports include the
following additions and changes: a Navy of 448 ships (down from
545) , including 12 deployable aircraft carriers and 1 devoted to
training, 13 carrier air wings, 150 surface combatants, with no
battleships; a 3 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Marine Corps of
159,000 personnel with simultaneous amphibious lift for the
assault echelons of 2% Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) ; 15
active and 11 Air Force wings, and 181 strategic bombers (down
from 268) including 75 B-2s.
Army divisions will apparently break down as follows: active
component— 7 armored, 4 light, 1 infantry; reserve component—
5
armored and 1 light with an additional 2 armored in the new
cadre division category. As the U.S. government attempts to
complete a new budget cycle, we will see numerous other force
levels suggested and debated. The June, 1990 New York Times
report should be viewed in the context of a minimally acceptable
force that probably was agreed to by the participants before
events in Iraq and Kuwait.
Termed the Base Force, the new force structure advocated by
General Powell will be organized into four basic military compo-
nents: Strategic nuclear offensive and defensive; Atlantic;
Pacific; and a Contingency Force; and four supporting capabili-
ties: Transportation, Space, Reconstitution, and Research and
Development. This force structure and supporting capabilities
are not contained in the President's speech but were developed
parallel to and in support of the President's new national secu-
rity strategy. What constitutes those forces will be debated
throughout the next year. These "Forces" are not meant to repre-
sent new commands, but rather force packages much the same that
"Tactical Air Forces," according to the annual Department of
Defense posture statement, includes aviation forces assigned to
the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Once acquired, these
packages would then be available to the existing Commanders-in-
Chief in the field.
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The Strategic Force
The Strategic Force will initially include those offensive
forces that result from START, as modified by the President's
national television speech at the end of September 1991. Bush
announced that he has ordered the immediate stand-down of alert
bombers and those intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs)
already scheduled for deactivation under START. Previously, START
II goals of 4500 and 3000 warheads for each side had been dis-
cussed openly —clearly those numbers are now on the high side of
our future nuclear arsenal.
Soviet reaction to the President's bold suggestions is
eagerly awaited. After the dramatic events of August 1991 in the
Soviet Union, it is possible unilateral cuts in the Soviet arse-
nal may be welcome; a shift in government and internal power may
also bring about an abrupt change in deterrence philosophy from
war-fighting to assured destruction with minimal forces.
In their February 1991 Congressional testimony, Secretary
Cheney and General Powell stated that they were prepared to
reduce strategic bombers from 268 to 181, halt the construction
of OHIO class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) at 18, not retrofit all of those submarines with the more
advanced TRIDENT II (D-5) missiles, and consider only the PEACE-
KEEPER (MX) rail garrison ICBM and small ICBM as research and
development programs, without plans for their deployment. Presi-
dent Bush told the nation in September 1991 that the mobile
PEACEKEEPER and small ICBM programs will be terminated, retaining
the non-mobile small ICBM as the only U.S. strategic nuclear
missile program. Admiral Jeremiah told Congress, in March 1991,
that the Base Force would include 550 ICBMs.
Reducing the offensive threat dramatically to such lower
numbers suggests revisiting the suitability of strategic de-
fenses. General Powell included the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) in his American Legion, Royal United Services Institute for
Defence Studies, and Armed Forces Communications and Electronics
Association speeches and his February 1991 article. Admiral
Jeremiah outlined the need for SDI in December 1990: "...against
an attack by a major power..." and "also against Third World
weapons of mass destruction delivered by ballistic missiles."
General Kutyna discussed the need for SDI and the Third
World ballistic missile threat in his January 1991 Space Day
briefing. He specifically noted Libyan Colonel Quadhafi's April
1990 statement that he would have fired missiles at New York had
he the capability, when previously attacked by U.S. forces.
President Bush said in his State of the Union address, in January
1991, that SDI would be refocused on providing protection from
limited ballistic missile strikes against the U.S., its forces
overseas, and friends and allies.
In his February 1991 testimony to Congress and subsequent
written report to Congress, Secretary Cheney outlined a reorien-
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tation of SDI to a system of Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes (GPALS) —indicating that it would be space, ground, and
sea-based. When the Soviets first commented on a revised U.S.
defense against limited nuclear strikes, they assumed that it
would be ground-based. After President Bush's State of the
Union address, they quickly picked up on a New York Times report
that the new GPALS system would consist of 1,000 land-based and
1,000 space-based interceptors.
The initial objective of GPALS would be protection against
accidental, unauthorized, and/or limited ballistic missile
strikes. The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the
United States notes that with adequate funding, GPALS could
protect troops in the field by the mid-1990s and the U.S. itself
by the turn of the century. The system should be only half the
size of the Phase I plan associated with SDI. In September 1991,
the President once again raised the issue of strategic
defenses—this time in the context of a limited deployment in
cooperation with the USSR. It is likely that strategic defenses
will at least continue as a research and development program.
An obvious area that demands clarification is the increased
nuclear role for naval strategic nuclear and air forces replacing
ground-based weapons withdrawn from Europe. General Powell
stated in both speeches in December 1990 that the U.S. remains
committed to a triad of offensive forces, but that we would
probably increase reliance on sea-based systems. In addition, he
stated in his Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Associ-
ation speech that "...we must make sure that our residual Strate-
gic Forces are second to none."
The Atlantic Force
The conventional military forces of the U.S. appear to be
headed for both reductions and restructuring. The Atlantic Force
will include residual forces in Europe, those forward-deployed to
Europe, and the continental U.S. -based reinforcing force (includ-
ing heavy ground forces) . The Atlantic Force would contain a
significant reserve component. This force would be responsible
for Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia, recognizing that
in the future the Middle East threat is on a par with that to
Europe, thus demanding the same type of response. That this
force is not called the European Force indicates both the shift
in emphasis of the new national security strategy and the appar-
ent desire to alter the concept for employment, and perhaps
command, of the forces normally assigned to the Atlantic, Euro-
pean, and Middle Eastern theaters.
General Powell stated in his December 1990 Royal United
Services Institute for Defence Studies speech that the residual
Atlantic Force retained in Europe would consist of a heavy Army
component (defined as perhaps at Corps strength) with supporting
air forces. In his testimony to Congress, in February 1991,
General Powell stated that the European forward-based Atlantic
Force would consist of mechanized and armored ground forces.
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In his March 1991 testimony to Congress, Admiral Jeremiah
gave the first unclassified breakdown of exactly what was des-
tined for the Atlantic and other Forces. The U.S. will retain in
Europe: 2 Army divisions and about 3 Air Force wings. The August
2, 1990 New York Times report discussed 100,000-125,000 military
personnel remaining in Europe although, in his September 1991
Congressional testimony, Powell used a 150, 000-level to describe
the residual guantity.
In his Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Associa-
tion remarks, General Powell further stated that forward presence
for the Atlantic Force means Marines in the Mediterranean and
strong maritime forces. In his testimony to Congress, in Febru-
ary 1991, General Powell stated that the European forward-based
Atlantic Force amphibious forces should be capable of forced
entry operations. According to Admiral Jeremiah, in March 1991,
the residual maritime forces in Europe will be 1 carrier battle
group and 1 amphibious ready group. The 1991 Joint Military Net
Assessment refers to an Atlantic Force with 1 carrier battle
group and 1 Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployed continuously
in the Mediterranean Sea or eastern Atlantic Ocean. The notional
force size of a MEU is 2,500 personnel with 15 days combat
sustainment. This is hardly a residual European-based capability
for significant forced entry.
In his Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Associa-
tion remarks, General Powell stated that forward presence for the
Atlantic Force means access in the Middle East, Allied interoper-
ability and flexible command, control, and communications sys-
tems, and military assistance programs. All spokesmen have told
Congress that there will also be some residual presence in the
Middle East. In his September 1991 testimony to Congress, Gener-
al Powell defined our residual presence as 1 carrier battle
group, 1 amphibious ready group, and prepositioned material.
Atlantic Force forward presence will be backed by a powerful
and rapid reinforcement capability. In his Armed Forces Communi-
cations and Electronics Association address, General Powell
stated that Atlantic Force reinforcement and sustaining forces
capability would consist of a mix of active and reserve heavy
Army divisions and tactical fighter aircraft. In March and
August 1991, Admiral Jeremiah identified that capability as con-
sisting of 4 active, 6 reserve, and 2 cadre reserve Army divi-
sions, 2 active and 11 reserve Air Force wings, 5 Navy carrier
battle groups, 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades, and the Marine
Corps reserve component. Each MEB has a notional force size of
16,000 personnel with 3 days combat sustainment.
General Powell told Congress in September 1991 that the Army
active duty reinforcement contribution will be 3 heavy divisions
that include roundout (third) brigades from the reserves compo-
nent. He also said that the Marine Corps contribution to the
Atlantic Force had been redefined as a Marine Expeditionary
Force—notional force size of 48,000 personnel with 60 days
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sustainment. Powell also adjusted the Navy reinforcement capa-
bility to 4 carrier battle groups, obviously due to the assign-
ment of 1 carrier battle group to Southwest Asia. General Gordon
R. Sullivan, the new Army Chief of Staff, stated, in an interview
published in the October 1991 Armed Forces Journal International .
that the Army's "III Corps, will be generally designated for
Central Europe, although it could go to Southwest Asia."
The Atlantic Force will be the backbone of America's future
conventional deterrence for an area of the world that has domi-
nated defense thinking for fifty years. Although there is no
specific reference to dual-committing forces from one theater to
another, it should be noted that Japan-based U.S. forces partic-
ipated in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. It should
be obvious that if we reduce our residual force in Europe to
those outlined above, it would strain them to be dual-committed
to the Contingency Force. However, General Powell told Congress,
in September 1991, that the concept of "strategic agility" ap-
plied to force structure means that European-based U.S. forces
will continue to be available for crises outside of the Conti-
nent.
The Pacific Force
In September 1990, Lieutenant General Butler stated "...that
the U.S. could undertake a prudent, phased series of steps to
reduce modestly our force presence in Korea, as well as Japan and
elsewhere." General Powell told Congress in February 1991 that
"...we can initiate a gradual transition toward a i partnership in
which ROK [Republic of Korea] forces assume the leading role on
the Peninsula. However, should deterrence fail, in-place and
reinforcing US forces would still be required to blunt, reverse
and defeat the type of short-warning attack that North Korea is
still clearly capable of mounting."
The Pacific Force will include a modest and chiefly maritime
residual forward-based and forward-deployed force in Korea, Japan
and elsewhere in the theater, and reinforcing forces located in
the continental U.S. Admiral Jeremiah outlined that modest force
in his March 1991 testimony. In Korea, we will initially retain
1 Army division and 1-2 Air Force wings; in Japan, 1-2 Air Force
wings and 1 home-based Navy carrier battle group. A Marine
Expeditionary Unit will operate in the Western Pacific for most
of each year. General Sullivan stated in an October 1991 pub-
lished interview that the Army's I Corps will be earmarked for
the Pacific theater. 12
General Powell stated in his December 1990 Royal United
Services Institute for Defence Studies speech that "the bulk of
American Army and Air Force power in the Pacific would be as
reinforcements.
. .using Hawaii, Alaska, and the continental United
States as springboards." Admiral Jeremiah defined that rein-
forcement in Hawaii and Alaska as a light Army division (probably
the 25th Infantry Division) , an Air Force wing, and a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade. He stated that in the continental U.S.,
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there would be an additional MEB and 5 Navy carrier battle groups
and that the modest reserve components in Alaska and Hawaii would
be allocated to the Pacific Force. In his Congressional testimony
in September 1991, General Powell stated that the Army contribu-
tion might eventually be 2 divisions, but that this subject
depended upon how the Alaskan and Hawaiian reserve component was
organized.
The fate of the Marines on Okinawa also remains unclear.
Powell said that the overall Marine Corps contributions to the
Pacific Force included a Marine Expeditionary Force—adding,
however, that it would be forward-deployed. The Marine Corps
does not even currently forward-deploy a MEF in the Pacific.
Perhaps the Chairman meant that a MEF would be assigned to the
Pacific Force and that a Marine Expeditionary Brigade would be
forward-deployed
.
In his Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Associa-
tion address, General Powell stated that "In short, the Pacific
Force would continue our very successful economy of force opera-
tion in this critical region." It is unlikely that the modest-
sized Army and Air Force Pacific Force assets would have a dual-
commitment to the European theater in a revitalized "swing
strategy" but it is clear that any substantial land war in Asia
would require "borrowing" forces from elsewhere.
Is there a need to retain expensive overseas bases in the
Philippines, and elsewhere, under the new strategic concept? If
the Cold War was our original justification for the presence of
large forces in the Pacific, and if the Cold War is over, then it
is ended in the Pacific as well. This was suggested also by
former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in his state-
ment to the Second International Conference on "The Asia-Pacific
Region—Dialogue, Peace, Cooperation," in Vladivostok, in Septem-
ber 1990 13 If forces and bases are to be permanently retained
overseas, it should be for other reasons, and those reasons
should be clearly articulated and debated in Congress. The
Congress and American public may well ask why the U.S. should
remain unilaterally committed to defend nations which are not
obligated to assist the U.S. in its own defense. If the U.S.
significantly reduces its forces in Japan, there is a possibility
that effective arguments will be provided to increase the size
and/or capability of the Japanese Armed Forces. Any such possi-
bility will be watched very carefully by China and many other
Western Pacific nations.
The Contingency Force
Perhaps the most dramatic innovation of the Chairman's
recommended force structure is idea of a Contingency Force based
in the continental U.S. For the present, existing Commanders-in-
Chief will still retain their own forward-stationed and deployed
forces for immediate contingency response. Continental U.S. -based
contingency forces will be available, as a quick-response force,
to assist CinCs as well as to provide significant conventional
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capabilities for those areas of the world not covered by the
Atlantic or Pacific Forces; i.e. South America, Sub-Saharan
Africa, and island nations. It is also possible that the Contin-
gency Force may provide forces for South Asia.
Soviet criticism of a unilateral U.S. crisis response force
was to be expected. In unofficial commentary by political ana-
lyst, the Soviets stated that: "No questions would be asked if
the new fire brigade force were created within the framework of
the United Nations and their military committee and manned by
troops from different countries. Such a force could then act as a
powerful factor in support of a new world order."
Continental U.S. -based contingency response forces are not a
new idea. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the military services experimented with a series of
similar schemes, eventually abandoned by the Kennedy Administra-
tion. A U.S. Strike Command existed from October 1961-December
1971 as a Unified Command. Similar arrangements involved varying
commands have, from time to time, been responsible for the Middle
East and South Asia.
Once the U.S. Army created a Strategic Army Corps (STRAC)
consisting of 2 divisions. Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC)
as well as Navy and Marine Corps units, not otherwise allocated
to other Commanders-in-Chief, were assigned to the U.S. Strike
Command. Similarly, the old Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
(RDJTF) was another precursor to the proposed Contingency Force.
U.S. planning for contingencies should also benefit from the
experiences of France's Force d' Action Rapide (FAR)—formed as an
additional component to the French Army in 1983—with a mission
similar to the proposed Contingency Force.
The Contingency Force will have a very small reserve compo-
nent; primarily of airlift and supporting forces—not combat
capability. According to General Powell's Congressional testimo-
ny in September 1991, the Army will commit 5 divisions 15 and Air
Force 7 wings to the Contingency Force. General Sullivan said in
an October 1991 published interview that the Army's "XVIIIth Air-
borne Corps would be a worldwide contingency force." 16 According
to the Army Posture Statement, contingency response divisions
will be structured to sustain deployments for about thirty days
without augmentation by reserve components.
The Air Force will overhaul its internal structure to be
more responsive to regional threats. A new "Air Combat Command"
will take the place of the existing Tactical Air Command and
Strategic Air Command. A new "Air Mobility Command" will replace
the Military Airlift Command. 17
A Marine Expeditionary Force, most of the rapid response
sealift and intertheater airlift will also be available to the
Contingency Force. The Navy will apparently provide dual-commit-
ted forces from the Atlantic and Pacific Forces. Special Opera-
tions Forces appear to have a role both with the Contingency
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Force and the Commanders-in-Chief. The 1991 Joint Military Net
Assessment additionally included the following in their defini-
tion of the Contingency Force: Army airborne, air assault, light,
and highly mobile heavy divisions, Air Force long-range conven-
tional bombers, and Navy attack submarines.
Lieutenant General Butler provided the following detailed
description of how the Contingency Force would function. The
first stage of a Contingency Force to be used in what he termed
a "graduated deterrence response," and, for program planning
purposes, would consist of (in the order stated) : (1) Army light
and airborne divisions, (2) Marine Expeditionary Brigades, (3)
Special Operations Forces, and (4) selected Air Force units. At
his Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association
speech, General Powell used a different order: (1) light Army
forces, (2) mixed Air Force and Navy units, (3) Marine Corps
units, and (4) units from the Special Operations Command. The
Air Force has made a strong case for the use of continental U.S.-
based airpower to respond to future crises.
According to Lieutenant General Butler, this initial compo-
nent of the Contingency Force would be buttressed as necessary
by: (1) carrier forces, and (2) amphibious forces. Normally the
Navy prefers to promote the frequent call on carrier forces for
immediate crisis response, and listing these forces in the
second component of the Contingency Force probably reflects the
land orientation of the concept. It would be wholly illogical to
assume that the U.S. will require fewer responses by carrier
battle groups in the future--indeed, a solid case can be made
that we will send the fleet more often in the future.
The listing of amphibious forces in the second tier seems
appropriate, reflects recent employment of the Marine Corps, and
is consistent with General Al M. Gray's, the former Commandant,
publication Warfighting (FMFM 1) on maneuver warfighting doc-
trine and shift in identification of Fleet Marine Forces from
"Amphibious" to "Expeditionary." Warfighting ' s lack of signifi-
cant use of the word amphibious is indicative of a shift in
service self-identity. On the other hand, General Gray later
claimed that "this type of operation [amphibious] can achieve




Amphibious capabilities must be retained by the U.S. but in
the context of tactical or operational-level regional contingency
operations rather than a major strategic-level assault on
Europe—General Powell's statement regarding the forced entry
amphibious capability for the Atlantic Force notwithstanding. If
another D-Day type invasion were ever required of American
forces, amphibious forces would be among the forces reconstituted
and built, as during World War II.
The third tier of the Contingency Force appears to be
heavier forces with the capability for long-term sustainability.
Again, we have seen this application in Operation DESERT SHIELD.
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On April 16, 1991, Major General Fred E. Elam, U.S. Army, Assist-
ant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, testified before the
House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials "...that evolving national
strategies require that the Army have a capability to simultane-
ously deploy two armored divisions anywhere in the world from the
US within approximately 3 days." 21
Admiral Frank Kelso, U.S. Navy, told Congress, in February
1991, that a Base Force, 451-ship Navy, deploying about 30 per-
cent of the available fleet, could provide an immediate response
to a crisis anywhere in the world within 7 days. It would com-
prise 1 Amphibious Strike Task Force, consisting of 1 carrier
battle group and 1 Amphibious Ready Group with an embarked Marine
Expeditionary Unit. A second carrier battle group could be
available within 15 days. A full Marine Expeditionary Brigade
could arrive within 3 days. Hence, the most the sea services
could deliver to a crisis area within a week under this plan is a
token force capable only at the tactical-level of warfare. Within
a month, the sea services could deliver a force with only about
the firepower equivalent of an Army light division and few wings
of aircraft—again only capable of tactical-level warfighting.
Surely the Army and Air Force could deliver more capability
within the same time frame as this—depending upon assumptions
made about host-nation-support.
It would take the sea services a 4 percent deployment rate
to respond to a regional conflict with a more robust combat
capability: 3 carrier battle groups and a full Marine Expedition-
ary Force. This type of force could be capable of operational-
level warfighting and perhaps opposed entry against a sophisti-
cated enemy. With the costs of providing such a high deployment
rate, it is unlikely that the Navy will recommend such a
posture
—
given its desires to replace aging hardware. Deployment
rates in excess of 40 percent are necessary for the sea services
to simultaneously respond with 3 carrier battle groups and 1 MEF
in one location and another carrier elsewhere.
Although the sea services logically could have been consid-
ered the core of the new Contingency Force, 23 the Army and Air
Force can argue that they can provide faster airpower and combat
capability anywhere in the world. Indeed, there have been arcane
informal suggestions by Air Force personnel that their new com-
posite wings can be expressed in terms of carrier battle group
equivalents! The new composite wing to be formed at Mountain
Home Air Force Base, Idaho, will be designed for quick air inter-
vention anywhere in the world - and if necessary to return to the
continental U.S. The wing at Pope Air Force Base, North Caroli-
na, will be paired with the Army's 82nd Airborne Division. 24
Assuming that the U.S. will involve itself in overseas contingen-
cy operations only with the cooperation of host nations, and with
the support of coalitions, then the Air Force/Army response may
appear more cost-effective.
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The clue to understanding the new crisis response portion of
the new national security strategy is that it is not keyed to
one service, or even to the active component having a unilateral
capability. Future crisis response appears to be a joint respon-
sibility with a mix of active and selected reserve units.
Transportation
According to General Powell, transportation is one of the
major supporting components to the new national security strate-
gy. Mobility programs proposed by the Secretary of Defense in
his annual report included the ability to return to Europe with 4
Army divisions, 3 Air Force tactical fighter squadrons, 1 Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, and their associated support within 10
days. Additional forces would be provided within 2-3 months.
The Department of Defense will continue to build toward preposi-
tioned equipment in Europe for 6 Army divisions and their associ-
ated support elements.
For contingencies outside Europe, the goal is to provide 5
Army divisions, together with associated air and naval forces in
about 6 weeks. Ground units would fly to a future crisis, much
as forces assigned to Operation DESERT SHIELD did to Saudi Ara-
bia. Personnel will then either be married with prepositioned
equipment or with equipment that arrives via sealift.
Prepositioning for ground and air forces is part of the
complete package that must include intertheater lift. The equip-
ment that must be prepositioned for even a light Army division,
essentially a duplicate set, will probably make prepositioning a
less attractive alternative to the Army than fast sealift. When
addressing fast sealift, the military must make a tradeoff be-
tween speed and tonnage.
The U.S. is obligated to retain sufficient lift to support
immediate contingency operations by either the Atlantic or the
Contingency Forces. Lift requirements for the Pacific Force are
less clear. Initial lift requirement will probably include the
capability to continue concurrent but staggered operations but it
is unlikely that funding will be provided for simultaneous
crises, given the years of failure to provide lift for a 1% war
strategy. The March 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment states
that the U.S. can deploy forces in all program scenarios except:
(1) , when two regional contingencies occur sequentially or con-
currently; and (2) , in the early weeks of a short-warning war in
Southwest Asia.
Lift capability disclosed during Operation DESERT SHIELD
will be studied and may result in new requirements and possibly
additional assets. The U.S. already has special lift assets
and a robust prepositioning program, but may learn from recent
experience that modest increments of additional lift or preposi-
tioned equipment are required.
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Lift will probably include a modest government-owned capa-
bility in a caretaker status and civilian air and sea transporta-
tion assets engaged in normal peacetime trade. The U.S. general-
ly met its lift requirements for Operation DESERT SHIELD with a
combination of existing assets, those taken from trade, and
charters of foreign vessels. 26 The new national security strate-
gy will probably make similar assumptions.
Air and sealift for a major NATO war in Europe is in the
category of forces that could be reconstituted during the two-
years' warning that future program planning now assumes is avail-
able. Reconstitution of lift should include: that provided by
allies, charters from foreign non-aligned sources, and the acti-
vation of assets in storage. It will be hard to justify the
retention of older, World War II-era ships, as a part of a re-
structured National Defense Reserve Fleet.
Unilateral Capability?
Among the more interesting questions regarding the continen-
tal U.S. -based Contingency Force, and potential crisis interven-
tion by the Atlantic or Pacific Forces, is whether the planning
assumptions include the ability for the U.S. to operate unilater-
ally. Are the force reductions envisaged by the new strategy so
deep as to make the participation of host nations and allies a
prerequisite for U.S. military action? Although Secretary Cheney
told the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, in February
1991, that the U.S. "will retain the ability to act alone," the
March 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment assumes that host-na-
tion-support and sufficient infrastructure is available for any
major regional contingency. At the end of April 1991, General
Powell told the Defense Base Closure Commission that: "Frequent-
ly, access ashore will be contested or unobtainable, requiring
employment of sea-based forces."
"Acting alone" must be viewed in terms of the level of
warfare being discussed—strategic (a major war such as World War
II) , operational (campaign sized similar to Operations DESERT
SHIELD or DESERT STORM) , or tactical (similar to the invasion of
Grenada or Panama) ; and whether such operations are essentially
nuclear, maritime, or air/land warfare. The U.S. will probably
reserve the right, and maintain the capability, to take unilater-
al conventional forces military actions at the tactical-level,
but probably not at the strategic- or operational-levels of
air/ land warfare. In other words, the strategy only calls for a
modest unilateral tactical capability, about that provided by an
Amphibious Strike Task Force or Maritime Prepositioning Force
(MPF) Marine Expeditionary Brigade. If the U.S. remains commit-
ted to maritime superiority, then it could still mount a unilat-
eral theater campaign at sea.
However, it should be assumed that the U.S. could not uni-
laterally mount an opposed contingency operation or campaign such
as DESERT SHIELD with the Base Force. Further, one could argue,
that the U.S. probably does not have this operational-level
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capability today. Both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were careful in their testimony to
the Senate Armed Services Committee, in February 1991, to project
that the Base Force could handle an Operation DESERT SHIELD or
DESERT STORM but that it might have taken longer before the
forces were prepared to go on the offensive. This answer as-
sumes, however, that such operations are coalition-based, and not
unilateral.
The U.S. long has assumed that a major war (at the strate-
gic-level) would be pursued only as a part of alliances, such as
NATO--hence there is no real change at this level of warfare.
Indeed, continued good working relations with allies is a specif-
ic goal of the new national security strategy and a vital build-
ing block for the reconstitution of a substantial U.S. military
presence in Europe. Similarly, the U.S. has always maintained a
unilateral capability at the tactical-level of warfare and there
is no reason to assume that it will not do so in the future.
The Administration amplified its views on this issue, in the
August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States ,
presumably after the military pointed out the significantly
different force structure required for the varying assumptions.
The White House document states that the U.S. must be prepared
for "differing levels of support from host nations." This in-
cludes the necessity to:
"deploy substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the
world where prepositioning of equipment will hot always be
feasible, where adequate bases may not be available (at
least before a crisis) and where there is a less developed
industrial base and infrastructure to support our forces
once they have arrived. Our strategy demands we be able to
move men and material to the scene of a crisis at a pace and
in numbers sufficient to field an overwhelming force."
If the U.S. desires a unilateral capability to intervene in
the world without host-nation-support, on the order of an Opera-
tion DESERT SHIELD, then the current force structure will remain
high
—
perhaps too high to absorb the imminent budget reductions.
If the budget drives the problem, we are less likely to field a
force that can intervene without the assumption of host nation
and coalition support. This issue will probably be a major focus
of discussion during the next budget year.
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U.S. forces in Europe, and elsewhere, cannot be changed
without considering long-term commitments to allies and the
planned employment of American resources in combined operations
under NATO command. Most Europeans initially assumed that the
U.S. Army and Air Force would either remain as a major element
in-theater, or maintain large standing active or Ready Reserve
forces which could return to Europe within a reasonable period.
This may not be the case, and America's promise to return may be
only quickly with a smaller existing active and reserve force
mix, and after two or more years with reconstituted additional
forces.
While the U.S. is considering major changes in strategy and
forces, so is NATO. The July 1990 NATO London Declaration stated
that "NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up
larger forces if and when they might be needed." The July
Declaration stated that the Alliance too was preparing a new
"military strategy moving away from 'forward defense' .. .towards a
reduced forward presence..." The declaration also stated that
"NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces" and
"will scale back the readiness of active units, reducing training
requirements and the number of exercises."
General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR) , told the Defense Planning Committee
(DPC) , in December 1990, that he envisages a change in his pri-
mary combat mission from flexible response and forward defense to
crisis response. NATO forces appear to be recast in three
levels: (1) , Reaction Forces available for crisis response with-
out major mobilization; (2) , Main Defense Forces consisting of
in-place Central European Army corps; and (3), North American,
primarily, and some European Augmentation Forces. These forces
are still under study, are dependent upon the outcome of Alliance
discussions on a revised strategy, and have not yet been final-
ized. Initial indications for NATO forces are as follows: 4
The Reaction Force will apparently have two categories:
Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)
.
The IRF will be centered around a standing multinational and
rapidly deployable forces modeled on the existing brigade-size
Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force. These forces will be
at the highest state of readiness and be able to respond within
72 hours to a contingency with around some 5,000 personnel.
RRF forces will be built around a multinational corps. This
corps would become available in 5-7 days for crisis response to
reinforce the Immediate Reaction Forces with a more substantive
combat capability. The Rapid Reaction Force would include 1
heavy armored British division, 1 light armored British division,
2 new multinational divisions, parachute forces, commandos, and
marines. The U.S. might contribute as much as 1 division.
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The Main Defense Force of some 4-6 Central European national
and multinational corps would consist of an active duty covering
force, termed the Ready Maneuver Force, and a large reserve
contingent. The Ready Maneuver Force would constitute the first
forces available for an expanded crisis. Generally, the Main
Defense Force appears to be sized to meet the threat of a signif-
icant contingency in Europe. Should these forces not be able to
support political decision making or a threat appear that resem-
bles the old Soviet theater strategic offensive operation, then
additional forces will be mobilized and regenerated or reconsti-
tuted .
Augmentation Forces of some 20, or so, divisions would
generally be available only after strategic warning and would be
dependent upon dual-committed strategic lift. The size of the
planned Augmentation Force would obviously have to be flexible
enough match the threat that would be posed in a Soviet reconsti-
tution scenario. Some of the Augmentation Forces include part of
the Ready Maneuver Force and would be available for crisis man-
agement. Figure 2—New NATO Defense Organization, based upon the
limited sources available thus far, outlines this new concept for
NATO military forces.
FIGURE 2
NEW NATO DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
Reaction Force
Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) , brigade-size, available within
72 hours
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) , 4-5 divisions, available within 5-7
days
Main Defense Force
Ready Maneuver Force, 4-6 divisions
Reserves
Augmentation Force, 20+ divisions
Source: The author
NATO initiatives include more emphasis on mobility and
multinationality. Multinational corps with 2 or 3 divisions from
different countries parallel existing arrangements for multina-
tional maritime forces. Multinational maritime arrangements may
be expanded to other areas and to include other types of forces.
General Galvin told the International Institute for Strategic
Studies that he would present his third draft of a revised force
structure to the Chiefs of Defense staffs in April 1991. He
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speculated that NATO would field about half of its existing force
levels in the Central Region with about the same forces in the
North and South.
Although NATO is attempting to reach an alliance-wide agree-
ment on force structure, many NATO nations are undertaking uni-
lateral force reductions. Germany is reducing its forces to
370,000 personnel, about half of whom will be placed in the
reserves. France is withdrawing all its 55,000 officers and men
from Germany. The United Kingdom announced a plan to reduce the
British Army on the Rhine by about 50 percent, demobilizing most
of the troops but retaining regimental identifications. There
are reports of additional unilateral cuts. These unilateral
decisions by member nations will have dramatic impacts on the
NATO war-fighting Commanders-in-Chief plans for military opera-
tions and campaigns in the event of war.
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe's realistic residual
U.S. force for Europe apparently is 1 corps (2 divisions) , 3% Air
Force wings, and the Sixth Fleet (which includes around 20,000
personnel ashore). Planning in Europe should include the possi-
bility of an eventual total withdrawal of American combat units
from the continent. Were this to happen, would other allied NATO
ground forces remain unilaterally forward-deployed, and if so,
where?
The NATO London Declaration and General Galvin's Defense
Planning Committee remarks indicate a new NATO war fighting
strategy is being drafted to replace the current strategy of
flexible response (MC-14/3) . The strategy perhaps may be identi-
fied as MC-14/4 or have a new series designation to signify the
fundamental changes that it reflects. The new overall NATO
strategy will be based upon newly calculated national commitment
force levels. It is not clear if NATO's Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE)
,
primarily a land theater and under
the command of an Army general, will take the lead in the devel-
opment of a new NATO maritime concept of operations, in his areas
of responsibility (which includes the Mediterranean) , or leave




Unilateral programming actions for future forces being
undertaken by individual NATO nations, like the U.S., will obvi-
ously affect the warfighting strategy that NATO as a whole can
implement as those programmed forces become operational. Current
national programming actions may stem from revised national
views on war, the threat, or the resources available for defense,
or any combination of these. This has happened in the U.S.
NATO is attempting to obtain a quick consensus on its war-
fighting strategy so that national programming actions will
support its new strategy, rather than limit it. In October 1990,
General Galvin reminded us that MC-14/3 took nearly six years to
write and be approved and that the General Political Guidance for
the employment of Nuclear Weapons took fifteen years. 11 NATO's
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Supreme Allied Commander Europe stated, in addition, that the
NATO process "...has to be completed within a year, or at most a
couple of years."
The Soviets, who have undergone a similar change in military
doctrine and strategy, are anxious that NATO complete this proc-
ess as soon as possible. Soviet Army General Vladimir N.
Lobov, now Chief of their General Staff, stated after attending
an elaboration of the strategy at the Spring 1991 North Atlantic
Assembly session in Rotterdam that, "It is sometimes said in our
country that we are disarming unilaterally and there is no reac-
tion from NATO. This meeting showed once again that such opin-
ions are erroneous."
General Galvin told the International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies in February 1991 that he would present the new
strategy before the Chiefs of Defense staffs of all the nations
at their meeting in April 1991. Later reports indicate that a
draft document "The Strategic Concept of the Alliance" has been
completed and was to be submitted for discussion to the Military
Planning Committee at the end of May 1991 and to the Council the
following November.
The new NATO strategy will be based upon paragraph 2 of the
London Declaration. According to General Galvin' s remarks at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, NATO strategy will
be responsive to peacetime, crisis, and wartime demands. Peace-
time elements will likely include: enumeration of national pre-
rogatives, maintenance of alliance cohesion by integration and
multinational forces, intelligence and verification of arms
control agreements, forward presence, active and reserve forces
training, force generation preparation, and interaction with non-
NATO forces.
The crisis response strategy will likely consider: readiness
for Reaction Forces, the quick reaction of the alliance to emerg-
ing crises, communication with adversaries, planned sharing of
risks and burdens, escalation and deescalation, and preparations
for controlled mobilization and demobilization. New political
realities require an enhanced political component to crises that
erupt in the NATO area. For example, the initial reaction to a
crisis in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic
might include the NATO German Corps deployment including avoid-
ing contact with remaining Soviet troops. The political goals of
a future crisis appears to be to control and deescalate.
NATO strategies will likely not be so strongly based upon
the threat; they will reflect the need to defend NATO member
states territory or NATO interests. If interests are to be
defended, this involves NATO in out-of-area operations—something
the Allies have traditionally been reluctant to formalize as an
Alliance role. There is an open debate on whether NATO should
assume this role, or whether such a role should exist under some
other umbrella organization—or at all? Out-of-area operations
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in Eastern Europe by Reaction Forces has been criticized by the
Soviet media.
There appears to be a definite difference in the use of the
term "reconstitution" by NATO and as envisaged by President Bush
and Secretary Cheney. NATO officials have been talking in terms
of mobilization over a longer period rather than the creation of
wholly new forces. A similar problem exists even in the U.S.
The U.S. Army uses the term "reconstitution" to mean both a
return of operationally deployed units to pre-hostilities levels
of capability as well as to rebuild forces as envisaged by Secre-
tary Cheney.
Reconstitution, as understood in the U.S., makes no sense
unless NATO is prepared to receive the military forces from the
continental U.S. In other words, if the Europeans have no similar
programs in parallel to match a revived Soviet threat, then it is
unlikely that the Bush Administration could gain the support of
the Congress to fund reconstitution in the U.S. There are some
indications that reconstitution against the two-year plus Soviet
threat is a "dead" issue in Europe and, in fact, will not be
funded. 16
^
All of the following actions are necessary: national pro-
gramming planning to deal with future national force levels;
national war planning to outline current plans to commit forces
to NATO and for actions by forces retained under national com-
mand; and NATO war planning to deal with current and future
forces they expect to commit to the Alliance. It ' is very likely
that initially, there will be significant differences between the
strategies articulated for each case.
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The New Soviet Union 1
Underlying any reexamination of America's role in the world
and America's or NATO's basic national security strategy are the
monumental changes in the international security environment in
recent years. Strategies are designed to cope with implied or
explicit threats; the profound changes in the threat, therefore,
have direct bearings on the strategies that the U.S. and NATO
need and will develop.
Has the Soviet threat to the U.S. and NATO gone away? Is
the danger of a superpower war so remote today that we should
shift our strategic planning focus to contingency operations and
non-military threats? Do events in Yugoslavia cause alarm in the
West and raise the specter of a fragmented Soviet empire with
multiple nuclear actors 3 or a central core that lashes out from
its deathbed? Once the breakup of the Soviet empire is complete,
will a new strong central government take its place and will this
one be just as great a threat to the West as the past one? The
danger of war with the USSR still exists, although the type of
war that we have all considered the old main line possible future
war scenario is not nearly as of much interest today as it was a
few years ago.
Military Doctrine
A pre-coup defensive draft Soviet military doctrine and
draft military reform plan, consistent with ,the new doctrine was
openly published and widely discussed in the Soviet and Western
literature. Under the draft doctrine, the USSR renounced war and
the use or threat of military force to settle any political,
economic and ideological differences. The USSR committed itself
"...to not begin military operations (voyennyye geystviya)
against any state..." except in response to an attack.
The draft military doctrine went so far as to state that the
USSR did not regard any people as its enemy, had no territorial
claims, and did not strive for military superiority. The draft
stated that the USSR wanted to reduce armed forces to: "...a
minimum agreed-upon level so that in providing for its defense,
no side would have the means and capabilities for a surprise
attack on the other side and for conducting large-scale offensive
operations." The draft doctrine, however, also reserved the
right of the USSR to make maximum use of any military capabili-
ties for stopping aggression aimed against it or any state allied
with it. The draft doctrine appeared to accept that defense of
the USSR will consist of defensive military operations originat-
ing from within its own territory. It did not state that the
USSR Armed Forces have any defensive mission external to the
homeland.
Both the August 1991 coup and the Soviet view of Operations
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM will affect what happens to the
draft military doctrine and reform—neither of which had been
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fully implemented by the time of the coup. At the time of writ-
ing, it was not totally clear what that affect would be; however,
initial indications from Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov,
the new Soviet Defense Minister are that defensive defense and
the concept of sufficiency will remain intact.
Having published a new military doctrine, the Soviet Union
was undergoing a thorough discussion of its military-technical
aspects. This debate will obviously have to be restaged once
they have identified the new political leadership of the Soviet
Union, or whatever replaces it. This discussion will effect the
reformulation of Soviet military art, strategy, operational art,
and tactics.
Some aspects of the previous draft military doctrine, howev-
er, give a clear indication how the Soviets think about war. For
example, the draft specifically identified the principal military
danger as the high levels of military confrontation, the U.S.
military-political policy of "from a position of strength," and
the presence of foreign military bases and forces around the
territory of the USSR. The draft also stated that the danger of
the initiation of local wars has not been eliminated. The Sovi-
ets do not talk about war in the abstract—they are quite precise
in the types of war that they fear, need to prepare for, and have
dismissed as impermissible in the future.
For example, the major Soviet sociopolitical characteristic
or class of war is a "war in defense of the homeland." Wars are
in defense of national independence are always just wars. Such
wars have not been renounced by the leadership of the Soviet or
Russian governments. Preparation for wars in defense of the
homeland are the objective raison d'etre for all national armed
forces. Even if the USSR breaks up into multiple and capitalis-
tic political actors, there will always be a requirement for the
defense of the homeland.
War involving the USSR is still possible. Figure 3, Soviet
Character/Classification of War, illustrates the various Soviet-
termed sociopolitical characteristics of war and their possibili-
ty in the near future. A "must" rating of probability is given
to wars in defense of the homeland since all nations must plan
for this eventuality, no matter how remote the possibility. A
"high" rating for the internal use of the Soviet military against
its own people is given due to recent events in the USSR. Wars
in support of allies is listed as "declaratory" since the draft
military doctrine specifically states that the USSR reserves the
right to participate in such endeavors.
The Soviets also characterize war by its military-technical
characteristics. For example, war is either global or local.
Traditionally, Soviet military doctrine has assumed that a future
war with the U.S. would automatically assume a global character.
There have always been differences in opinion (in the USSR and
the U.S.) concerning whether a war with the U.S. could or should
be limited to a single theater of origin.
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Another Soviet military-technical characteristic of war is
whether it is nuclear or conventional. Despite Soviet pronounce-
ments that nuclear war can serve no political purpose— implying
that it should not be fought-- a just nuclear war fought in
defense of the homeland is still possible and must be planned for
by the Soviet Armed Forces. Other types of nuclear war that must
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be planned for are: accidental or inadvertent nuclear wars, local
nuclear wars (with China, for example) , and nuclear escalation
out of a crisis. In addition, the Soviets must continue to be
interested in nuclear war as a hedge against the possibility that
their current arms control efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons
by the year 2000 will be unsuccessful. What the Soviet political
leadership actually renounced was not all nuclear war but rather
only nuclear-rocket war on a scale that would equate to a world
war. 8
Figure 4, Soviet Military-Technical Character/Classification
of War, presents the author's judgment of which types of war have
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been renounced or affected by recent political events and which
type have not. The categories that appear in boldface appear to
have been either renounced or made more difficult to execute due
to recent political changes. The implication for U.S. and NATO
politico-military planning is that war between the U.S. or NATO
and the USSR, or whatever replaces it, is still possible and
therefore must be planned for.
Strategic Missions
The major strategic goals and strategic missions of the
Soviet Armed Forces in an armed conflict have been openly dis-
cussed in the Soviet military literature for numerous years.
There is some Soviet literature evidence, however, that these
traditional strategic missions have been revised in accordance
with the new defensive military doctrine. Any changes in U.S.
or NATO military doctrine or strategy must take these new Soviet
strategic missions into account.
Figure 5 graphically depicts these new missions and place
the Soviet Armed Forces within them. Figure 5 shows the connec-
tion from military operations/actions at the strategic-level of
armed conflict to the combat operations/actions at the operation-
al- and tactical-levels. Original Russian words are contained in
parentheses where appropriate to ensure that the reader can
correctly place key phrases in this diagram.
It appears that the traditional strategic missions of the
Soviet Armed Forces, and the criteria for successful completion
of those missions, have undergone significant revision. Former-
ly, total defeat of the enemy's armed forces in an armed conflict
was demanded as the military's contribution to the overall war
effort. Under a defensive doctrine, the revised military re-
quirement is to defeat the invading force and to prevent vertical
and horizontal escalation, or the escalation of the conflict over
time. This change in requirement is a major change in Western
planning assumptions regarding the Soviet threat.
In a November 1989 interview, the late Marshal of the Soviet
Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev offered some very specific views on
how long this defensive period would last. He implied that the
role of the defensive, during the first few weeks of the initial
period of a future war, was to allow the political leadership the
opportunity to terminate the crisis before it erupted into a
major armed conflict and war. If the political leadership
failed, Akhromeyev implied that the military would then be
unleashed to perform their normal function of crushing and deci-
sively routing the enemy. °
The draft defensive doctrine also attempted to deal with
this issue of how long the defensive period would last. It
stated that "defense is the principal form of military operations
with the beginning of aggression. Subsequent operations by the
USSR Armed Forces are determined by the nature of the enemy's
military operations and depend on means and methods of warfare he
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is using." The draft also revealed that the defensive mission of
the Soviet Armed Forces in the event of aggression is to repel
it, defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
create "conditions for the most rapid cessation of war and the
restoration of a just and lasting peace."
A previous debate within the framework of Soviet military
science covering the initial period of a war may prove instruc-
tive on the topic of initial defensive operations today. During
1922-1941, questions arose regarding how long border skirmishes
and diplomatic exchanges would last prior to total mobilization.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi K. Zhukov, in his memoirs,
gives the interwar years planning interval as "several days"
while Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasiley D. Sokolovskiy writes
in his Military Strategy that the initial period might have
lasted 15-20 days. L1
The political/ ideological goal of traditional post World War
II Soviet war termination strategy was to ensure that the aggres-
sor could not again threaten the USSR, and that progress was made
toward eventual peace ("mir") and a world socialist order. The
political goals for war termination are now to prevent nuclear




Army General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, then-Chief of the USSR
Armed Forces General Staff and USSR First Deputy ' Defense Minis-
ter, announced in November 1990, a series of significant Soviet
military reforms that parallel actions being taken by the U.S.,
NATO, and the general European community of nations. 2 Moi-
seyev 's interview was followed by publication of the previously
cited "USSR Ministry of Defense Draft Military Reform Concept."
Although this draft reform plan will be revised in the post-coup
environment, it indicates just how far the former Minister of
Defense, Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, and Chief of the General Staff
were willing to go prior to August 1991.
The first stage of the planned reform was to last until 1994
and consist of the complete redeployment and resettlement of
Soviet troops now based on foreign soil. The second stage (1994-
1995) was to consist of the formulation of strategic groupings of
armed forces on Soviet territory with a new system for training
and mobilization. The third stage was to last from 1996-2000.
In this stage, further reductions, reorganizations, and reequip-
ping of forces will take place.
By the year 2000, according to the draft plan, strategic
nuclear forces were to be cut 50 percent (with additional cuts
possible)
,
ground forces by 10-12 percent, air defense forces by
18-20 percent, air forces by 6-8 percent, and administrative,
research, and other combat forces by 30 percent. The number of
generals to be cut was 1,300, officers 220,000, and warrant
officers and ensigns 250,000. The overall armed forces was to
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number 3-3.2 million personnel—down from 3.9 million. Military
authors tended to tie such drastic reductions to the elimination
of weapons of mass destruction; rendering a military force inca-
pable of conducting offensive strategic operations should not
occur until the total worldwide destruction of all nuclear weap-
ons. 3
The number of nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union possess-
es will fall dramatically. The "sufficiency" of strategic nucle-
ar forces was defined in the draft military doctrine as:
...the nuclear potential necessary for delivering a retalia-
tory strike, the conseguences of which would wipe out any of
the aggressor's advantages; such sufficiency is considered
an intermediate state on the path to the total elimination
of nuclear weapons.
There has been a significant amount of Soviet literature
evidence, since 1987, suggesting that the measure of 400 eguiva-
lent megatons of survivable and deliverable nuclear combat poten-
tial, is not only appropriate for the United States but also for
the USSR. Others have suggested that around 10 per cent of the
existing force to survive START, or around 500-600 weapons is
more appropriate. A real minimal deterrence posture of "tens"
of warheads surfaced early in the debate and appears to have
gained renewed interest. Some spokesman have suggested that the
Gaullist model of a force d'frappe is perhaps appropriate for the
new Russia, initially as a stage enroute to total abolition.
As far as the former Minister of Defense Marshal Yazov was con-
cerned, a fully defensive military doctrine and strategy coul<
only occur in a nuclear-free world! 18
The U.S. Department of Defense stated in as early as Septem-
ber 1990 that "...a short-warning or pre-emptive strategic nucle-
ar attack against the continental United States for the foresee-
able future... is judged to be unlikely." The 1991 National
Security Strategy of the United States stated that: "Despite the
threat still posed by the existence of Soviet nuclear weapons,
the likelihood of their deliberate use by the Soviet state is
declining and the scenario which we freguently projected as th<
precursor of their use—massive war in Europe--is less likely
than at any other time since World War II." 2 Obviously, the
President's unilateral actions in September 1991 to reduce our
nuclear alert rates and operational nuclear forces means that h(
has judged the possibility of a "bolt-from-the-blue" attack by
the USSR to be much lower than before.
However, existing offensive Soviet nuclear forces far exceed
that necessary for delivering a retaliatory strike—even under
the "worst-case" for the USSR. Defensive systems and an aggres-
sive research and development program to improve those defensive
systems are strong evidence that the Soviets have never accepted
the mutual vulnerability reguired under mutual assured destruc-
tion (MAD) . Critics of this excessive Soviet nuclear capability
may have to learn to live with this state of affairs until such
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time as the USSR is able to reduce its force structure. An
offensive-capable Soviet nuclear force does not automatically
indicate an offensive military doctrine or strategy. Critics
should remember that once the U.S. had total strategic nuclear
superiority over the USSR—within an overall defensive military
doctrine and strategy.
Perhaps the most startling "new thinking" about Soviet
military reform was the proposal by a senior Soviet, General-
Major V. Ivanov, attached to the General Staff Academy that
appears to have gained renewed support in the post-coup USSR. In
this proposal, the Armed Forces of the USSR restructure them-
selves into three basic contingents, which show a remarkable
resemblance to President Bush's new national security strategy
and General Powell's Base Force structure. General-Major Ivanov 's
proposal also appears to be entirely consistent with the subse-
quently published draft Soviet military doctrine. The USSR ap-
pears to be discussing its own version of an active, reserve,
and reconstitutable force and strategy.
The first contingent, in General-Major Ivanov' s proposal,
would comprise forces in a state of permanent high combat readi-
ness. It would consist, in part, of new military services called
the Nuclear Forces and Space Forces. The Nuclear Forces would
comprehend the existing Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as
appropriate units from the Air Force and the Navy. Space Forces
would include existing Air Defense and Antisatellite Forces.
These new services would remain under the direct control of the
Supreme High Command.
The first contingent would also consist of highly mobile
Ground Forces, whose strength and composition could change de-
pending upon the international politico-military situation and
the economic potential of the USSR. This force size would be
sufficient to resolve a conflict in an individual region until
relieved by forces of the second contingent. The draft military
doctrine referred to such a concept and specified that: "the
first strategic echelon consists of troops of the border military
districts and fleet forces. Troops of internal military dis-
tricts form the strategic reserve."
Prior to the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, the USSR
deployed slightly more than half (56 percent) of its Ground
Forces divisions, some 170 divisions and 2 brigades (2,901,000
personnel)
,
to the defense of state borders in the Western Thea-
ter of Strategic Military Actions (TVD). 22 The Soviets deployed
56 divisions and 2 brigades in the first echelon of its border-
defense armies. Each first echelon division was responsible for
some 100-120 km of the border when it followed mountains or
rivers and 25-30 km in the most important axes. There were 52
divisions in second echelons and 62 divisions in reserve deployed
some 25-75 km from the state border. The General Staff's May
"1941 State Border Defense Plan" also provided for additional
reserves in interior military districts. These reserve forces
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would be used to deliver counterthrusts and man defensive lines
100-150 km from the new state borders.
The requirement for the future first contingent of Ground
Forces, under General-Major Ivanov's proposal, does not appear to
include the capability for offensive military operations at a
theater strategic-level—hence it will be necessary to compare
the Soviet experiences in the Great Patriotic War with future
force levels. General-Major Ivanov gave estimates for a first
contingent force of only 1.2-1.3 million servicemen allocated
between the Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense and Space
Defense Forces, and the Navy. Command and control would remain
with the High Command of Forces in the TVDs.
The second contingent, according to General-Major Ivanov's
proposal, would consist of an additional 630,000-man reserve
force. Up to 1/3 of the first contingent would form the nucleus
of the second contingent. Hardware and weapons for these re-
serves would be stored at depots and bases. This contingent
would form the large strategic formations necessary for major
military operations in a war. The second contingent could proba-
bly mount an offensive theater strategic military operation—but
before it was organized, strategic warning would be provided.
The third contingent would embrace, in part, some 300,000-
350,000 additional men undergoing between 5-6 months training
for national service. The men would then serve for an additional
5-6 months with either first and second contingent forces, or a
longer period in newly organized republican units, probably
similar to the U.S National Guard. Call-up will take place twice
a year. These forces would augment troops in the field should
war erupt. A second part of the third contingent would consist
of these new republican units. The total strength of the third
contingent would be some 600,000-700,000 servicemen.
General-Major Ivanov's proposal for reorganizing the Soviet
military is but an example of a continuing internal debate over
the programming for new forces. Among the many articles that ap-
peared during this debate was one that was authored by General of
the Army Vladimir N. Lobov—now the Chief of the General Staff
In this article, Lobov was critical of the concepts of defensive
defense envisaged by the draft reforms. Another article by a
civilian academic also criticized the USSR Defense Ministry
"Concept of Military Reform" for being too offensive and failing
to take into account doctrinal, strategy, and force structure
changes going on in the U.S. and other foreign nations. 24
Some other literature evidence provides significant details
on what was visualized by some civilian academics as a defensive
military doctrine— important because military leadership was
involved in the August 1991 coup and may now have to change their
position in the programming debate
—
(emphasis added):
In the area of conventional arms, defense must be not only
and not so much positional as it is mobile. It includes
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meeting engagements, counterstrikes, flanking strikes and a
counteroffensive with the objective of driving an invading
aggressor from one's own territory.
For conventional armed forces, the main indicators are not
only the quantity levels and qualitative characteristics of
weapons but also deployment, structure and strength and
possibilities of strengthening. At the tactical level, the
same divisions, their arms and combat equipment can carry
out offensive as well as defensive operations, whereby both
may be required for defensive strategy. But at the strate-
gic level (that is, at the level of fronts and groups of
forces at the scale of a theater of war) as well, it is
quite possible to delimit offensive and defensive orienta-
tions. If the forces are spread out along a forward edge,
this most likely indicates a defensive strategy. If the
forces are concentrated in strike "fists" in individual
sectors of the front, then one can conclude that there are
offensive plans. .
.
...From the point of view of defense, it is optimum to have
troops at the forward edge deployed along a front (or in
threatened sectors) in fortified defensive lines and an
offensive reserve (second echelon) in the rear for a coun-
terattack so as to close a possible penetration and repel
the enemy. The stronger the defense at the forward edge and
the more serious are the reciprocal measures of the two
alliances to restructure their military potentials under
defensive principles, the smaller is the necessary size of
the counteroffensive force and the deeper it can be deployed
in the rear without causing fear on the other side. .
.
...the mission of the armed forces and conventional arms is
to carry out not offensive strategic operations in the main
theaters of war in Europe and Asia but defensive actions for
the purpose of disrupting the offensive operations of the
enemy; a prolonged conventional war is impossible and the
mission of the armed forces is not to permit a victory of
the enemy in intensive short combat actions and not to allow
nuclear escalation with impunity.
In a startling post-coup article, General Lobov modified his
previous criticisms of the defensive nature of the draft reforms
and embraced a series of actions that strongly resembled those
originally proposed by General-Major Ivanov. ° Lobov stated that
the USSR would have to fundamentally review military doctrine
once again, provide for a cost-effective defensive military that
was not a burden for the country, and account for the new role
for republics. Lobov went so far as to say that the Soviet Union
does "...not regard anyone as an actual enemy..." and that their
"...defensive measures will not cause anyone any anxiety."
Finally, he declared that the Soviet Union would embrace a de-
terrence strategy that hinted at punishment rather than denial of
war aims as the method.
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The debate is not over, however, and many military leaders
today retain their "old thinking" from the days that they were
first socialized into the Army and it is this type of thinking
that we would have to face if there was a war today. During the
Civil War, the Red Army was forced to use former Tsarist officers
because they were the only Russians who had been trained and
educated in military strategy. Even if the USSR breaks up into
multiple republics with independent armed forces, it is likely
that a majority of the officers in those armed forces will have
been educated in and retain an affection for the "old" Soviet
military strategy and thinking.
Impact on Western Theater of Strategic Military Actions
It is also appropriate to analyze the impact of these
changes on the Soviet Commander-in-Chief of the Western TVD. NATO
is aware of the capabilities of Soviet hardware, military exer-
cises and deployment, and military-technical aspects of military
doctrine, indicating a real strategy and capability for offensive
warfare by the Western TVD Commander. Employing this offensive
capability was termed, by the Soviets, a theater strategic mili-
tary operation. The Manchurian Operation they fought against
Japan near the end of World War II strongly resembled the theater
strategic operation of which we believed the Soviets capable of
recently. 27
In the Western TVD, initial offensive military operations by
a front were assumed to achieve advance rates of 4 0-60 kilometers
per day to a depth of 600-800 kilometers. A normal frontal
operation lasted about 15-20 days, meaning that overall, two
fronts should have handled all of Western Europe in about 25-30
days. NATO took this threat seriously and prepared its own
forces and counterstrategy accordingly.
It is not clear whether the Soviets ever saw themselves as
the fierce warriors the West did. They had a much clearer pic-
ture of deficiencies in the military-industrial sector, that have
only now become apparent to the West. They recognized the incip-
ient problems if they attempted a theater-wide military operation
with a simultaneous surge effort by multiple fronts. It is
doubtful that they even felt capable of managina such a theater
strategic offensive using sequential operations.
With the nagging self-doubt in their ability to manage a
theater strategic military operation before the sweeping recent
political changes in Europe, the problems are infinitely more
complicated, with the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal
of Soviet forces from Germany, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic. Even if Soviet forces remain in Poland for a
few years, the Western TVD Commander cannot count on former-
Warsaw Pact nations committing their armed forces to Soviet
command. Indeed, the Western TVD Commander probably assumes that
Eastern European military forces would oppose a Soviet forced
reentry.
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The Western TVD Commander cannot advise his political lead-
ership that, under current or likely future conditions, it is
possible to launch offensive military operations at the theater-
strategic-level, against Europe with any degree of confidence in
successfully completing his assigned mission. The Western TVD
Commander is probably driving his staff to develop new plans for
the defense of the USSR from within their own borders and perhaps
their forced and opposed reentry into Eastern Europe.
These observations made about the Western TVD dovetail
remarkably with the draft Soviet military doctrine and the draft
military reform. We have often seen Soviet deeds belie Soviet
words, when they previously spoke of a defensive doctrine but
clearly maintained forces for an offensive strategy. The Soviet
Union is moving towards re-positioning all its ground forces
within its borders, absorbing the first blow from an adversary,
then having the capability and military strategy to repel the
invasion to the Soviet border but not cross and continue the
counteroffensive in enemy territory.
If NATO, or its member nations, finds themselves in an armed
struggle with the USSR (under any circumstances) , do they know
what their new political goals will be? For example, should the
West have military plans, in the event of an armed struggle, to
overthrow the existing border republic governments? Would the
Soviets try to do this to its former allies, now neighbors, in
the new national security environment? Can either side use its
military forces to achieve that objective anymore?
New Roles for the Soviet Navy
It is to land-oriented military strategy that we must first
look to in order to properly understand Soviet Navy roles and
missions. Soviet Navy roles and missions have been recast in
terms of the new defensive doctrine and strategy. What this
means for the Soviet Navy is that first-strike damage limitation
by nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines is disavowed and
that the fleet will conduct defensive fleet operations (oper-
atsii) in bastions which may even be closer to the shore than we
once assumed.
It is fairly obvious to see the impact of the withdrawal of
the Soviet Armed Forces from Eastern Europe and the specific
reductions in Ground and Air Forces on land warfare capabilities.
It will also be fairly obvious to see the impact on nuclear
strategy of the negotiated and coming other reductions in nuclear
forces. It will not, however, be quite so easy to understand the
new roles and missions for the Soviet Navy and we have already
seen some of the Western sea services—and especially retired
officer community—to argue that the threat at sea is still
there, no matter what is going on ashore.
If the shift to defensive strategy truly involves the Soviet
Navy, then we should see evidence in the form of hardware empha-
sizing antisubmarine warfare helicopters, short- or mid-range
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land-based naval aviation, and small coastal patrol ships instead
of long-range Bear F aircraft, aircraft carriers, and supporting
open-ocean battle groups. The Soviet (or Russian) Navy should
immediately end its forward deployments of naval forces that can
be construed by the West as being "first-strike" nuclear forces
targeted against the U.S., its overseas bases, or its allies.
Despite the lack of significant change in fleet hardware to
date, we must consider that without a capability to consolidate
victory ashore, the offensive Soviet Navy that we see today can
be construed as a "defensive" force. Just how offensive is it
anyway, without significant sea-based air power and at sea sus-
tainability? Remember, the most offensive naval force ever
amassed, the U.S. Navy, is understood without guestion to be part
of an overall defensive military strategy. Despite our might at
sea, NATO armies were simply capable of the type of defense that
the Soviets are moving towards—repulse of the aggressor and
restoration of prewar borders. The military-technical character-
istics of war include its pace; hence there will be a reguirement
for the conducting of both short and long wars, although there
may be funding shortfalls for the more expensive long war.
Navies are a hedge against the long war.
Implications for the West
The message for the West is that if reorganization plans
like this are implemented, and reductions in military capability
include strategic nuclear and naval forces in the future, then
Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's promise to eliminate the
threat has come true. The changes in strategy envisaged by Presi-
dent George Bush and by NATO are appropriate under such an inter-
national security environment.
Even if the Soviets are found to be cheating on the margin
with regard to Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and
other future arms control and confidence building measures in
Europe, we should ask ourselves if they are in the position to
once again mount the old theater strategic offensive operation?
When confronted with that guestion, CFE "cheating" may more
correctly be seen as an inability to provide exact numbers and
locations which will be corrected when reguested. When testi-
fying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 25,
1991, General Galvin, U.S. Army, stated that two-thirds of all
the Soviet military eguipment moved east of the Urals, which have
been described as non-complying, has been left to rust if not
already partially or totally destroyed.
Learning how the Russians think and calculate the correla-
tion of forces and means and coefficient of control must be of
the highest priority to our intelligence community. They will
then face the arduous task of explaining the Soviet perceptions
to political and military decision makers who will not be as
aware of the differences and will be tempted themselves to auto-
matically "mirror image." If the Soviets appear to be oriented
toward output measures, dynamic assessments, and other complicat-
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ed non-Western measures, then we must deal with these measures as
the Soviets or Russians see them. We must now consider the
questions stemming from "what if peace?"
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Issues For Discussion
The issues raised in the President's Aspen speech are numer-
ous, complex, and require discussion. Among the most important
are: how likely is the President's new national security strategy
to appeal and take hold; how do we define our new goals and
objectives for both program and war planning; what are the last-
ing impacts of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM; what
are the new requirements for the intelligence community and for
decision-making? What is reconstitution? What are the invest-
ment strategy and industrial aspects of the new national security
strategy: research and development, technology requirements, and
the impact on stockpiles? Answers to these questions will cer-
tainly have an immense impact upon Department of Defense organi-
zations and the need for a special transition period. Finally,
there are obvious implications for arms control and military
operations research and analysis. This section responds to the
obvious questions, and perhaps suggests what else might be in-
cluded.
Is the New Strategy Real? 1
It may be instructive to review another Presidential unveil-
ing of a major programming strategy to seek parallels. When
President Ronald Reagan announced his concept for SDI in March
1983 he explained how the U.S. and its allies planned to defend
themselves against an attack by Soviet intercontinental ballistic
missiles. Both President Reagan's and Bushes speeches unveiling
their new strategic concepts were just that; visions of a new
strategy to be debated and possibly adopted—not necessarily an
announcement of new governmental policy.
The strategy associated with SDI would be possible only if
the Congress purchased the weapons systems associated with it.
It would have been wrong to assume that current U.S. or NATO
strategy was immediately changed to defend the U.S. against
intercontinental ballistic missiles, since neither the U.S. nor
its allies had defensive forces which could engage such mis-
siles.
Just as in 1990, in 1983 there occurred a series of brief-
ings and speeches by supporting officials following the Presi-
dent's vision of a new defense doctrine. Then-Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger delivered a major speech explaining the
basic concept. A Blue-Ribbori panel of experts was commissioned
to study the possible applications of technology to the strategy4
and initial results of their deliberations began leaking to the
public in late 1983. Not until the programming documents were
delivered to Congress in February 1984 was the strategy for
defense of homeland and allies under SDI fleshed out in official
documents. Indeed, strategic defenses in the previous set of
programming documents provided no hint that a new initiative was
being contemplated.
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Unlike the 1990 case, in 1983 the civilian academic communi-
ty appeared to mobilize almost instantaneously and publish both
supporting and critical assessments of the new doctrine, mostly
newspaper Op-Ed pieces. It was months later before the public
saw more comprehensive treatments of the strategy and associated
technologies. There was widespread interest in the technologies
associated with SDI, primarily because of the opportunities for
procurement business with the government and opportunities to
work in the vanguard of science. What is less well recognized,
however, was the great deal of "study money" used to flesh out
the strategic concepts.
We should assume that President Bush's Aspen speech will
also lead to substantial "study money" to flesh out the concepts
he discussed. What remains to be seen is whether the studies
will be completed before 1991 budget actions or faster than
significant international events unfold. Recent events in the
Middle East shelved or sidetracked much internal examination of
the new national security strategy and the expected critical
evaluation from those outside government.
Under the American form of government, the announcement of a
policy by the Administration is not necessarily an announcement
of government policy. Indeed, SDI, although feared and attacked
by the Soviet Union, and probably the cause for major decisions
in the Soviet budget, never developed beyond an initiative, and
full-scale evolution or deployment may not yet be feasible. On
the other hand, the Bush Administration has been successful in
working with the key power bases in Washington td push policies
through with a minimum of debate.
Another case of a new strategic vision is also instructive.
Both candidates George Bush and Michael Dukakis appeared to
embrace the "competitive strategies initiative" during the last
presidential campaign. The Annual Report to the Congress by the
Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Years 1987 through 1989 included
sections devoted to competitive strategies. Competitive strate-
gies also appear in the 1987 edition of the White House's Nation-
al Security Strategy of the United States and in the United
States Military Posture FY f Fiscal Yearl 1988 . prepared by the
Joint Staff. Competitive strategies, still an initiative, has
never attained full policy status in the Executive branch of
government and receives barely a mention in the 1991 annual
posture statement by the Secretary of Defense. Despite having an
extremely powerful weapon to use against the USSR today, the
economic weapon, the West is not only not using this weapon but
is actively trying to bail out the Soviet Union.
In short, before any new initiative becomes a funded govern-
ment policy, vested domestic interests and America's allies will
have opportunities to make their desires known. Whether they
succeed in becoming a player in shaping America's new national
security strategy and Base Force structure will depend upon their
political prowess.
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Parliamentary governments, common among our NATO allies, may
have some advantage in completing a comprehensive review of
strategy and redirection of defense programs. Hence, it may be
easier for NATO nations to respond to this U.S. initiative and
international events than it will for the U.S. to take action.
A good example of the verities of parliamentary forms of
government, compared to the American government, in making major
defense policy changes, is the review of the master strategy for
Australian defense forces conducted from 1985-1987. In February
1985, the Australian Minister of Defense, Kim Beazley, employed
noted strategist Paul Dibb to examine the current capabilities of
the Australian Defense Force, describe the current strategic
environment, set defense priorities and strategy, and define the
appropriate future force structure.
Dibb issued his report in March 1986 and, after an adequate
period for analysis and criticism, the government issued its own
version in March 1987. 8 Concepts first outlined by Dibb were
adopted by the Australian government, after a serious but brief
(by American standards) debate and adjustment. They were then
carried out by the Ministry of Defense and the Australian Defense
Forces. Such a relatively orderly process seldom occurs in the
U.S., and we should not expect debate over the President's new
national security strategy to remain either bloodless or limited
to American domestic political actors.
Defining Goals and Objectives in Programming and War Planning;10
Political-military strategic planning generally commences
with: (1) , a tabulation of the resources likely to be available,
or (2), an assessment of the threat, or (3), an examination of
the goals and objectives to be attained. The planning process
can start with any of these factors but it generally starts with
different ones, depending upon the type of planning underway—war
planning for immediate combat operations or program planning for
budgeted forces to be delivered in the future.
In wartime, planning often starts with a tabulation of the
resources available
—
probably how the military started the proc-
ess on December 8, 1941 after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
put significant portions of the Pacific Fleet out of action.
Existing plans for war with Japan had to be revised based upon
the numbers and types of surviving forces. Initial goals were
limited by the resources available.
In wartime, nations may also turn first to an examination
and analysis of the threat, especially when faced with the need
to create major strategic plans insufficiently researched before
the war. The USSR likely did this after the Germans invaded on
June 22, 1941. Prior to being invaded by Germany, insufficient
attention had been paid to fighting the Germans on Soviet soil on
the strategic defensive. The Soviet military was forced to
develop plans in short order and execute them according to a
revised threat scenario.
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War planning may also start with an examination, analysis,
and reconsideration of goals and objectives. The U.S. and the
Soviet Union had initial goals and objectives they attempted to
achieve in the initial stages of World War II. Generally these
were limited by the newly revised resources available and the
actual threat demonstrated by enemy capability. Later, however,
the allies amassed sufficient forces to operate on the strategic
offensive in all theaters and recognized that "unconditional
surrender" was a possible goal. War plans could then be devised
with primary consideration given to goals and objectives rather
than resources and the threat. This also underscores that goals
and objectives can, and often do, change during wars.
Much of the literature devoted to defense planning does not,
however, concern actual war planning, but rather program plan-
ning, used to explain to legislators and the public why certain
types of weapons systems and forces should be purchased and
maintained. There is often some overlap between the initial
program plans and subseguent program plans—but not always. For
example, the USS MIDWAY was justified in 194 0s programming plans
to help defeat Japan. War plans in the 1980s included the USS
MIDWAY defending Japan. Similarly, program plans after March
1983 included SDI but war plans written that year could not.
Program planning under the Planning, Programming, and Budg-
eting System (PPBS) , in the U.S., officially starts with an
examination and identification of the threat. There have always
been implicit unofficial discussions of the rang'e of resources
available and a general consensus on goals that preceded the
threat examination. The consensus on goals is what is being
discussed in the President's new national security strategy.
Current U.S. and Soviet program planning has been drastical-
ly affected by the change in perceptions of the threat facing
them. After decades of reliance on military preparedness to
guarantee peace, each side apparently understands that what it
considered reasonable steps for self-defense were perceived by
the other side as evidence of aggressive intentions. The
American public, and therefore the Congress, has revised their
world view, and let it be known that the levels of programming
expenditure devoted to the Soviet threat are no longer required.
It seems that the major driving factor behind the President's new
programming strategy is the need to present a viable plan to
maintain national defense in a climate of greatly reduced re-
sources.
Program planning logically should start with goals and
objectives but, in the past, this has rarely occurred. In gener-
al, a fundamental reexamination of goals and objectives has not
been necessary given the generally stability of politico-military
relations between the superpowers. Due to the major changes in
the international political climate, we should also expect to see
the U.S. debate whether its program (or even wartime) planning
should include unilateral capabilities, or automatically assume
72
standing alliance or ad hoc coalitions and host-nation-support.
There is a tremendous difference in programming based upon the
assumptions made on this question.
Although the U.S. and NATO never had the opportunity to
develop war plans a milieu that included forces envisaged under
SDI, there is no need to delay immediate revisions of war plans
for existing forces. There are significant changes in the inter-
national environment, especially the threat, and an urgent need
to reduce defense expenditures—hence plans can be changed now.
According to the National Security Strategy of the United States ,
we have apparently already begun to alter the planned employment
of strategic nuclear forces.
We should be addressing the need to target facilities and
forces in nations that clearly are no longer enemies? It is a
fair assumption that we once targeted Soviet nuclear forces
deployed in Eastern Europe. Presumably, we have technical ways to
preclude nuclear warheads from exploding in the former German
Democratic Republic now that this territory is part of a NATO
member nation. We should apply common sense to the nuclear
targeting of other national areas. Soviet nuclear forces are
deployed in only four Soviet republics: Russia, the Ukraine,
Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. 2
What political benefit would be gained from targeting areas
where restless nationalities are already struggling against the
national (Union) government in the USSR? Will the Soviet mili-
tary assume that these areas and Eastern Europe are "safe
havens?" Will the USSR create targeting plans for areas in
formerly allied nations? Can both sides change their targeting
fast enough to respond to rapidly changing political events? Do
we have to render inoperative certain warheads in missiles with
multiple warheads to both meet our objectives of destroying
military targets yet avoiding collateral damage?
The Soviet press covered an initial and limited report in
the Washington Post that the Strategic Air Command and Pentagon
have revised the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) to
delete 1,000 targets in Eastern Europe. According to Soviet
sources, the new plan, termed SIOP-7, "hastily" deleted these
targets last year. Another, more in-depth, discussion of the
major shift in U.S. targeting is contained in a later Washington
Post report. 14 This shift in targeting strategy was severely
criticized in the Soviet media for not having gone far enough in
reflecting the changed political circumstances in the world.
According to President Bush's September 1991 address to the
nation, we will immediately lower our alert posture and reduce
our operational strategic nuclear forces—necessitating addition-
al major changes to existing nuclear war plans.
When assessing the possible targets for nuclear weapons in
an actual war, the key considerations should be: the political
objectives of the war; the required military campaigns and ac-
tions that are necessary to achieve strategic goals expected to
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attain these objectives; the time schedule by which one hopes to
meet these goals; and the price that one is willing to pay in
order to achieve them.
The ability to dominate the decision to escalate vertically,
horizontally, in time, or to another medium of warfare, is a
significant political advantage that the U.S. gave up in the
1960's. It is also an advantage that we chose not to once again
seek, attainable perhaps following the end of the Cold War and in
the aftermath of the August 1991 coup in the USSR. In fighting a
future war, the U.S. will probably be unable to dominate the
escalation decision and thereby control escalation or war termi-
nation. The U.S. should not allow actions to be taken during the
conventional phase of a future war that would place the Soviet
Union into a position where it can do so.
In the conventional realm, there is an obvious, immediate
need to revise existing war plans—since NATO now controls both
sides of the Fulda Gap. Indeed, General Galvin told the Defense
Planning Committee that "it is clear that the old General Defense
Plan is useless, and I have already rescinded it." NATO has now
been asked for assistance to defend a member nation, Turkey, from
a non-Warsaw Pact threat— Iraq. Did plans for that contingency
exist? There are obvious components to conventional war planning
that should be revisited and need not await programming deci-
sions.
Conventional war planners also should be changing the focus
of their efforts, from the "big" war with the USSR, to the re-
gional contingencies outlined in the 1991 Joint Military Net
Assessment . War planners have traditionally devoted most of
their efforts to planning for the most demanding and least likely
scenarios—they should now devote the bulk of their efforts to
the most likely and less demanding. This redirection will not
come easily and may require different types of expertise. New
contingency plans are needed soon so that program planners can
have Commander-in-Chief inputs to force requirements, i.e. the
forces desired for contingencies may not be the same as we pro-
cured for the "big" war.
Conventional war planning in the U.S., unlike nuclear war
planning, has generally been done by professional military
forces, without significant direct civilian involvement. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the warfighting Com-
manders-in-Chief should reconsider this situation and seek active
interaction with the civilian community to make meaningful con-
tributions and immediate changes to conventional war planning.
Specifically, strategists, political scientists, area stud-
ies specialists, economists, etc., probably can all provide the
military immediate assistance and advice to adjust current plan-
ning scenarios and war and contingency plans. The military tradi-
tionally has performed this task in-house, but with the phenome-
nal changes in the international security environment and the
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preoccupation of the bureaucracy with Operations DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM, assistance from the "outside" may be required.
Most "experts" in strategic planning have been educated and
worked with a fundamental assumption being an implied threat that
no longer exists. Put another way, if our fundamental threats
are economic and non-Soviet, the government needs to supplement,
or replace, its Soviet and European-oriented strategic planners
with those whose expertise lies elsewhere. Complicating this
problem is the current lack of education and experience in the
skills of politico-military strategic planning by most economists
and non-Soviet or European area specialists.
Left to their own devices, the bureaucracy may be tempted to
ensure that current war plans support planned future programs and
the existing organizational structure. Many civilian "outsiders"
who could help are the numerous government employee faculty
members at the war colleges, service academies, research labora-
tories, and similar institutions. These individuals are not from
"outside" the government and many have requisite security clear-
ances and a great deal of expertise.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff already recognizes
that a revolution has occurred in the international security
environment which requires the immediate transfusion of expertise
from the civilian community to the military. We cannot afford
the indulgence of waiting for new officers who recently studied
these affairs, to cycle through the graduate education and war
college processes; nor is the contracting and consulting communi-
ty the government's best source for new ideas. This involvement
by civilians in military affairs already occurs with nuclear
program and war planning, and general forces program planning.
Although proposals for such involvement from individuals within
the Pentagon have been made before, they have always been
defeated.
NATO nations and the USSR should intermix their civilian
academic communities with military planners. It is my experience
that some other armed forces and perhaps even the intelligence
communities are more comfortable with this model than is the
American or Soviet military. This is not the time to draw dis-
tinctions between who should be involved in the debate over
fundamental goals and objectives. In World War II, the U.S. and
allied armed services drafted, or otherwise secured, the services
of academics who had years of area experience that the military
lacked. The social, political, and economic upheavals in the
world have not been seen by the existing bureaucracy. Now is the
time to repeat the involvement of outsiders.
An alternative model would be for the military to allow or
invite the political leaders of their nations to dictate the
revised goals and objectives. While there are some political
leaders and many advisors available to discuss and decide nuclear
strategy issues intelligently, most civilian leaders lack the
requisite background in conventional warfare to know what is
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possible and what is not. The military perspective is that the
military must participate in the debate. The military should
also involve civilian specialists in areas from which they tradi-
tionally have been excluded.
In addition to these questions, we should address the type
of individual involved in this major overhaul of the defense
planning assumptions? The military should provide individuals
who can both represent service interests and capabilities and
appreciate the task at hand. This exercise cannot be just anoth-
er interagency meeting, with compromise likely and one service
holding the entire process hostage to their threats or objec-
tions.
This review will have serious repercussions in existing
force structures and established plans for future forces. It is
going to hurt, and will require officer participants willing to
place their allegiance to country ahead of combat arms or service
parochialism. These individuals exist in the peacetime services,
generally already networking outside of official channels. 8
Perhaps we could review our entire system for training and edu-
cating weapons systems acquisition managers, and more fully inte-
grate basic political science type issues that were assumed
constant in the past.
Problems with the quality of Department of Defense strategic
planning and personnel have been discussed frequently. They
should have been solved by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and two
administrations committed to implement this legislation. The
fundamental review of national military strategy will severely
test this assumption. The low level of inter-service infighting
made public over Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM indi-
cates that there has been success in this area.
Past problems occurred at all levels: with political ap-
pointees, within the services, or both. Some political appointees
have caused problems because of their relative inexperience, high
turnover rates, and lengthy vacancies. The position of Under
Secretary of Defense (Policy) during the Reagan Administration
remained unfilled for an extended period following the resigna-
tion of Dr. Fred Ikle. Past friction between the experienced
military and the relatively inexperienced political appointee
could be exacerbated when those political appointees preside over
the wholesale dismantling of a military machine that senior
officers spent their entire careers building and defending.
Impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM19
A decade ago, when the U.S. initially prepared contingency
plans for its Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, many observers
feared that the deployment of significant military forces to the
Middle East would move forces simultaneously committed to the
defense of Europe. War planners feared an outbreak of hostili-
ties in the Western TVD at the same time U.S. forces were arriv-
ing in Southwest Asia. That nightmare would tax America's capa-
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bility to redeploy forces, or deploy forces remaining in North
America, to Europe in time to influence the war. Despite some
541,000 U.S. personnel deployed in early 1991 to Southwest Asia,
and the new force levels associated with the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaty, there was a dearth of commentary from
Europeans worried about this issue. If we could afford to place
more combat troops in the Middle East than we had in Europe at
the height of the Cold War, should we not assume that European
NATO nations have accepted the diminution of those forces in
Europe to deter a war today?
Operation DESERT SHIELD demonstrated that the U.S. could
muster sufficient assets from the continental U.S. to meet a
major contingency where there were no forces in being. Indeed,
General Powell drew this parallel as early as December 1990 in
both his speeches at the Royal United Services Institute for
Defence Studies and the Armed Forces Communications and Electron-
ics Association. Brigadier General Daniel W. Christman, U.S.
Army, Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy for the U.S. Army
Staff, has also drawn a parallel between Operation DESERT SHIELD
and our new contingency-based strategy. Interestingly, he cred-
its former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William
J. Crowe, U.S. Navy, with initiating the current redirection of
U.S. national security strategy.
The initial deployment of forces in Operation DESERT SHIELD
also seemed to demonstrate that such a force does not reguire
basing overseas in Europe, although additional forces were rede-
ployed from Europe and other locations to the Middle East. The
developed ports, airfields and petroleum available in Saudi
Arabia and the geographic vulnerability of Iraq may not be con-
venient at future contingency locations, let alone such an exem-
plary villain or six unmolested months to build up forces—cau-
tioning us to exercise caution in using these Operations as
models for the future. It will take careful analysis of Opera-
tions DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM to make a definitive state-
ment on the issue--but we should review the President's new
national security strategy and the associated force structure now
that these Operations have run their course.
Some initial studies of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT
STORM purport to also analyze what they term as "the U.S. mili-
tary's new regional contingencies strategy," without demonstrat-
ing that they have fully internalized the implications of the
President's new national security strategy. Instead, they often
refer to previous studies and make prescriptive recommendations
rather than really analyzing the consequences of what has been
charted by the Bush Administration. 21 The first official Depart-
ment of Defense reports on these Operations concentrate on the
military conduct of the conflict rather than their impact on the
new national security strategy.
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM after-action reports will try
to ascertain which systems appeared to make a difference in the
political and military outcome? Successful use of the PATRIOT
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anti-missile system has already suggested to many the value of
antiballistic missile (ABM) systems for the continental U.S.
"
The corollary to this old lesson is that events of seemingly
little military import, i.e. the launching of an Iraqi SCUD
missile, can have an enormous political significance that demands
military action.
Systems that did not make a major contribution to Operation
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM should be reevaluated for upgrad-
ing, cancellation, or replacement. Under the new national secu-
rity strategy to reconstitute capabilities useful in a Europe-
centered global war with the USSR, there will be no need to
retain systems that do not have a dual-use in the Contingency
Force.
There appear to be a number of obvious areas for research
concerning lessons learned. Among the more obvious are whether a
land campaign was truly required, or could our objectives have
been accomplished with airpower alone? Since the destruction of
Iraq's nuclear weaponry figured so high in the American public's
support for Operation DESERT STORM, should we continue to consid-
er nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the same warfare
category, or, single out nuclear weapons as the most important?
Are reserve air forces staffs needed if they will never be de-
ployed?
What lessons do the Soviets claim they have learned from our
experience? Both sides will obviously study the lessons learned,
especially of the Air Campaign, and see if adjustments to mili-
tary art are required. If the lessons are that significant, we
can expect to not only see the U.S. consider revisions to the new
national security strategy, but also the Soviet Union start their
internal military doctrine debate anew. At least one major
lesson should have been learned by the USSR; that the politico-
military behavior of the U.S. cannot be predicted (responding to
the threat to Saudi Arabia with troops and public support for
that response to include an offensive military campaign) . Even
in retrospect, most politically-aware American "experts" still
would not have predicted the Bush Administration's actions and
public support for those actions during the events in the Persian
Gulf.
There is a significantly reduced life expectancy for the
equipment used in the desert for the recent Operations. Should
the reserves be reduced as a result of the new national security
strategy and Base Force, what do we do with the excess equipment?
Another significant impact of Operation DESERT STORM will be a
significant alteration in the resources assumed to be available
for defense programming. When the new national security strategy
and Base Force were initially discussed by staffs in Washington,
planners simply could not have known the level of military activ-
ities that would be undertaken shortly in the Middle East, the
need to replenish stocks of war materials and equipment, and the
costs involved with cleaning sand from our equipment, mobilizing
reserves and providing for post-conflict veteran's entitlements
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—to name a few. In essence, if the driving force for the new
national security strategy was a realization that defense dollars
will decrease, then DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM may add to the
problem.
New Requirements for Intelligence
The changes suggested by the Bush Administration, if accept-
ed by the U.S. Congress, will place an enormous burden on the
intelligence community. Although one might argue that logically,
concomitant with such fundamental changes intelligence appropria-
tions should increase, it is probable that they will decrease
like defense spending.
President Bush's Aspen remarks are programming remarks and
do not reflect changes in the current defense plans for the U.S.
or U.S. forces which would fight today under NATO. The intelli-
gence community should provide all of their traditional services
until the new international security environment takes hold.
This action should satisfy critics who will complain that we are
overlooking the Soviet threat or that the events that we see in
the USSR are simply a ruse or represent an attempt to secure a
breathing space prior to a massive rearmament. In short, there
is a current intelligence requirement that remains well focused
on the existing Soviet threat.
In addition to providing intelligence products concerning
the USSR to support current war planning, the intelligence commu-
nity must also provide new products to support programming for
the future Atlantic Force. For example, we need quick, rough
answers to approximations of how much the USSR will devote in the
future, or is devoting, to defense, given other needs. Naturally,
the intelligence community has been attempting to provide this
information all along but, with new information available, we can
perhaps refine our assessments. Similarly, we need to identify
the new international goals and objectives that serve as the
requirements for future Soviet forces. Perhaps the time has come
to game jointly, with the USSR, the deescalation of crises.
Before dismissing this suggestion out of hand, the reader is
reminded that General Powell did not rule out the possibility of
joint exercises with the Soviet Armed Forces when he and Army
General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, former Chief of the Soviet General
Staff, were interviewed by American Broadcasting Company newsman
Ted Koppel on "Nightline, " July 25, 1991. If we do international
wargaming with the USSR, we will need to "game the game" before-
hand to not give away more than we expect to learn.
Most of the U.S. and NATO national intelligence communities
are oriented toward understanding and countering the Soviet
threat. Although it took many years, the West eventually grew
sophisticated at understanding the Soviet perspective on doc-
trine, strategy, arms control, and the like. Our intelligence
agencies and associated policy offices are substantially less
competent at analyzing, predicting behavior, and conducting net
assessments for the rest of the world. Obviously that situation
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is already remedying itself vis-a-vis Iraq, but there remain many
areas of the world for which this conclusion is true. The Con-
tingency Force will need strong supporting intelligence capabili-
ties.
We need more in-depth intelligence capabilities for wide-
ranging areas of the world. Deficiencies should be corrected, and
quickly. Can the intelligence community prepared to provide
players in seminar and war games who can represent the behavior
of nations other than our traditional enemies? The failure by
the U.S. to capture North Vietnamese behavior with "red" team
players in late 1960s - early 1970s politico-military war games
has been addressed before. We recently felt comfortable enough
with our knowledge of the USSR to create artificial intelligence-
like models to represent Soviet behavior in expert systems that
substituted machine actions for human behavior. Are we ready to
do this for non-Soviet actors?
Flexibility is essential in shifting intelligence assets
from one set of collection targets to rapidly emerging priority
targets to support the contingency response element of the Presi-
dent's new national security strategy. Continued unimpeded
access to space underlies support for the use of American mili-
tary forces and has been identified by General Powell as one of
the key supporting capabilities.
Intelligence activities include more than collection and
analysis. There is the arcane area of counterintelligence; ac-
tions taken to thwart the activities of foreign intelligence
services. As the Soviet military withdraws from Eastern Europe,
their overt military intelligence collection efforts will suffer,
forcing a shift to covert programs. For many reasons, the U.S.
prefers to categorize its own covert action; i.e. intelligence
support to foreign intelligence services, political actions,
propaganda, and paramilitary actions, as an intelligence function
rather than within the routine province of statecraft. Are the
Western intelligence services ready for expanded counterintelli-
gence and covert action in areas that have traditionally not been
in the limelight?
As the U.S. withdraws its military forces from overseas and
reduces its presence, there also will be a concomitant reduction
in available military intelligence. The loss of these sources
must be matched by new collection efforts. The Director of Naval
Intelligence told the Congress, in March 1991, that: "It is time
to rediscover classic intelligence collection using legal travel-
ers, emigres, elicitation, the attache system, industry, acade-
mia, area expertise, and 'open sources'."
As the intelligence community re-enters areas, it will have
to make some adjustments in how it does business. Formerly, when
intelligence analysts differed, the debate could be settled by a
re-assessment of the data. With political and economic intelli-
gence, it is often the methodology rather than the data that
settles disputes.
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We have to build capabilities to match our stated need for
new types of information. Economic and other forms of strategic
intelligence, for example, may become relatively more important
than extremely costly technical intelligence systems designed to
provide tactical warning. This fact has not gone unnoticed by
the Soviet Union. 29 On the other hand, from published U.S.
reports, the Department of Defense is avoiding any entry into
economic intelligence. The net impact of the President's new
national security strategy is that the intelligence community may
have to undergo a fundamental reexamination of its missions and
priorities.
The U.S. possesses an excellent intelligence community which
will need fine tuning and some redirection but is capable of
providing the government with all the necessary assessments. To
involve the intelligence community with additional tasking in
economic analysis will challenge the community, and it should be
done only with the full cooperation of existing organizations
outside of government. The challenges of providing two-years and
other forms of warning should not be allowed to degenerate into a
debate over the track record of the intelligence community. The
nation will need a discrete list of data required to provide such
warning, and the political process will determine whether the
resources can, or will, be made available.
Requirements for Decision-Making 3 -*•
NATO used to talk in terms of a few days warning (the time
to detect an invasion) and another few days for decision. Mobi-
lization and return of initial American troops and air forces
from the continental U.S. to Europe would take around 10 days.
Hence the canonical 14-day scenario arose, with enormous effort
devoted to the assessment of theater-strategic operations and
campaigns to be fought by forces that could be brought to bear.
We became adept at calculating theater-wide force ratios for the
first 30 or 45 days of a war in Europe.
The question arises: how long would it take the Soviets to
regain a position to cause the U.S. worry about a European crisis
that could escalate to warfare and perhaps be over within a month
and a half? Similarly, how long does the Soviet military feel
that it would need to respond to an unanticipated rebuilding of
Western military potential in Europe?
The March 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment asserts that in
the event of a superpower crisis, the prime programming assump-
tion is that armed conflict will not occur for at least 24
months. This is not equivalent to assuming that we will have
two-year's strategic warning and response time; warning might be
provided and ignored, or warning signs might not be recognized.
For programming purposes, however, U.S. planners should assume
that the old theater strategic operation, or a surge operational-
strategic-level attack across the old inter-German border with
the Pyrenees as goal, could not be mounted without the U.S.
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intelligence community obtaining and understanding indicators two
years in advance.
For program planning, we also assume that during this two
year period, the U.S. can reconstitute forces for defense of
Europe while the Soviets are doing the same for their offensive
capability. During that time, we assume that we can re-build
forces and materials instead of maintaining them on active duty,
in the Ready Reserves, or prepositioned in Europe. U.S. forces
reconstituted for a major war in Europe need only be adeguate to
deter or defend against a Soviet attack--not launch a theater
strategic offensive operation.
In short, the need for the old, massive, short-term (14 -day)
mobilization has diminished. The threat planning assumption that
once drove NATO toward a two-week mobilization reguirement has
been replaced with a threat assumption, for programming purposes,
that now gives the alliance two years to respond.
We need to expand our discussion of this two-year period.
For example, should we assume that we will have two years to
reconstitute forces from the instant that strategic warning is
provided and accepted by the intelligence community? If so,
which intelligence community—the U.S., NATO, all NATO nations,
or some new international command? Could it be two years follow-
ing the government's acceptance that "something is wrong" that
should be redressed? Which government or governments, and must
NATO, collectively, agree to react? Is it two years, assuming
that we detect something significant and .recognize it at the
time?
Two-year • s warning does not mean that the USSR cannot launch
an intercontinental nuclear strike against the continental U.S.,
or an attack at the tactical, or perhaps even the operational-
level in Europe, in less time. There is probably some period of
time associated with still realistic, but lesser, threats from
the Soviet Union that is less than two years and more than two
weeks. A major regional contingency involving the USSR in Europe
should be, and is, in our program planning contingencies.
Indeed, the U.S. should include in its family of programming
scenarios a major regional contingency involving the USSR in
Europe, but limited to that theater. This will be new for
navies. Program planning for a major single region contingency
involving another global seapower will involve new thinking— in
war situations, navies could hardly be expected to keep the fight
limited to a single theater. That program planning assumption
will now also need to be made by the sea services.
Even accepting the ability of the intelligence community to
provide a two-year's strategic warning, there is controversy over
what governments will do when faced with the initially, perhaps
inconclusive, evidence provided. In October 1990, General Galvin
told a group of former NATO headguarters officers that two-year's
warning time should be viewed in the context of the warning
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provided to, and the response made by, the U.S. from September
1939 to December 1941. 2 Post-Stalin Soviet military authors are
never reluctant to remind readers that, despite overwhelming
intelligence evidence of an impending invasion by Nazi Germany,
and despite the recommendations for mobilization from his mili-
tary staffs, the USSR was not prepared for the invasion that
began in June 1941.
If Western history is a guidebook of non-reactions to rear-
mament by totalitarian nations and violations of arms control
agreements, we should assume that democracies will: (1), delay
decisions to rearm for many reasons—such as different interpre-
tations of ambiguous intelligence data, the desire to deescalate
a crisis, etc., (2), deny that a change in a former opponent's
behavior has taken place or, if it has, is strategically insig-
nificant or not precisely a violation of an agreement, and (3)
,
even suppress the intelligence and findings of facts that do not
support government policy.
A major lesson from previous arms control agreements is that
they not only limit necessary preparations for deterrence, but
also deter democracies from exposing totalitarian nations openly
violating such agreements. During the inter-war period, Germany,
Italy and Japan built many warships exceeding limits set forth in
arms control and other treaties—clear violations, actively
hidden by at least one major democracy. For example, Britain had
an Italian cruiser in its Gibraltar drydock, weighed it, found it
in excess of the 10,000 ton treaty limit, and hid its findings.
In yet another case, the Admiralty continued to record the incor-
rect but treaty-compliant tonnage for the German battleship
BISMARK, even after it was sunk and the Royal Navy's Intelligence
Division had examined the surviving ship's logs and crew. 4
Linking the behavior of a nation to a formal agreement, such
as arms control, takes the reporting and interpretation of data
away from the intelligence community and makes it the province of
lawyers and politicians. For years, these bureaucrats debated
whether a Soviet radar was in compliance with the Antiballistic
Missile Treaty, despite no apparent changes in the data provided
by the intelligence community. We sensed that there were dif-
fering interpretations of ambiguous data, that the violation was
not strategically significant or not a precise violation, or
that, even if true, the fact should not have been reported since
it undermined the arms control process. In the end, the Soviets
admitted that the radar was a violation. Had this radar not been
linked to an arms control treaty, it is most likely that the
assessment of its intended purpose would have been the routine
province of professionals.
We must make a serious study of the decision-making patterns
of nations faced with decisions similar to that which NATO gov-
ernments will face when presented with ambiguous evidence which,
some might argue, constitutes "proof" that the USSR, or the
Russian Republic in a new USSR confederation, is violating the
"understandings" or treaties that codify the new international
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security environment. NATO reactions will be inhibited by the
arms control and confidence building measures we adopt over the
next few years.
War planners, unlike program planners, are not required to
use "best-case" assumptions and are, therefore, authorized to
formulate their plans on less optimistic suppositions. Hence,
redirection of programming planners to the "best-case" (two-years
warning) does not necessarily influence war planning for current
forces. Nor does it necessarily deny government decision-makers
access to alternative intelligence assessments based upon current
capabilities rather than program assumption intentions.
The military should include in their family of actual war
plans, plans based upon the track record of their governments
acting courageously in response to provocation. For example, the
military is not barred from drafting internal war plans which
assume that authorization for the mobility of existing forces and
the mobilization of reserves will not be granted until hostili-
ties begin.
Decision-making studies to support program and current war
planning should span the gamut of possible scenarios. At one end
of the spectrum is the "worst-case" of NATO reconstituting its
forces within the two years predicted, but withholding the au-
thority to mobilize forces out of garrison and responding to
tactical warning until an attack by the USSR takes place, is
verified, reported to the national and allied command authori-
ties, and an authorization to respond is communicated to the
field. In this scenario, we assume that the Soviet military
machine came back strong and went back into Eastern Europe. The
related "best-case" would be if all forces could report to their
NATO-assigned positions, ready for a stillborn Soviet threat
generated during two years of economic and political chaos.
Perhaps in this situation, NATO might have an option for offen-
sive tactical and even operational-level warfare against the
USSR.
At the other end of the spectrum is the other "worst-case"
of a USSR that takes a full two years to rearm in such a manner
that it obtains a significant advantage in its estimation of the
correlation of forces and means. The scenario would assume that
NATO nations failed to make bold decisions when faced with ambig-
uous evidence by the intelligence community. The associated
"best-case" would be a NATO that made the bold decisions and
matched the Soviet regeneration with their own. Both sides would
then be fully reconstituted and on a wartime command and control
footing and deployment.
Simply put, numerous scenarios need investigation. Despite
the lack of credibility accorded the old "bolt-from-the-blue"
ground or strategic nuclear attack by the USSR, we should analyze
these scenarios to develop intelligence indicators to monitor as
insurance against such a possibility. Soviet press reports on
the new Czech and Slovak Federal Republic military doctrine have
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emphasized its shift in attention to the threat from the East. 35
According to a Polish press report, the Polish military has
already been "rehearsing operations on exercises" that included
an offensive from an "eastern enemy." 36
It is even conceivable that Eastern European nations might
ask Soviet, or Russian, troops back into their nations. As far-
fetched as this sounds, it is interesting to note that this exact
scenario was examined at a forum "Civic Control Over Security"
that took place in Rostov-on-Don. That scenario can build upon
our existing studies. Differences with today's scenarios might
include reconstitution at national locations but failure to
deploy forces from home garrisons and allow their transfer to
NATO. Other possibilities include using portions of the pro-
grammed Pacific and Contingency Forces, in addition to the Atlan-
tic Force, to respond to a European crisis.
War planners will also wrestle over how much time, and what
type of decisions, are required during the initial combat actions
in a crisis, before forces are either called up from the reserves
or reconstituted in full. During this period, presumably both
superpowers would act defensively. How long should we assume
this period will last? Should we have one set of assumptions for
programming and another for war planning? It is very likely that
programmers will assume a longer defensive period than do opera-
tional war planners.
NATO exercises and simulated military decision-making usual-
ly has assumed that the alliance political structure would make
decisions, which would then be executed by near-simultaneous
actions taken by all member nations. In a restructured NATO
alliance more political than military, in a new international
security environment, alliance and national military commanders
might have to devise future plans based upon a likely decision-
making process which has member nations taking unilateral actions
prior to those of the Alliance.
National decisions taking preeminence, in turn, would re-
quire Alliance planning for sequential rather than simultaneous
military operations. Similarly, planning for allied, or combined
forces, military operations may take second place to national
planning. Future military planning by NATO may stress combined
or joint operations but with forces under national command.
These topics are all being discussed by the appropriate military
commands
.
Crisis decision-making should also be reviewed carefully,
with the lessons of the post-World War II era firmly in mind.
Not all crises will require decisions at the same pace; some
crises are slow to build, others are more fast-paced. Some
crises occur with armed conflict imminent while others occur
after the outbreak of hostilities. Measured responses need to
include the full gamut--from a minor show of force to a major
insertion of all types of troops. Scenarios should include a
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favorable outcome to a "worst-case" response. A building-block
approach appears an appropriate analogy.
These and other scenarios should be augmented by the most
sophisticated technigues available, to learn lessons of wars and
campaigns yet to be fought. An artificial history could be writ-
ten of alternative futures. Then the military can better advise
the political leadership on the most suitable courses of action
for impending decisions.
Reconstitution 3 8
Reconstitution has three essential sub-components: mobiliza-
tion, military force reconstitution, and industrial reconsti-
tution. Mobilization will provide the ability to respond to
crises with an active duty and reserve force mix. Much more
attention should be paid to ensuring that the reserves can re-
spond, then return to their disrupted civilian occupations with-
out loss of families, homes, and jobs. Existing legislation
should be reviewed now that we have completed Operations DESERT
SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
Military force and industrial reconstitution, however, are
areas in which the U.S. has not had active interests for many
years. Reconstitution must provide, primarily in the European
theater--but not only there, additional forces and military
hardware for a major war, assuming that no major combat takes
place for two years. Reconstitution time goals can be somewhat
vague; since what is reguired is that we need only convince the
Soviet Union, and European nations, that we can: "reconstitute a
credible [deterrence/] defense faster than any potential opponent
can generate an overwhelming offense." Reconstitution in
Europe is possible only with a continued alliance structure such
as NATO.
According to Admiral Jeremiah's March 1991 Congressional
testimony, the new Army cadre reserve divisions will reach com-
bat-ready status in 12-18 months. The Army is now stating that
the time involved may be as short as 15 months. In peacetime, a
cadre division might consist of a skeleton organization of some
3,000 officers and noncommissioned officers (vice over 10,000 in
an active division). The individual ready reserve or conscrip-
tion are low cost methods of managing the necessary manpower pool
required for reconstitution.
Marine Corps reserve divisions have not been included in
this new cadre status. Additional goals for reconstitution will
be provided as staffs become familiar with the concept—but some
initial areas to investigate might include: operational-level
amphibious capability, sealift and intertheater airlift, strate-
gic air and missile defenses, short-range and naval nuclear
weapons, intercontinental strategic nuclear bombers, advanced
ballistic missiles, and civil defense.
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Most difficult will be maintaining a cadre of leaders. How
will they obtain the necessary military leadership training at
appropriate levels of command, when there are fewer forces to
command? Schools are an obvious solution for the officer corps
and senior non-commissioned officers, but will the services fund
schools when faced with giving airmen flight time or sailors
actual time at sea? Service schools may have to be consolidated
for efficiency but there may be even more novel solutions.
If the officer corps is to be significantly reduced below
current levels, eventually a level is reached at which it is no
longer efficient to maintain military-run graduate schools, war
colleges, and individual service flight training. A similar
problem exists with special and limited duty, non-commissioned,
and warrant officers, technical schools, and some government
laboratories. Suggestions to consolidate Department of Defense
facilities are already under consideration but other government
agencies might consolidate with defense.
The Department of Energy maintains laboratories, the Federal
Aviation Agency has aviation facilities, inter alia. Expanding
the student body may even take the form of training and educating
military students from former socialist nations—attempting to
provide them with the technical details and structural framework
for a military operating within a democracy. The Department of
Defense has already started moving in this direction with the
expansion of International Military Education and Training (IMET)
resource allocation courses at the Defense Education Resources
Management Center (DRMEC) in Monterey, California. This school
saw its first contingent of Eastern Europeans (Polish, Hungarian,
and Czechoslovak officers and civilians) in July-August 1991. The
intelligence community could take advantage of opportunities like
these to learn more about the capabilities of the Soviet and
other foreign military services. Increasing the number of for-
eign students attending military schools may also improve our own
language training capabilities.
One solution, other than consolidation, or expanding the
student base, is an affiliation of defense schools and laborato-
ries with select civilian institutions. The innovation would
provide mixed civilian-military educational and research institu-
tions that can be "reconstituted" to pure military or government
facilities within two years. We may not need large numbers of
officers and technical specialists trained during peace, but the
model for the reconstitution of industry might well be applied to
military training and education. Although not directly related
to the new national security strategy, the Congress required the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to look at the "practicality and
desirability of using civilian educational institutions to pro-
vide technical training to military personnel." 41 .The RAND
Corporation is about to issue a report on this subject. 42
Another solution is to broaden and raise the level of re-
search conducted at these institutions so that a substantive
faculty remains onboard, and can shift to teaching duties when
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required. Keeping special and limited duty, non-commissioned,
and warrant officers active in research at industry, or mixed
government-industry design bureaus, can maintain the nucleus of a
capability that may be required on short notice. Similar ar-
rangements can be made with government graduate schools to in-
crease their research and still return quickly to teaching.
These suggested solutions beg for a Presidential Blue-Ribbon
panel to study the options and make non-partisan recommendations.
Some of the military capability that America and its allies
must retain should be contained in existing active duty and ready
reserve forces. On-hand equipment and supplies are needed for
those ready forces, while some should be stockpiled and preposi-
tioned. Maritime prepositioning offers great flexibility, re-
cently demonstrated in the Middle East. However, not all the
materials for all types of war need be readily available.
Implicit in the President's new national security strategy
is the capability of tooling-up for wartime production within two
years for a major war in Europe and less than that for lengthy
contingency operations. General Powell stated in December 1990
that this ability to reconstitute was one of the critical under-
lying support capabilities of the new national security strategy.
This capability will consist primarily of the knowledge, skills,
and tools to respond within the time limits specified. This
concept is not new. We should review the 1930s history of plan-
ning assumptions and industry's ability to respond.
Congress is just beginning to explore its* role in this
process. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
completed a background study in February 1991 that accepted the
emerging changes in the national security environment and at-
tempted to provide a first look at: "what form the future defense
technology and industrial base might take; what form it ought to
take; what government policies can do to draw these two together;
and now the sweeping changes expected in the base can be managed
to minimize adverse economic effects and ensure sufficient tech-
nology and industrial capability to meet the Nation's needs."
This preliminary report from OTA made only passing reference to
the Base Force and President Bush's proposed "Reconstituted
Force." It is obvious that the authors either did not have a
complete understanding of the implications of the new national
security strategy or that they chose to not consider the proba-
bility that this strategy would survive Congressional oversight.
A second report, issued in July, demonstrates that the Office
of Technology Assessment authors were again aware of the Aspen
speech and the new national security strategy, but again, they
did not use them as a basis for discussion. A final report is to
be delivered in the Spring of 1992.
Dr. Fred Ikle, former Undersecretary of Defense (Policy)
,
was a proponent of preprogrammed crisis budgets and industrial
responses to bridge the gap between peacetime and wartime.
Industrial mobilization, instead of military mobilization or the
deployment of troops, might form the basis of an adequate govern-
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mental response to ambiguous warning indicators. Ikle proposed a
series of industrial alert conditions, similar to those used in
the military, which would trigger specific actions. These would
be less threatening because they would not immediately increase
military capability.
A Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) system was investi-
gated by the Department of Defense in the 1980s but largely as a
component of our deterrent strategy vis-a-vis the USSR. 4 A
"graduated deterrence response," the term used by Lieutenant
General Butler, could well involve a "graduated industrial re-
sponse." This is not the same type of response that the govern-
ment ordered in 1987 under the GMR concept—that program now
being used to support national mobilization for crises and war
with existing forces and strategies. 48 GMR remains a high prior-
ity program to support regional contingency response. There is no
reason contracts cannot be let ahead of time for both a response
to a major war and for contingencies.
Although we speak abstractly about devising plans and pass-
ing budgets ahead of the need to do so, economists must help
government ascertain how much money would be reguired to re-
constitute the defense industry. If that money is earmarked for
other purposes, then financial planning should include tracking
sufficient governmental short-term money which can be guickly
diverted to defense--if Graduated Mobilization Response and
reconstitution part of the new national security strategy is to
have teeth.
Industry and government should decide on a basic strategy
consonant with our ability to support a defense industrial base
and invest in new technologies; and both must be comfortable with
their new, nonconfrontational, roles. Government should ensure
that industry is capable of retooling and delivering military
products within two years or less.
The government record of abandoning major production pro-
grams is a travesty, and it is likely that—unless consciously
addressed—we will permit the destruction of most capability.
Notable examples include the APOLLO and SATURN V programs, where
facilities, equipment, hardware, stores, instrumentation, data
files, test stands, etc. were destroyed and all technical teams
were dispersed.
Many military contractors have been provided government-
owned equipment, or have charged the development of facilities
and equipment to military contracts. If the federal government
wants these facilities retained, mothballed, or perhaps even
improved, then it should provide incentives. Ownership of gov-
ernment equipment can be transferred to industry, or management
of facilities can be turned over to government. If retained by
industry, federal, state, and local tax laws must be revised to
reduce or eliminate taxes on idle property and land.
89
Industry will work, meanwhile, on projects that have no
direct defense application and simultaneously be asked to main-
tain the expertise necessary to produce military equipment within
specified time limits. Keeping this expertise will require
innovative measures
—
perhaps even joint government and private
repositories of knowledge at taxpayers expense. This, in turn,
requires new and innovative approaches to intellectual property
rights. The Department of Defense has allowed defense contrac-
tors to retain title rights for inventions while reserving the
right of license-free use. If we mix federal and private sector
research, we may have to allow federal employees to benefit from
royalties for work that is produced while on government time.
Making the two-year response time a reality may require
abandoning military design specifications (MILSPEC) in many
areas. We may have to acknowledge that, to meet deadlines,
available commercial products may be substituted. For areas that
clearly require specifications, the old system should be re-
tained.
The reconstitution of industrial capability appears the
single most demanding element of the new national security
strategy. The March 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment states
that "it would likely be 6 to 24 months before industrial base
mobilization or surge production could begin to deliver critical
items... by the end-FY [fiscal year] 1997, it is estimated that it
would take 2 to 4 years to restore production capability to 1990
levels for items whose lines have gone 'cold'. 1 ' Fortunately, the
Soviet Union is accorded the same capability. Clearly, the U.S.
will have to monitor the ability to meet reconstitution targets,
to test capabilities, to enhance the credibility of our response
and to monitor the Soviet ability to do the same.
Reconstitution is fundamentally oriented toward the U.S.
contribution to the defense of Europe in the face of a regenerat-
ed Soviet conventional threat. The U.S. need not reconstitute
the 1990-era conventional force it had forward-deployed to Eu-
rope. New technologies, especially in air-breathing systems, may
offer the same or even increased combat potential with fewer
ground troops.
Nuclear weapons, especially those based at sea, and maritime
forces, offer the U.S. an ability to fully meet its military
commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty without the extensive
deployment of any ground or air forces on European soil. Simply
put, if the U.S. Army was to totally withdraw a combat capability
from the European continent, the U.S. could still provide routine
extended deterrence with its strategic nuclear forces at sea. A
rapid response to any European crisis can be met with our for-
ward-deployed carrier and Marines as well as new Air Force com-
posite wings and rapidly deployable Army units.
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Investment Strategy and Conversion
The major implication of the two-year warning of a Europe-
centered global war with the USSR is that American programming
strategy will shift its focus to the more immediate threats
presented in other areas of the world. Until now, the unstated
relationship of the threat to programmed forces was, generally,
that U.S. forces would meet the challenge of the most demanding
threat, the USSR, and assume that they could also cope with
lesser contingencies. That basic assumption was not entirely
true and now will be essentially reversed: forces will be ac-
quired to meet the challenges of the more likely, less demanding,
threats assuming that they are also useful against the more
unlikely but greater threat posed by a Soviet Union that decides
to rearm.
This will be a new planning assumption for America, new for
its allies, and somewhat impractical for the near term—or until
we see substantial changes in Soviet maritime and nuclear force
structure to match what we know for certain are reductions in the
ground and air forces. The intelligence community is tasked to
advise Western governments when their strategic nuclear and
maritime postures can be relaxed. Can it meet the challenge?
There will be a fundamental restructuring of the near-term
programming already contracted, and there may be extraordinarily
high penalties incurred as industries move from the defense area
to others. Programs like the B-2 , A-12, the YF-22A, and other
advanced technology aircraft, the SSN-21 SEAWOLF nuclear-powered
attack submarine, the follow-on to the TRIDENT II missile, and
other programs such as TACIT RAINBOW, tied to the AIRLAND Battle,
appear related to an international security environment that no
longer exists.
There will be last-ditch attempts to salvage certain pro-
grams, arguments that previously programmed forces are needed in
the Base Force, and bids to simply keep people employed and
legislative districts satisfied. This will be a great challenge
to the Congress--which should play its larger role instead of
responding only to narrow constituent interests.
An obvious next step for the Department of Defense is to
provide incentives for the services to stop rejustifying old
programs under the new national security strategy and, instead,
to actually perform a zero-based needs assessment. An obvious
second step is to plan for the divestiture of unnecessary forces,
equipment and industrial capability. There will be a great
temptation to tie the reduction in capability to arms
control--both for reasons of merit and to delay, or perhaps
derail, reductions.
Implicit in the reconstitution portion of the new national
security strategy is the retention of capability to produce
equipment and supplies that have not been maintained. Not all
firms must convert, nor should they be allowed to convert to the
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civilian non-defense sector. Government could regulate the
decline but appears prepared to allow the market to determine
survivors. This position appears to have also been echoed by the
government of the Netherlands. Deputy Defense Secretary Donald
Atwood told a group on May 1, 1991, that:
I believe the free economic system is the system which
should determine who wins, who loses, who merges. I believe
in the free marketplace. I don't think we, the Department
of Defense surely, have the capability to try to plan any
kind of industrial policy. Quite the contrary. The free
marketplace has to determine. Our role is to sponsor re-
search and development and our role is to make sure people
know what we're going to buy. And let the marketplace deter-
mine those in between.
Some firms will manage to convert to the civilian sector.
The assisted conversion of defense businesses to the civilian
sector is a highly charged process. If a firm can produce tanks
and another automobiles, why subsidize the uninitiated to do what
there are competent firms already doing? Conversion assistance
schemes abound, with proposals to use independent research and
development funds for everything from non-military ventures to
fully-funded programs.
For those firms which can convert, with or without assist-
ance, there will be significant cultural adjustments. Government
contractors often have the customer providing capital for spe-
cialized facilities and eguipment. This is ,not normal procedure
in the commercial market. In the defense industrial world, re-
quirements often advance the state of the art whereas in the
commercial market, state of the art is limited by costs and
competition. The two environments have drastically different
financial structures and supporting infrastructures capable of
preparing proposals.
Defense contractors are often organized along narrow com-
partmentalized, functional lines with little awareness of the
overall program. Many firms do business in both worlds but there
is little interconnection of personnel. Government and civilian
contractors both agree that there is a significant problem con-
verting personnel from one culture into successes in the other.
It is also likely that management cannot make the transition.
After Vietnam War production ended, a downsizing of the
defense industry was followed by massive displacements of pro-
fessional and technical specialists. Conversion efforts then
consisted largely of acquiring non-defense firms and attempting
to expand into new markets. Most conversions failed, but pri-
marily at the plant level. The cultural shock was either too
great or the technologies offered by the defense firms were not
needed
.
The wholesale demobilization of military personnel into the
civilian job market has taken place several times in the U.S.,
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with mixed results. Appropriate temporary programs are needed to
ensure that we manage the transition smoothly to support new
national industrial and business goals.
Some industrial and military facilities inevitably will be
idled, even made obsolete, by the new national security strategy.
We can anticipate massive environmental cleanups at particularly
dirty facilities, such as industrial sites used for the manufac-
ture of weapons-grade plutonium. The staggering costs of these
efforts will make them economically unattractive for private
peaceful use. Initial costs of $30 billion for a Five-Year Plan
represent only a fraction of the hundreds of billions of dollars
that could ultimately be required. 51 Clearly, the government
will have to assume these costs.
The conversion of defense plants, and other government capa-
bilities, should be studied by a Blue-Ribbon Panel assisted by
industrial and professional associations. This effort goes beyond
similar panels that have suggested acquisition reform since, in
this case, the government must ensure that defense-critical
industries are identified and make certain the capability to
produce is retained.
Research and Development
A fundamental restructuring of the defense procurement proc-
esses is long overdue. Industry often sought, or took the lead-
ing role in exploring, technological opportunities and charged
that research to overhead for major programs. With the major
programs likely to be severely reduced, a new mechanism is re-
quired for basic research and initial development. To change the
leading role in military research and development, governments
may be compelled to reverse a major downward spiral in this
category of spending. Indeed, General Powell stated in his
December 1990 speeches that defense research and development is
one of the four underlying support capabilities of the new na-
tional security strategy.
Another possibility is to set up major government design
bureaus, and internalize research and development responsibility
itself
—
perhaps specializing in areas devoid of normal civilian
spin-offs. The Navy did this in the 1930s, when its Naval Air-
craft Factory did prototyping, and both the Aircraft Factory and
shipyards provided "yardsticks" by which to measure contractor
performance. An alternative strategy is to continue those opera-
tions in the private sector and provide nourishing government
subsidies. Perhaps state and local governments can be persuaded
to invest in research and development as well. The objective is
to retain technology capabilities in numerous areas and the
production capability in a few.
In any case, the output cannot be a family of senescent
designs, curing on the shelf, but rather fully operational proto-
types which normally never enter full scale development. In some
cases, limited production runs may be necessary to ensure that
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production experience is maintained. In most cases, product
improvement programs should be included in the prototype program.
Prototyping generally results in three major options: (1) buying
the system, (2) buying major components, or (3) , rolling over the
technology to the next generation. This third option is current-
ly being looked at by the staff of the House Armed Services
Committee Policy Subcommittee. A prototypes development program
should ensure that both the capability of assembly and a dynamic
research and development program continue.
The Soviets also have worried about the same issues as they
convert former military industries to civilian production. Rear
Admiral Yu M. Khaliulin, Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet,
told Soviet President Gorbachev at a November 13, 1990 meeting
with military people's deputies, that a naval ship should be
built every year or two at newly "converted" shipyards, just to
retain the capability to do so.
Such a shift in USSR defense procurement will offer new
challenges to our intelligence community. How do we classify
evidence of new hardware when we cannot predict whether it will
be followed by a procurement program? Keeping multiple products
on the shelf is also a good competitive strategy that will force
an enemy to match all possible threats, instead of just a few.
This, of course, works both ways and may prove justification for
otherwise unwanted armaments. This shift to worrying about
possible "breakout" is not altogether new, but will alter the
emphasis of our collection efforts.
The new programming environment will reflect a new under-
standing of the partnership between government and industry. It
will require major changes in the charters of many research and
development and programming agencies to allow easier adaptation
of commercial technologies into the defense sector and the con-
tinued flow of defense technologies into the civilian world. It
is also likely to require changing defense regulations to allow
profits on research and development and prototypes.
Technological Requirements
In the new politico-military environment, the American
public predictably is unlikely to support a major overseas mili-
tary presence, or combat in foreign lands. The new national
security strategy calls for an ability to respond to crises,
however. This requirement necessitates technologies to support
easily deployed and sustained weapons systems. If future crisis
scenarios assume host-nation-support and coalitions, we must also
plan to resolve these crises quickly, then withdraw. Hence,
requirements will demand high technology weapons systems using
robotics and artificial intelligence so that, if engaged in
combat, American casualties are minimized and the crisis resolved
rapidly. As Admiral Jeremiah reminded us in December 1990, with-
out the Soviet threat to spur continued investment in hardware,
obsolescence in deployed systems will slow down
—
perhaps permit-
ting us technological leaps instead of concentrating on marginal
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improvements. America's smaller armed forces should be provided
with the most technologically advanced equipment.
Perhaps it is time to revisit President Reagan's dream of a
defense-dominant world. 55 Deployment of the ABM Treaty-compliant
antiballistic missile system should be a first step, instead of
the Administration arguing for both strategic defenses and the
available technology required for GPALS. Once there is a nation-
al consensus on the value of defenses, and a Treaty-compliant
system is actually fielded, the U.S. can move toward more costly
programs—but incrementally. Recent actions taken by the Senate
Armed Services Committee to require deployment of an Antiballis-
tic Missile Treaty-compliant ballistic missile defense of the
continental U.S. have not gone unnoticed in the USSR.
Technologies formerly considered less useful under the old
political and international security environment may prove more
interesting in the brave new world. For example, with adequate
overseas bases, offshore basing technologies received only modest
interest. With the possibility that many American forces may
return to North America, the U.S. should investigate carefully
the realistic capabilities of offshore basing concepts.
With the demise of the old NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario and the
prospect of numerous arms control agreements, the requirement for
certain technologies may diminish. For example, if the Soviet
Union accepts mutual assured destruction, demonstrated by aban-
doning strategic air and missile defenses, we may not need to
invest in countermeasures tg penetrate those defenses and attack
strategic offensive forces. Similarly, if warhead numbers are
driven low enough, we might abandon the search for increased
missile accuracy.
With NATO armies on both sides of the old inter-German
border, some systems designed for AIRLAND Battle should have
lower priorities. Conversely, some technologies identified with
NATO follow-on forces attack (FOFA) may still be useful in
out-of-area contingency operations. An integrated joint task
force, comprised of all the services, might benefit from technol-
ogies designed to conduct simultaneous operations over the full
breadth and depth of the battlefield. 59 The intelligence commu-
nity should provide an assessment of world areas where such
technologies might prove useful. An unbiased review of the tech-
nologies and systems associated with the AIRLAND Battle and FOFA
will decide which are appropriate under the new national security
strategy.
The U.S. government is concerned with maintaining its edge
in defense technologies. 60 It has identified key technologies
that should be protected, and routinely tracks our relative
standing in these areas vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. We have
recently expanded the comparisons of our technological standing




Expanded technological comparisons call for new analyses
from the intelligence community, and demand new national efforts
to ensure that the appropriate technology is protected. Technolo-
gies available for what remains of military competition could
improve so dramatically in the next few years that the fundamen-
tal nature of warfare may also change. Competition in military
hardware could shift from the nuclear arena to the non-nuclear
and, as non-nuclear weapons become ever more capable, they may
substitute for nuclear weapons at the tactical-, operational-,
and even strategic-levels. Nations will attempt to retain their
technological leads in key areas, including sectors which former-
ly did not require protection. If protection of emerging tech-
nologies is too restrictive, it can stifle initiative and
progress. A balance should be maintained between the need to
protect technologies and that to ensure growth.
Economic technological competition with other nations will
continue despite the new international security environment.
While there have been efforts to limit the spread of technologies
to the Eastern-bloc, we will likely see wholesale changes in the
management of militarily significant commercial products by the
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM)
.
This has not yet happened. Existing national legislation re-
quires reconsideration and amendment, while new legislation is
clearly needed to deal with the myriad of questions arising when
former socialist states apply for access to technologies forbid-
den them for outdated ideological and military reasons. Govern-
ments must fundamentally revise policies to transfer key technol-
ogies to certain nations for economic advantage 1, not military
balance of forces.
The nation would benefit from a Presidential Blue-Ribbon
Panel synthesizing key technologies to explain and validate their
importance in the new politico-military environment. The panel
might attempt to resolve the difficult question of balance be-
tween protection and growth and perhaps many we thought critical
can be downgraded. Still, if we are to reconstitute a signifi-
cant combat capability against a world-class adversary, we should
to identify those technologies that we must still protect.
Stockpiles63
Technologies are not the only economic assets whose protec-
tion has been justified for military reasons. Our National
Defense Stockpile is guaranteed to provide the U.S. with guaran-
teed access to critical strategic minerals for three years. We
feared both disruption during a long war with the USSR, and
curtailed access during the so-called "resources war," that never
occurred. Interestingly, although we can claim that certain
critical finished components should have been stockpiled, no such
program ever existed. Such a stockpile would be very difficult
to manage due to the transitory nature of "critical" components.
Our National Defense Stockpile of strategic minerals had its
genesis well prior to the Cold War, but can it be justified
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economically? Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, maintain similar
reserves for economic reasons but, some years ago, a major study
of the goals and objectives of our stockpile concluded that a
less costly option to ensure access to materials included inter-
national development agencies and diplomatic efforts to ensure
stability of major minerals producers, without significant budg-
etary costs.
Perhaps maintaining strategic reserves had more to do with
domestic politics than true defense needs. In any case, the
entire program should be reexamined and one of the options should
be a carefully controlled sale of major portions of the stockpile
to reduce the federal deficit.
The Strategic Petroleum Reserves have been justified for
economic rather than military reasons. On the other hand, the
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and numerous military programs
have also been justified to ensure America's access to oil.
Given competition for tax dollars, it seems a prudent planning
assumption that the Congress may not fund both a refill of the
petroleum reserve and General Powell's Atlantic Force to ensure
we have access to oil. The 1991 National Security Strategy of
the United States urges the U.S. to "...develop creative mecha-
nisms to fill its Strategic Petroleum Reserve to the statutorily
required one billion barrels, consistent with sound budgetary




It is equally appropriate to review the goals- and objectives
of our capabilities to provide sufficient quantities of oil—but
to fund only one. If, instead of the current unmet goal of 90
days, we had an oil reserve capable of supplying all economic and
military needs for one or two years, would we also have time to
mobilize additional military reserves for, or reconstitute, a
more capable Atlantic Force? If our oil reserves were this high,
would we have intervened in Kuwait?
Impact on the Navy and Marine Corps
From this look at the Presidents' s new national security
strategy and the Chairman's recommended Base Force, it appears
that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps will change the least. The
fundamental maritime approach of our new national security
strategy should logically result in asymmetric loss of military
influence in favor of the sea services. This does not mean,
however, that the Navy and Marine Corps can sit out the debate on
roles and missions since they will not be effected by
either—they will. The Air Force appears to have accepted the
coming debate over roles and missions.
The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations,
and the former Commandant of the Marine Corps have obviously
internalized the new national security strategy and the Base
Force ideas and indicated their willingness to become partners in
the new directions that the Department of Defense are taking. 67
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The Secretary has even suggested that: "Given continued changes
in the Soviet Union, we eventually expect to see a diminished
open ocean anti-submarine warfare threat. . .With changes in the
world order and our own strategy, it is appropriate to re-examine
the top-priority emphasis we have previously placed on countering
the Soviet submarine threat." 68
At the strategic-level of warfare, forward defense and the
Maritime Strategy have been replaced by crisis response and
presence. This is not an insignificant change since the old
Maritime Strategy called for maritime superiority. Although the
Maritime Strategy and former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman
were associated with maritime superiority, the term should have
never been interpreted as being across the board superiority in
all geographic and functional areas. Indeed, careful analysis of
the public statements of Lehman reveals that eventually, maritime
superiority in wartime meant a working ability to command the
seas, in selected areas of the world, during a designated period
of time, and in conjunction with allies.
At the operational-level of warfare, or the campaign-level
associated with Operation DESERT STORM, antisubmarine warfare as
the Navy's primary mission has been replaced by power projection.
Operational-level power projection set into the context of
strategic-level crisis response is not the Navy-Marine Corps Team
storming the beaches of the Soviet Union. This section will now
discuss what the future force structure looks like for the sea
services as their roles and missions will be under jointness.
At his speech to the Comstock Club in September 1990, De-
fense Secretary Cheney twice spoke of the need for naval superi-
ority. In his testimony to Congress, in February 1991, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (an Army General) discussed
the need for maritime superiority. General Robinson's address
to the Military Operations Research Society in June 1991 used a
slide that appeared to set maritime (and aerospace) superiority
as an underlying tenant of our ability to respond to crises
—
not
in the context of the old Soviet threat.
Secretary of the Navy Garrett's testimony to Congress in
February 1991 alluded to the possibility that maritime superiori-
ty may not be affordable in the future: "Fiscal realities have
also made af fordability an important factor to be considered in
sustaining maritime superiority." These sentiments were echoed
by the Chief of Naval Operations as well: "There should be no
doubt that, if the continued decline in Navy funding, force
structure, modernization, and personnel persists, we will reach a
point where this nation will no longer be capable of maintaining
the maritime superiority so vital to the support of our global
interests.
"
Retaining maritime superiority does not mean that the U.S.
will adopt an overall national maritime strategic outlook, posit-
ing heavy reliance on maritime forces to the exclusion of others,
since the sea services can contribute to attaining political
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goals, but they cannot achieve them all. On the other hand,
defense cuts under this new national security strategy should be
asymmetrical and favor the sea services. Within the sea serv-
ices, resources should also be allocated asymmetrically to favor
those capabilities that are required under the new national
security strategy.
Secretary Garrett and the Chief of Naval Operations Kelso
told the Congress, in February 1991, that a 451-ship Navy could
provide 2-3 aircraft carriers, 2-3 amphibious ready groups, 25-30
surface combatants, and 14 nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs) on permanent forward deployment. 72 The CNO • s 3 percent
deployment rate means that he used around 50 available submarines
to maintain 14 subs routinely on deployment—a far cry from the
recent goal of 100 SSNs or even the fallback position of 75-90. 73
In an interview published in the October 1991 Sea Power, Chief of
Naval Operations Kelso told readers that he not only supported a
Base Force of 450 ships, but that he had come up with the same
number previously. 74
The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have been using the most supportive Navy missions
in their public pronouncements—maritime superiority, power
projection, and sea control. If Secretary Cheney and General
Powell truly agree with these concepts, then the sea services
should capitalize on that and not focus on second-order issues
involving specific programs or the Unified Command Plan. Unfor-
tunately, it seems apparent that elements associated with the
Navy have fired a series of broadsides at both the- strategy and
the Base Force—due to programming and UCP issues. On the other
hand, there is every indication that the Marine Corps is taking a
more statesmanlike approach and carefully trying to ascertain its
place in the "new world order."
The May 1991 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings /Naval Review
1991 contains a series of articles that make it clear that the
authors understood most, but not all, of the new concepts and did
not embrace them. Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
wrote a brief commentary entitled "Head's Up, Navy" 76 in which he
essentially told the Navy to circle the wagons and defend itself
against the attack it faced from the Air Force, the Army, and
specifically the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
commentary is placed prominently as the first substantive arti-
cle. Another Navy study concluded that the recent review of
strategy leading to President Bush's speech at Aspen was only
possible due to: the fiscal crisis, the waning threat, and the
new powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff author-
ized by the Goldwater-Nichols Act—all of which did not come
together until General Powell became the Chairman. 7
Another May Proceedings article enumerates Navy weapons
systems that are in serious jeopardy because of the new strategy
and Base Force. Apparently this is true: June 1991 testimony
by the Congressional Budget Office to the Senate Armed Services
Committee suggests that the Navy may end up with as few as 310
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ships, depending on the funding decisions made over the new AX
attack aircraft, upgrades to the F/A-18, and the SSN-21. * A
June 1991 book written by a retired naval officer and strategic
planner now at the Center for Naval Analyses, seconds this fear
with a warning that the Navy and Marine Corps are headed toward:
300 ships in the year 2000; including 8-9 carrier battle groups,
50 nuclear-powered attack submarines, 50-60 surface combatants,
10 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and 2 Marine
Expeditionary Brigades. ° By the end of September, 1991, press
reports contained additional reports that 450 ships is merely a
number that will be hit while on the way down.
The members of the Navy League of the United States, who
attended their May 29, 1991 national convention in Anaheim,
California, adopted a resolution calling for "caution in the
formulation of the nation's long-term global political and mili-
tary strategy" and that "the U.S. global strategy in a peaceful
new world order should be the subject of a national policy com-
manding grass roots support."
The July 1991 Proceedings contains another critical article
of the strategy's resulting budget. 3 Another prominently-placed
article by a retired flag officer critical of the Base Force
concept appeared in the August 1991 Proceedings . Rear Admiral
William J. Holland's commentary "Strategic Command - Who Needs It
and Why?" denies that a roles and missions feud is on-going but
encourages the Navy to "lock up its daughters and put its wallet
in an inside pocket." Again, this commentary is located conspic-
uously as the first significant article of that issue. Although
elements of the retired flag officer community have taken excep-
tion to the new national security strategy and Base Force, the
leadership of the active duty Navy has publicly embraced both.
Even the new Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (ACNO)
(Undersea Warfare) , Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon—nominal leader
of the Navy combat arm perhaps most likely to lose the most under
the new national security strategy--did not break ranks. Vice
Admiral Bacon's only non-consistent comment was to say that his
own personal thinking included the potential threats to the U.S.
from the existing Soviet submarine force. Vice Admiral Bacon
also embraced the strategy in his address to the Naval Submarine
League 9th Annual Symposium on July 13, 1991. Non-dissenting
Congressional testimony this Spring was given by the Atlantic and
Pacific Commanders-in-Chief, Admirals Leon A. Edney and Charles
R. Larson, U.S. Navy. ' On the other hand, at least one active
duty submarine flag officer, Admiral Bruce DeMars, has registered
his disagreement with this attempt to shift roles and missions. 88
An interesting question is should the bulk of the Marine
Corps remain as a part of the Department of the Navy; or, since
it is dedicating forces to the continental U.S. -based land war-
fare-oriented Contingency Force and playing a significant role in
the Army-heavy Atlantic Force, move most of its assets to the
Department of the Army? Some argue that the Navy/Marine Corps
team is already an existing contingency response force— implying
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why do we need another?89 The new strategy assumes that we need
a unilateral but modest tactical amphibious warfare capability,
which we already have with our Amphibious Strike Task Forces.
Marine Corps Commandant General Carl E. Mundy, Jr. apparently
gave a speech on September 25, 1991 speech of to the 48th annual
luncheon of the National Security Industrial Association in which
he told his audience that there was no longer any debate between
the Army and Marine Corps over the role that each would play in
the Contingency Force. °^
If the Marine Corps casts its lot with the Army, it might be
able to successfully shift the bulk of its fighting potential
without loss of its special identification. Other armies have
amphibious troops and the U.S Army already has 5 amphibious as-
sault ships and is building 35 assault landing craft. 1 A very
small independent Naval or Marine Infantry might be retained
under the Navy for at-sea duties such as: evacuation of non-
combatants, piracy suppression, the at-sea recovery of maritime
assets, drug interdiction, and guard duties.
On the other hand, staying with the Navy Department means
that planned programs and personnel actions will not undergo the
scrutiny associated with a shift to a new military department. On
the whole, although one can make a case that the bulk of the
Marine Corps could and even should shift to the Army, it is
doubtful that either the Administration or the Joint Chiefs of
Staff will tackle this issue in the near term. Hence the Marine
Corps should not oppose the new strategy and Base Force--they
should assume that under it, no one will question their "right"
to exist.
Navy programming planning appears to have gone along, during
much of 1990, without any recognition that the world was
changed. 2 There are signs, however, that at least some parts of
the Navy recognized the changes and worried about the implica-
tions for programming. The rationalization for Navy and Marine
Corps programs should be first: what are the national missions
that require: attack submarines, aircraft-at-sea, at-sea Marines,
etc. This will lead to the number of submarines, aircraft-capa-
ble units, ships that can carry troops, etc., that the nation
needs. Second, we should ask what type should be built: attack
submarines (nuclear or diesel) , ships to carry airpower (conven-
tional or vertical takeoff) , or ships to carry Marines (amphib-
ious or other) —recognizing the tradeoffs that are inherent
between numbers and capability. Only then should be decide what
type of hulls or specific models are needed. Saving the indus-
trial base is not a reason that the nation will build a signifi-
cant number of very expensive formerly programmed fleet units.
The future budget climate for the military will simply not allow
the Navy or Marine Corps to retain programs it took for granted
in the past, or that it would rather have.
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Submarine Force
For the submarine community, the shift in top priority from
antisubmarine warfare means that the goal of 75-90 or 100 nucle-
ar-powered attack submarines, previously justified assuming a
European-centered global war with the USSR, must find a new
rationalization. The U.S. Navy faces an extremely difficult task
over retaining the full SSN-21 SEAWOLF program in a new interna-
tional security environment focused on regional crises. 9 ° Since
it currently is the only submarine shipbuilding program (OHIO
class ballistic missile submarines are considered national sys-
tems and exist quite apart from attack submarines) , attempts to
cut the SSN-21 will be interpreted as an attempt to cut the
submarine force. Indeed, the April and July 1991 issues of the
Journal of the Naval Submarine League, The Submarine Review ,
contained a series of articles which sought to defend the SEAWOLF
submarine building program despite the new strategy.
The Chief of Naval Operations told Congress that he has
ordered a study (the CENTURION) to explore a new, lower cost
option for a successor to the SEAWOLF nuclear-powered attack
submarine. Although the study for this new submarine has been
identified as the CENTURION, it is not clear if this will also be
the name of the new class. Since it would likely take 10-15 years
to launch the first "SSN-X," we may see a maximum of some dozen
or so SSN-21s built before a newer, smaller, and less-capable
class would be available.
The May 1991 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings' reported that
the SEAWOLF program may stop with 5-6 boats. Others, who have
questioned the SEAWOLF program, predict that it could lead to a
total of 30 SSNs in the fleet. 8 In his June 1991 address to the
Naval Submarine League, Admiral Bruce DeMars, U.S. Navy, Direc-
tor, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, stated that the current construc-
tion and retirement programs would lead to a 70 nuclear-powered
attack submarines force by the end of the century, 4 SSNs by the
year 2025, and inevitably 30 thereafter.
Certainly there will be those who question whether we need
even 14 deployed submarines at sea in our new crisis response and
presence-heavy strategy if we are going to have only the capabil-
ity to quickly respond with 1 carrier task force and 1 Marine
Expeditionary Brigade. Even if the submarine community today can
justify 7 deployed submarines on each coast, the question is
whether such deployments are too ambitious in the future given
the paucity of surface and aviation units that will be routinely
available for crisis response? In other words, is there a higher
political payoff for the nation by forward-deploying 14 subma-
rines but only 2-3 carrier battle groups or fewer submarines and
4-5 carriers? Which type deployments better serve to meet na-
tionally-mandated missions?
If the submarine community can make the case that it needs
14 deployed units, then the second-order question is whether all
of these need to be nuclear-powered or some can be diesel-elec-
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trie? Third-order questions should be what specific hull design
is used. Saving the industrial base is not a reason that the
nation will build a significant number of very expensive SSN-21s.
New justification for the submarine force might include
substituting for carriers called away for crisis response and
direct integrated response in crisis areas performing: surveil-
lance, power projection, delivery of special forces, combat
search and rescue, evacuation of nationals or hostages, blockade
interdiction of surface traffic, etc. For an interesting series
of articles addressing other roles and missions for the submarine
force, see recent issues of The Submarine Review. 100 Similar
articles appear in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . 1Q1
Rationalization for nuclear-powered attack submarines also
involves GPALS since submarines are high leverage platforms that
can carry intercontinental ballistic missile or submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) interceptors which can catch
missiles in the boost phase of flight. Perhaps we should consid-
er ready reserve submarines. Submarine officers have also argued
that submarines have a role in naval diplomacy. Using these
and other more traditional missions, the submarine force can
justify a total number of hulls that it needs before it proceeds
to the specific types to be built.
Surface Forces
In addition to the obvious programs on which the Navy has
traditionally placed less emphasis (sealift, mine warfare, diesel
attack submarines, etc.), there are some other candidates for
review. In this "new world order," is there a place for major
fleet vs. fleet engagements, or will it be primarily fleet vs.
shore? If long range weapons make it less likely that major
fleet forces will ever engage, there are probably some signifi-
cant changes in order for our surface and other forces. If we
renegotiate the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, naval surface
ships, such as the TICONDEROGA class, may perform GPALS intercep-
tor duty.
If a principal reason for deployments is to maintain over-
seas presence, under the new expanded definition of presence,
perhaps we do not need such highly capable nuclear-powered attack
submarines or surface warships. It has been standard practice
for the French Navy to maintain low-capability forces on perma-
nent forward deployment in many areas of the world (e.g. the
Indian Ocean) while the U.S. and Royal Navies generally cycle
through high-capability forces on a scheduled basis. The U.S.
Navy used to perform these type of low-capability force deploy-
ments before World War II. When faced with extremely tough budget
decisions, the U.S. Navy may consider whether the French naval
deployment system has any merit and adopt the less-capable forces
as substitute for the fully-capable carrier battle group. Re-
sponse to a crisis involving forward-deployed less-capable fleet
assets may be with long-range continental U.S. -based Air Force
units rather than naval aviation.
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Now that the President has stated that the U.S. will remove
all tactical nuclear weapons from our naval forces and land-based
naval air forces, the U.S. government will revise its long-stand-
ing policy of neither confirming nor denying (NCND) the presence
of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. naval surface ships and attack
submarines. NCND was a good policy for a national security
environment that simply no longer is operable.
Naval Aviation
Naval aviation programs are also in serious trouble—being
referred to in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings as being in
"Chapter ll". 105 The goal of 15 deployable carrier battle
groups, the A-12, and upgrades for existing aircraft, previously
justified by assuming a European-centered global war with the
USSR, have already gone by the wayside. With transportation goals
of only 1% contingencies and a unilateral intervention capability
reguirement at only the tactical-level of warfare, we have al-
ready seen studies stating that the need for big-deck aircraft
carriers is perhaps as low as 9 and the nation can afford some
smaller less-capable aircraft carriers.
We should expect to see less support for traditional naval
aviation programs and planned upgrades for existing forces as
well. Naval aviation programs need to be justified in terms of
future contingency operations in the Third World--not using the
scenarios that have been of interest in the past few decades.
Under the new program planning assumptions,
.
justifying the need
for air defense assets in terms of the threat of regiments of
BACKFIRES is liable to create the impression that the Navy is
unaware of the changes that have occurred in the world recently.
The Navy still needs to defend itself against air threats but may
not be allowed to procure active and ready reserve forces to
defend itself against the "old" Soviet threat—those forces will
be "reconstituted," if necessary.
New justification for a modified carrier force might in-
clude, however, some roles against the revised, but still credi-
ble, Soviet threat; antisatellite warfare and defense against
ballistic missiles. The Air Force has proven that aircraft can
carry missiles that can reach into space—why should some of
these not be sea-based? Might not carrier aircraft carry GPALS
interceptors which can catch ballistic missiles in the boost
phase of flight?
Maybe this is the time to again consider re-integrating the
aircraft carrier into the SIOP and adding cruise missiles back
into its arsenal? Perhaps we should borrow an idea from the
USSR and integrate aircraft carriers into continental air de-
fense? There are strong bureaucratic and strategy reasons that we
did not do these in the recent past—but perhaps these conditions
no longer apply. Deterrence and defense of the homeland will
always remain missions for the U.S. Armed Forces. The ability of
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naval aviation to supplement missiles and land-based air and
extend the air defense envelope should not be ignored.
Another idea that we should also consider is ready reserve
aircraft carriers that can be reconstituted with reserve air
wings within 1-2 years. Reserve forces may not be as appealing
as active ones, but as the budget ax falls, consideration should
be given to naval aviation capabilities that can respond to the
threats posed by a regenerated USSR or other similar high end
threat. Our new training carrier, USS FORRESTAL, should be dual-
committed to the Atlantic and/ or Contingency Forces, much as the
USS LEXINGTON was once considered a back-up antisubmarine warfare
carrier. Budget cuts may even force the Navy to accept additional
common or joint elements to flight training for its aviators.
Power projection in the new international security environ-
ment may not require advanced strike aircraft operating from
large deck carriers but rather Army and Marine Corps helicopters
operating from Navy surface warfare ships and civilian cargo
ships taken up from trade in conjunction with land-based Air
Force fixed wing assets. Recent press reports discusses coopera-
tion between the Army and Air Force in the areas of power projec-
tion and complaints from the Navy about being "forced" out of
this role. Let us not forget the tremendous success enjoyed
by the nation when Army aircraft flew off a Navy aircraft carrier
and struck Tokyo in the early days of the World War II Pacific
campaign. Since antisubmarine warfare is no longer going to be
the Navy's primary mission, there is no reason that Navy antisub-
marine warfare helicopters cannot also have an anti-tank mission.
This suggests that interservice, in the new era, is much more
important than allied interoperability—a major Navy priority and
strength in the past.
Amphibious Forces
The Marines have already seen the Navy's battleships moth-
balled and may see the reduction or total redesign or mothballing
of major amphibious assault ships. The amphibious assault ships
that we retain could also be dual-committed as sea control or
antisubmarine warfare ships. What forward-deployed Marines we do
retain in Europe could operate in multinational task groups as a
part of the new NATO Reaction Force.
Power projection for primarily contingency response in the
new international security environment may not necessitate large
numbers of advanced amphibious assault ships. The bulk of our
Marine units would arrive in a crisis area by air and be support-
ed by prepositioning. Press reports predict that, due to a reduc-
tion in resources and personnel and the impending block obsoles-
cence of the amphibious fleet, we will only have the capability
for the amphibious J-ift for 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades by
the next century. There have been some reports that General
Carl E. Mundy, Jr. the new Commandant of the Marine Corps, is
dissatisfied with current programmed levels for amphibious
ships. 109
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It unlikely that the modest-sized Army and Air Force assets
dedicated to the Pacific Force should have a dual-commitment to
the European theater in a revitalized "swing strategy" but what
about Pacific Marines? These forces are supposed to be loaned to
the Contingency Force, if needed, unless the Marines decide to
dedicate assets to this new force. In this case, a substantial
land war in Asia would necessitate "borrowing" forces from else-
where, including Atlantic or Contingency Force Marines. In
short, the dual-commitment of sea services to the new force
commanders will have to be carefully negotiated.
Special Operations Forces
The sea services will have to decide upon their desired role
in regard to special operations forces, presumably to be all
assigned to a new joint Contingency Force, and in riverine war-
fare. The Marine Corps has avoided assignment of its forces to
the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) but it also claimed
that its Marine Expeditionary Unit-sized forces were normally
special operations capable—earning the designation as MEU(SOC)
.
This force is ideally suited for coastal raids but "brown water"
is an area of the world's oceans of general disinterest to the
Navy. This is obviously an area that needs to be ironed out.
Does the Navy want to take more interest in "brown water"
operations, or will USSOCOM continue to purchase hardware for
Navy special operations forces? Perhaps the Marine Corps can
also rely on USSOCOM to purchase amphibious, ships and craft for
them? Does the U.S. Coast Guard desire a piece of the "brown
water" action? If so, what arrangements can be made with the
Department of Transportation to involve the Coast Guard as a part
of the Contingency Force?
Reserve Forces
As a cost-cutting measure which allows retention of the
industrial base, perhaps some Navy hulls might remain uncompleted
and, instead, put into deep storage where they could be "re-
constituted" for a war with the USSR. It has been announced that
some naval surface escort forces necessary for more robust power
projection will be put into a new Innovative Naval Reserve Con-
cept (INRC). 110 The Navy plans to use 8 FF-1052 KNOX class frig-
ates as training ships with an additional 32 in a Reduced Opera-
tional Status (ROS) which would be available within 180 days.
These forces are not reconstitution forces but rather reserve
forces available in a lengthy contingency. We might also consid-
er reconstitution of additional amphibious capability by placing
amphibious assault ship hulls in deep storage.
It is likely that a robust shipyard capability, to repair
battle-damaged fleet assets, may be part of the defense industri-
al base to be reconstituted and not fully maintained in peace-




We are headed toward an overall force structure and opera-
tional tempo (OPTEMPO) that will permit the U.S military to
respond to only 1 or perhaps 1% contingencies (not wars) with
active-duty forces. Could a more innovative approach be taken
with lift requirements? Government has already provided subsi-
dies and other incentives to ship and aircraft owners and opera-
tors to maintain a military lift capability while operating their
fleets in commercial trade. Perhaps future arrangements will
include the government purchasing commercially inefficient but
militarily useful shipping and allowing rotating commercial
operations of this fleet by a contractor? Contractors could be
subsidized to operate ships while performing routine maintenance
and modifications to modernize the fleet. Although all sealift
is not specifically administered by the Department of the Navy,
the Navy, does and should, play an important role in this criti-
cal issue for the new national security strategy.
Jointness
If changes to force structure of this magnitude will occur,
it is obvious that the Department of Defense is about to undergo
another soul-wrenching reappraisal of military service roles-and-
missions. From a reading of this year's Service Secretary's and
Chiefs of Staff posture statements, it is obvious that the Army
was more attuned to the new strategy and Base Force than were the
other services. The absence of serious discussion of the new
national security strategy by the other services in their posture
statements is, frankly, remarkable
—
given the fact that the Aspen
speech occurred almost six months earlier.
No matter how painful, the review of roles and missions will
occur, implicitly through budget decisions or explicitly if we
dare. Should new services be created—such as space or special
operations forces—or do we instead field the recommended four
new force packages, made up of multiple but existing services
operating under joint military strategies for the benefit of the
existing Commanders-in-Chief?
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told an American
Defense Preparedness Association audience and Army Times, in
April 1991, that the four new military forces do not necessarily
represent new Commanders-in-Chief. On the other hand, it had
been reported that General Powell was indeed considering changes
to the Unified Command Plan. 112 According to a more recent
report, ambitious plans to reorganize the UCP were "scaled back
as senior officials realized the difficulty of pushing through
such a major reorganization in the face of possible opposition
from the CINCs, the services, Congress and others." 113
In an August 1991 interview, Admiral Jeremiah suggested that
it might be too soon for substantive changes but hinted that
future command reorganization were not precluded. 114 The same
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line was followed by General Powell the next month, in his Con-
gressional testimony. Powell emphatically denied that any
changes would take place soon but that cuts in headquarters would
have to occur in the future. Two days after Powell testified to
Congress, the President announced on nationwide television that,
with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, all operational strategic nuclear forces in the
U.S. would be reorganized under a new Strategic Command.
Probably more than any other issue associated with the new
national security strategy and Base Force, the review of the
Unified Command Plan, dividing the world into CinC areas of
responsibility, has more flag and general officer's attention
than any other item. The new national security strategy and
Base Force suggest that we revisit the existing wartime command
and control structure for theater and functional Commanders-in-
Chief. Do we need warfighting CinCs for the entire world?
With asymmetrical reductions in force structure should come a
loss of organizational influence. Such changes will obviously
affect all joint military and intelligence organizations.
Commands, however, will obviously not be allocated on a
basis where the Navy has the majority. The Pacific theater has
been declared a maritime one and the assumption is that it will
retain a Navy CinC. If there is no serious maritime opposition
to Navy forces at sea in the Pacific area of responsibility, is
this assumption valid? Regarding the new Strategic Command,
although a majority of strategic nuclear warheads may be sea-
based in the future, at best, command will rotate between the Air
Force and the Navy. Recent press reports indicate that this
actually will happen.
The Army and Air Force have already indicated they would
dedicate serious assets to contingency response, making them the
current leading candidates for command of a continental U.S.-
based Contingency Force. This alone should cause the Marine
Corps to seriously consider consolidating existing flag officer
billets in order to gain one new four-star general who would be a
contender. The press reports the Marine Corps' recent position
on the proposed Contingency Force being that of a need for a
Joint Task Force and a rotating or nominative command
structure. If the Navy dedicated standing forces to a future
Contingency Force, it would logically lead to a full rotational
command policy.
Perhaps the most serious debate will occur over the proposed
Atlantic Force. By dedicating most U.S. Army heavy assets to
this force, one could conclude that the Army sees the Atlantic
Force as a land-oriented command with seapower as a significant
but supporting element. The Navy will probably focus on the word
"Atlantic" and argue that it should obviously retain its maritime
character and command. The Navy might even be willing to surren-
der cognizance over the Caribbean and South American waters in
order to retain the Atlantic Force. Major fleet elements of the
U.S. Navy operated under the command of Army generals during
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World War II and have routinely done so in the Mediterranean
since then.
If the Atlantic Force is in fact primarily focused on re-
gional response power projection in Europe and the Middle
East/ Southwest Asia, then perhaps the major peacetime commander
should be oriented toward ground warfare with air and maritime
commanders playing a subordinate role. After all, is there any
serious threat to our maritime forces in this area of the world?
If the Soviet (or some other) threat returns, it will be rela-
tively easy to split the Atlantic Force into its land and sea-
based components as a part of our reconstitution for a major
global war originating in Europe.
On the other hand, in the new era of jointness, it can be
argued that all Commander-in-Chief positions could be filled by
the best candidate from any service with no one single service
having a lock on any specific job. Even if this would mean, in
reality, rotation, the objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act
may be more fully realized than if we retain current practices.
The current active-duty Navy and Marine Corps leadership
appears to have internalized the Goldwater-Nichols Act and agree
that "jointness is here to stay." One strategy to deal with
the jointness issue is to not just "embrace it, but capture it,
take it over and run with it." This recommendation attempts
to use jointness as a vehicle to perform traditional maritime
missions with traditional forces. Another strategy is to accept
jointness, accede to nationally-mandated roles and -missions, and
modify the Navy's traditional self-image as the victor in the
Pacific theater in World War II. This approach would necessitate
refuting the retired flag officer community's criticism of the
new national security strategy and Base Force. 122
The uniformed services response to the new national security
strategy reflects what can be found in a 1987 RAND Corporation
assessment of their self-identification and cultural biases, from
which I have extracted segments below. The U.S. Army is
described as having "its roots in the citizenry. .. service to the
nation, and. . .utter devotion to the nation. . .taken greater pride
in the basic skills of soldiering than in their equipment .. .the
most secure of the three services ... aimed at getting a single
answer (often a number) rather than illuminating the alternatives
in the face of recognized uncertainties. . .not shown any particu-
lar strong affinity for strategy. . .unique among the services in
its acceptance of national strategies in peacetime which it is
both utterly committed to execute and unlikely to be able to
successfully prosecute in wartime." "What is the Army? It is
first and foremost, the nation's obedient and loyal military
servant." The U.S. Army appears to be very comfortable with the
new national security strategy and the Base Force.
According to the RAND study, the U.S. Air Force is "said to
worship at the altar of technology. . .by far the most attached of
the services to toys. . .always the most sensitive to defending or
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guarding its legitimacy as an independent institution. . .supremely
confident about its relevance. . .the most comfortable of the three
services with analysis. . .the most comfortable with strategy and
things strategic. . .but not irrevocably committed to their execu-
tion in war." "Who is the Air Force? It is the keeper and wielder
of the decisive instruments of war."
Although the U.S. Air Force has always had strong analytic
support, they are only beginning to study the implications of the
new national security strategy— instead preferring to address
strategy and force structure, to date, in terms of their pre-
Aspen speech White Paper, "The Air Force and U.S. National Secu-
rity: Global Reach - Global Power." 124 As with the Navy, non-
active duty elements associated with the Air Force appear to have
decided that the President's new national security strategy is
not necessarily in the best interests of their service. 125
The Navy is characterized by the RAND study as being "far
less toy oriented. . .more likely to associate themselves with the
Navy as an institution. .. the hypochondriac of the services,
constantly taking its own temperature or pulse, finding it inade-
guate, caught up in an anxiety largely of its own making... su-
premely confident of its legitimacy as an independent institu-
tion, but with the advent of long-range aviation, and again with
nuclear weapons, its relevancy has come into guestion. . . has
little tolerance of analysis for planning or evaluating the
Navy. . .may advocate strategies in peacetime to their advantage,
but they are not irrevocably committed to their execution in
war." "Who is the Navy? It is the supra-national institution that
has inherited the British Navy's throne to naval supremacy."
All of this discussion over roles and missions might reopen
old debates between maritime and continental strategies. On the
other hand, one might conclude that the maritime school has
become clearly preeminent. Recall criticism of the Maritime
Strategy of the 1980s for failing to more emphasize the primary
role of land forces in attaining political goals that reguired
military forces. The Navy should recall that it forms but one
component of triadic forces that ensure U.S. national security
strategy.
Under the President's new national security strategy, we are
clearly marching to a drumbeat that will probably mean the end of
unilateral naval intervention overseas. Naval and Marine Corps
forces are viewed under the new national security strategy and
Base Force as being a part of a larger package--they are not
going to be able to advertise themselves only as the Navy/Marine
Corps Team. The new team is a leaner but more powerful U.S.
Armed Forces. If the sea services are going to argue for the
existing command structure and autonomous military capabilities,
then they have the burden of proving that off-shore airpower,
"can-opener" capability, and maritime Commanders-in-Chief are
still reguired in this "new world order."
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The Transition Period126
Before we attain the "new world order," we must manage a
smooth transition period that gets us from here to there. There
are numerous problems of consensus on what this new world will
look like; but assuming such a consensus is possible, a plan
needs to be devised for the journey. The new national security
strategy and the Base Force are the Administration's first at-
tempts to articulate the goals. They are not yet a plan for the
transition.
With the Administrations • s goals, American social scientists
must quickly provide rough answers to approximations of how much
can be devoted to defense, considering other pressing national
needs. The initial answer has been provided by the Administra-
tion and the Congress—a 2 5 percent reduction is in order. This
is not necessarily final, however. We may find that there are
compelling reasons to defer such deep cuts so quickly or, that
such success follows our initial reductions, that we should
reduce even more.
The intelligence community and civilian academics outside
government should rapidly provide assessments of all threats to
U.S. interests in areas of the world traditionally relegated to
official indifference. Initially, planning for non-Soviet con-
tingencies will be assessed in terms of Operations DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM, but recent actions in Southwest Asia may prove
to be the exception rather than models of the future.
When President Reagan outlined his visions of a world with-
out nuclear ballistic missiles, or a defense-dominated security
environment, it was necessary to look not only at those individu-
al scenarios but also to think through the painful transition
from the current state of affairs to the new one. One scenario
that should have been considered was a USSR that attempted to
militarily "prevent" deployment of strategic defenses because of
Soviet fear of the new security environment. After looking at
this scenario, analysis should have yielded conditions necessary
to make the USSR secure during this transition.
We will need to evaluate carefully Soviet reaction to our
rosy view of the "new world order." Although the Soviet Union
appears to be an economic basket case, incapable of influencing
external events, it does retain a significant military capability
that cannot be ignored. In short, we should work closely with
Soviet and Russian leaders to ensure that they are comfortable
with the transition to a non-confrontational world that may be
even less stable than the past.
Arms Control 127
Governments should have an integrated defense and arms
control agenda. We should not attempt to delay military cuts in
order to achieve an arms control agreement. Opponents of the new
national security strategy may embrace arms control as a mecha-
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nism to derail the transition. Parallel unilateral actions by
both superpowers is an acceptable model for action. Arms control
should only be engaged in if it can be demonstrated that the
agreement will contribute to the defense of the U.S., the de-
creased likelihood of war, the reduced consequences of war if one
were to nevertheless break out, or a concurrent reduction in
costs.
Actions are already being taken to attain the real objec-
tives of arms control—without the actual signing of treaties.
Unilateral actions by the President at the end of September 1991
were a welcome first step. In addition to following the Presi-
dent's lead, the post-coup USSR and/ or Russia must help the West
understand its military doctrine and strategy, and the internal
debates over these issues. Military officers of both countries
should continue to write on doctrine and strategy in each oth-
er's professional journals. Similar writings by civilian academ-
ics should also be encouraged.
The new national security strategy will present some inter-
esting challenges to traditional arms control wisdom. For exam-
ple, although both sides may wish to significantly reduce their
nuclear arsenals, they may also desire to reconstitute additional
capability. Indeed, a "quick fix" for an unseen or unchallenged
Soviet regeneration or reconstitution is that of naval and air
force nuclear weapons deployed to Europe. We may find military
commanders even recommending retention of empty intercontinental
ballistic missile silos in order to reconstitute land-based
nuclear capability within two years. These empty holes would
offer verification difficulties and if this recommendation is
made and accepted, it would require revisiting START and the SALT
I Interim Agreement.
We are currently engaged, or will likely soon engage, in
arms control negotiations or unilateral steps in lieu of arms
control, in almost every warfare area—including naval forces.
Yet virtually none of these agreements reduces the threat to the
U.S. in theaters outside of Europe—the very area that we say is
our primary focus for defense programming!
The disposition of naval tactical nuclear weapons currently
deployed on surface ships, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and
with land-based naval aviation will present some difficult prob-
lems. How will we manage the plan for reconstitution of these
nuclear weapons and what conditions must be met before we once
again deploy them with the fleet? Although they might have been
used to deter potential Third World nuclear powers from acquiring
or threatening American forces with weapons of mass destruction,
we will now need alternative plans for arms control, deterrence,
or direct defense. There are significant verification issues
that need to be addressed as we implement President Bush's new
plans to cut tactical nuclear weapons at sea. The President's
plan to reduce these weapons reverses the U.S. government's long-
established position opposing naval arms control.
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Even now there are some modest naval arms control measures
that can be pursued without waiting for more important issues to
be resolved. The existing seventeen year old bilateral incidents-
at-sea agreement, and recent high level meetings between the
military staffs of the superpowers appear as constructive moves
to minimize potential crises arising from military contingency
and normal peacetime operations and maximize communications on a
professional level. These agreements could be signed on a bilat-
eral basis by all major sea powers, with eventual negotiation of
a multilateral agreement open to all maritime nations. Expanding
the incidents-at-sea agreement to include non-interference with
attack submarines or aircraft operations might also be examined
and evaluated.
Open exchange of non-sensitive data, such as the names,
classes, and homeports of major ships, can also be non-threaten-
ing to the U.S. Navy since this data is generally known. It
might be nice to have an official list of all Soviet fleet units
with their current status (active, reserve, decommissioned, moth-
balled, etc.), actual name, ship rank, and home fleet. Current-
ly, this information is obtained by each side from intelligence
sources. If we can exchange similar data for nuclear, ground,
and air forces, why not build confidence by understanding each
other's naval force structure?
Although nuclear weapons free zones may not have been neces-
sarily in the West's best interests previously, they represent a
reasonable concept today given President Bush's move to remove
these weapons from our fleet. Another concept worth adopting now
is no first nuclear use at sea. The disposal of naval nuclear
reactors is another topic that might be scrutinized since it is
in the best interests of all governments and navies to ensure
that this is done safely and with minimal environmental impact.
Although not a specific step to control naval arms, it is a
useful step and confidence building measure.
Agreements on the notification of ballistic missile tests,
and on the prevention of dangerous military activities, were
recently signed by the superpowers. Perhaps we can agree as well
on advance notification of major naval exercises. Notification
might be limited to those which the other side finds most threat-
ening, such as flushing of all Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines from port to deployed bastions, or conducting
a fleet-size antisubmarine warfare exercise by NATO in waters
close to the USSR. Although advance notification clearly under-
mines the principle of freedom of the seas, if navies are asked
to accept some restrictions, it is better to promise to notify
prior to an exercise rather than to have the exercise canceled
for lack of governmental support.
A final area into which we should once again look at is
permissive action links (PALs) . PALs must receive an active
signal to fire of a nuclear device. PALs are found on strategic
bombers and in the system to launch land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles. Although generally impractical for our
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nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (and an emotional
issue for the crews involved) , how have we accepted this princi-
ple with sea-based cruise missiles and naval aircraft delivered
systems? Would the West not feel more secure, should the Soviet
government again prove incapable of governance, if Soviet SSBNs
could not fire without such a device? To ensure that this is the
case in the now unstable USSR, it may be worth the price of
inserting PALs on Western SSBNs.
Military Operations Research and Analysis
The operations analysis and political science communities
must cooperate as they never have before. The lack of coopera-
tion between the policy sciences and operations research has
recently been addressed by the operations research community 2
but has not yet been recognized as a significant deficiency in
some parts of political science.
Military operations analysis previously concentrated on
investigating issues posed in a politico-military environment
that was not subject to debate. Those assumptions are no longer
valid. The old European-based war scenarios with two weeks
warning and mobilization are simply not of very much interest
anymore. The military operations analysis community has to
reorient itself to measurements of regeneration and reconsti-
tution where the timelines are measured in months and years, not
days or weeks. Strategic warning, decision-making, non-NATO
battlefields (ashore and at sea) , manpower and personnel plan-
ning, resource allocation, test and evaluation, combat models,
and gaming and simulation are all areas that will need fundamen-
tal readjustment in the new international security environment.
The Military Operations Research Society (MORS) addressed
all of these subjects at their 59th MORS Symposium at West Point
in June 1991. When General Robinson addressed the Society, he
contrasted the requirements in the past to those of the future.
Robinson suggested that analysts pay more attention to political-
military games with low-moderate resolution simulations and "on-
the-fly" tools.
One technique for viewing alternative futures is that of
path gaming. These are politico-military games that identify
interesting alternative paths to a desired future, and examine
them simultaneously with different groups of players. Gaming,
naturally, is no substitute for solid analysis. Gaming, however,
can provide new insight, and supplements more traditional methods
of dealing with alternative futures. This technique was recently
used by the Naval War College to explore the politico-military
environment under President Bush's new national security strate-
Governments will become more adept at using means, other
than military forces, to influence the behavior of other
nations—hence these tools will also need to be studied as a part
of our "graduated deterrence response." A recent Soviet forum
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"Civic Control Over Security," sponsored by the magazine Mezhdu-
narodnava Zhizn and the School for the Strategy of Socio-Intel-
lectual Enterprise in Rostov-on-Don, highlighted the vulnerabili-
ty of the USSR to economic sanctions as the USSR becomes tied
into the world economy and less self-sufficient. 131 In short,
the military operations research community will need to integrate
itself into analysis involving other tools of statecraft rather
than considering itself a discipline that can exist unto itself.
For example, new research may evaluate how successful eco-
nomic sanctions have been in the past 132 and as a supplement to
Operation DESERT SHIELD. Apparently, sanctions were not as
successful as some desired, since the U.S. and allied coalition
nations launched Operation DESERT STORM. What is the appropriate
mix of economic sanctions as a precursor to military operations
and a follow-on, once the military campaign is completed? Econom-
ic tools are even more difficult to use than in the past, as
multi-national corporations become less responsive to national
governments. The intelligence community will have to provide new
types of information to decision-makers to allow them to assess
the capabilities of economic and other sanctions.
We also need much more sophisticated analysis of the mili-
tary balances well beyond the traditional units of measure in-
volving only the two superpowers and their allies. We need to
become extremely more sophisticated in our construction of threat
and net assessments. Simple minded tabulations of force levels
based on familiar arms control measures of effectiveness are not
only misleading but not a true measure of military balances. We
must move well beyond input measures that" count "things" and
perform complicated dynamic assessments that include the interac-
tion between offense and defense and nuclear and conventional
forces over an extended period of time. "Spasm" exchange calcula-
tions must give way to analyses of campaigns in which time as a
crucial variable is not overlooked. The correlation of forces and
means is not a static calculation but is a dynamic assessment
that varies over time before, during, and after the war. Have we
yet begun to model the new Soviet concepts of net assessments by
comparing combat systems rather than the old correlation of
forces? 133
A more correct way to assess a threat is to outline the
objectives that each nation hopes to achieve by its expected
military campaigns, the time required to do so, and the price
that must be paid to meet those objectives on schedule. In short,
we must focus on output measures that by their very nature will
not fit neatly onto briefing charts or the front pages of news-
papers. New measures of effectiveness will be difficult to ex-
plain to the public and the political leadership of the nation
but will serve to more fully represent reality. This will put a
heavy burden on the simulation and gaming communities.
In short, military operations research and analysis will
become more complicated and require the cooperation of special-
ists in other disciplines. This will mean that the government
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should devise a strategy to direct and manage all the studies
that will be done as we learn what is required of our transition
to the "new world order."
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Critical Success Factors 1
There appear to be four main problem areas in which solu-
tions portend success for the President's dream. The first is
that everything depends upon the responsible, good behavior of
the Soviet Union. It may not be desirable to have your fundamen-
tal national security strategy so dependent upon the behavior of
the once "evil empire" but, for any of this to work, the Soviets
must return to their homeland, remain inwardly focused, and
continue the serious reductions in military capability they have
only started.
Specifically, what is meant by the continued "good" behavior
of the Soviet Union will be debated. Clearly, additional draw-
downs in naval and strategic nuclear systems must follow soon.
Their inability to mount an offensive theater strategic offensive
operation in Western Europe should be the key determinant.
Internal behavior of the Soviet Union toward its own population,
and marginal "cheating" or non-compliance with arms control
measures, should not be grounds to derail the new national secu-
rity strategy.
The second critical area demands that the intelligence
community be able to surmount the new challenges. If funding for
intelligence follows defense downward, then the reconstitution
portion of the new national security strategy is bankrupt. The
intelligence community should move into spheres they have tradi-
tionally avoided or under-emphasized, such as the Third World and
economics. They will also have significantly increased burdens
demanded by the monitoring and verification of compliance of arms
control agreements. This is possible only if decision-makers
recognize this crucial underpinning of the new national security
strategy.
The third area that can undermine a successful transition to
this new world will be the international behavior of allies and
the U.S. Congress. Clearly, without Congress onboard, none of
this is going to happen. Secretary Cheney's efforts to articu-
late the new national security strategy are designed to ensure
that the Department of Defense is ahead of Congress and that the
new policies are adopted.
Defense cuts have normally been performed in a "salami"-like
fashion—across the board. The new national security strategy
strongly suggests asymmetrical cuts. Reductions in all govern-
ment programs have been made in the past without reference to
existing or suggested government policies. Without an articulat-
ed national security strategy by the Bush Administration, the
Congress would probably: (1) cut across the board, or (2) decide
on their own version of a new national security strategy, and
make asymmetrical cuts in accordance with that strategy. Clearly
the Bush Administration has no choice but to present to Congress
an articulate strategy for the defense of the U.S., then partici-
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pate in the normal budgetary and political debate that will
result.
If our European and Asian allies attempt to keep our forward
presence there, and their contributions to their own defense
lower than they should be, they will likely attempt to exploit
our separation of governmental powers. The debate over retaining
a forward overseas presence for U.S. forces has generally assumed
presumptions made by each side; unquestionably we need to main-
tain a permanent presence, or we can now return all the troops
home. In the debate over retaining an overseas presence, all
sides should explain the rationale, the benefits, and costs of
their points of view.
The final and most demanding, critical factor in the success
of the President's new national security strategy is the ability
of private industry to deliver during the "reconstitution" proc-
ess. What is visualized is not industrial mobilization from a
"warm" start: rather, industry will be asked to deliver military
equipment and supplies from a "cold" start—assuming that many of
our current defense industries shift to the non-defense sector.
The Bush Administration is attempting to both save our
defense industrial base under very trying conditions, and simul-
taneously reduce defense spending--a dubious prospect, when it
seems reluctant even to address the need for a national industri-
al policy? At least one military service has publicly advocated
the need for a national plan for the industrial base. Reconsti-
tution of U.S. industrial capabilities will' be insuffi-
cient—international reconstitution will be necessary for over-
seas suppliers of finished goods and raw materials. According
to one report, during Operation DESERT STORM, "...the U.S. gov-
ernment had to seek emergency assistance for 3 foreign govern-
ments to ensure that suppliers of critical components met combat-
essential schedules." 4
Major changes are required in the way we do business, to
retain both our technological position in the world and the
personnel necessary to meet newly defined defense needs. By
withdrawing forces from overseas and promising to reconstitute
within two years and return, the U.S. will have fundamentally
changed its international politico-military posture. If after
internal investigation, we cannot fulfill this promise, then the
U.S. government should keep this conclusion under wraps, endure
the open-source critical debate and criticism it will face, and
keep this declaratory strategy operational.
The President's new national security strategy is a program-
ming concept that supports the continued reliance on deterrence
of war as the cornerstone of American security. There are those
who doubted that the U.S. would ever use centrally-based nuclear
weapons for the defense of Europe--perhaps a President never
would have decided to actually do that. Deterrence strategies
are influenced greatly by perceptions; under the new national
security strategy, it will be important to maintain the percep-
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tion of our ability to reconstitute. Just as in the past, evi-
dence of programs, deployments, exercises, and literature must
be provided to support deterrence.
Notes
(1) This section draws upon my article "America Promises to Come
Back: The President's New National Security Strategy," Security
Studies . Vol. I, No. 2, Winter 1991/1992, p. 173-234.
(2) Department of the Army, Army Focus , June 1991, p. 66.
(3) General Accounting Office (GAO) , "Industrial Base: Signifi-
cance of DOD ' s Foreign Dependence," Report to the Chairman,
Subcommittee on Technology and National Security, Joint Economic
Committee, U.S. Congress, GAO/NSIAD-91-93 , January 1991, 26 pp.
(4) F. Clifton Berry, Jr. , "Maintaining the Defense Industrial
Base," National Defense . Vol. LXXVI , No. 469, July/August 1991,
p. 7.
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Defense Business as Usual?
Major changes to the international environment have led
planners to significantly shift the manner of addressing problems
and issues. The first order questions, such as "what is Ameri-
ca's role in the world, or the business and purpose of the
Department of Defense," now demand answers prior to consideration
of second order programming or efficiency issues, that have
dominated the traditional defense debate.
America's new role in the world will widen strategic plan-
ner's horizons to considering issues more befitting planners of a
major international superpower; such as the long-term competi-
tion between nations, the economic, political, legal, scientific-
technical, and cultural aspects of competition, and uses of the
military for other than a Europe-centered global war with the
USSR. The U.S. cannot afford to indulge itself with "gold-plat-
ed" strategies capable of successfully dealing with all possible
contingencies by itself.
The world may move to a more integrated political structure,
or, at least parts of the world will move in this direction. The
United Nations (UN) Charter still contains the framework for
national armed forces acting on behalf of the Security Council.
Perhaps this is the time to consider regional and global coopera-
tion as alternative models to the nation-state. The nations of
the world rejected this direction when they failed to adopt the
UN-sponsored Law of the Sea Treaty and its^ "Common Heritage of
Mankind" approach to certain types of "common" ocean resources.
True, that approach was flawed, given the political realities of
its day, but perhaps this is the time to amend international
organizations, and see if they can do better than before.
Changes in the international environment likely will be more
significant in the next twenty years than in the last twenty.
Planning for the long-term requires a 10-20 year planning hori-
zon. We cannot afford to lock up our strategic options with
political and military assumptions or force structures that were
developed in a political world which no longer exists.
The fundamental shift in the way programming planners look
at the world will lead to less emphasis on the USSR and Europe, a
redirection toward other areas of the world, and managing day-to-
day competition with other powers. All this will occur while the
U.S. has significantly less capable tools in its kit. Rather than
acting as a "Chairman of the Board" with our allies, America's
appropriate future role may be that of "first among equals" 2 if
it does not withdraw to the North American continent in splendid
isolationism. If we elect to stay engaged in the world, is it
likely that we will engage in "winning" the peace as we once
prepared to "win" war? If so, it implies the creation of a truly
integrated and nonconfrontational governmental and commercial
planning process.
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Problems in American defense planning have, for some time,
provoked calls for more and better planning. Evidence of plan-
ning problems is abundant in four major areas of Department of
Defense planning: strategic goals and objectives that lacked
clarity; a functional organizational design which impedes mission
integration; overemphasis on budgets and programming needs to the
detriment of overall policies and strategies; and ignoring other
agencies, competitors and the external environment. We have the
opportunity to, and should, improve the quality of our national
strategic or long-range planning while we answer the call made by
the President at Aspen.
A major planning problem was a lack of a coordinated effort
to integrate the government's primary goals, policies and action
sequences into a cohesive whole. Analysis and review of Ameri-
ca's fundamental role in the world should force the Department of
Defense to solve this basic problem, at least temporarily. Sound
strategic management, of which strategic planning is but one
component, integrates an organization's principal goals, policies
and action sequences into a cohesive whole. It marshals, allo-
cates, and shapes an organization's resources into a unique and
viable posture based on its relative internal competencies and
shortcomings, anticipated changes in the environment, and contin-
gent moves by intelligent opponents. Strategic management is
concerned with the management of the whole enterprise, not just
its functional components or sub-parts.
The U.S. government has not developed truly successful and
coherent defense, industrial, scientific, engineering, oceans,
etc. policies since the end of World War II. Yet, we do have a
successful agricultural policy and supporting programs. The
federal government has also successfully managed complicated
programs for space exploration, rural electrification, and trans-
portation. Now is the time to again exercise leadership and
provide guidance and support for success.
It is a challenge for the organizational leader to combine
and direct the efforts and activities of other members of an
organization toward the successful completion of a stated mission
or purpose. It is this type of effort that we will see the Bush
Administration attempt to perform while it undertakes a fundamen-
tal restructuring of America's role in the world, and missions
for its military forces. It will be this effort, not the old
roles and missions, that NATO political leadership will have to
understand to deal effectively with the U.S. as it undergoes
internal self-examination.
In contrast to most other types of planning, strategic
management also analyzes an organization's external environment
and internal climate, searches for new trends, discontinuities,
surprises, and competitive advantages. Since its scope is broader
than other types of planning, it typically embodies more qualita-
tive shifts in direction than might be anticipated from the long-
range planning process. Also guided by an idealized vision of
the future, strategic management is much more action-oriented.
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The organization attempts to keep its options open, considering
a variety of alternatives to respond promptly to unforeseen
contingencies as it seeks its ideal.
On the other hand, long-range planning, which has typified
NATO planning in past decades, on the other hand, focuses more on
specifying goals and objectives, translating them into current
budgets and work programs. The objective of long-range planners
(and short-range planners for that matter) is to work backward
from goals to programs and budgets to document the sequence of
decisions and actions required to achieve the desired future,
embodied in the goals. Hence, long-range planning assumes that
current trends will continue into the future and plans tend to be
linear extrapolations of the present. Clearly, this is no longer
feasible since our objectives appear to be changing.
To be effective, strategic management assumes certain neces-
sary conditions. Among these are: agreement, or at least consen-
sus, on goals and objectives; a process by which the organization
can scan its environment, monitor trends, and assess its competi-
tors; a management information system based on an integrated
communication and control system; and a review and monitoring
process to determine whether the current strategies are viable or
should be revamped.
The top-down vision of the future, outlined by the President
in Aspen, will usher in new governmental politico-military goals
and objectives. The major players will be both domestic and
international, and it is likely that a consensus will be reached.
It is uncertain which group or groups will dominate the debate
but the American public's willingness to sustain heavy defense
burdens concurrently with large domestic programs (including the
Savings and Loan bailout) should not be assumed gratuitously in
the absence of a clear and present danger.
Effective strategic management is not possible without
responsive and timely feedback. The debate over the President's
new national security strategy should include an analysis of the
U.S. political goals sought by the forward deployment of U.S.
forces, and the political environment that compelled the formula-
tion of America's alliance structure. If those goals have been
attained, if the international environment has drastically
changed, then it should be obvious that the fundamental strategy
and resulting force structure are subject to wholesale renegotia-
tion. That this is being done in a thoughtful and comprehensive
manner, with the full participation of domestic interests and
allies, should be comforting.
New legislation will be required as a result of the changes
in the international system—so this exercise is not confined to
the Executive Branch of government. The two government branches
can cooperate or they can assume an adversarial relationship.
Congress will cut forces and programs—with or without a careful-
ly considered plan. The Executive Branch must present every
possible option for cuts to the legislature—even those that
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wrench the very souls of the leaders of a particular combat arm
or military service. The Administration appears prepared to meet
this challenge. Without a consensus between the legislative and
executive branches on threats and an appropriate response, a
closer relationship will never be possible between strategic
planning and defense acquisition. 3
The assumption of two-year's strategic warning will be
debated endlessly and perhaps never fully resolved. What the
Administration has accomplished with this assumption is to make
it explicit that to absorb a 25 percent cut, we must make an
assumption of this magnitude. If nothing else, it will force the
Congress and the American public to recognize exactly what we are
buying into with the new national security strategy and Base
Force. One hopes that the dramatic changes are recognized in the
USSR as well.
Should the services refuse to present realistic plans to the
Department of Defense, or play end-around games with Congress,
the cuts will be made anyway. The services could find themselves
playing catch-up, and redrafting strategies with whatever forces
the resulting legislation permits. The looming debate should be
about goals and objectives, realizing that these do not have to
be what they were in the past. If we are realistic about these
goals and objectives, there is every likelihood that we can reach
a consensus on force requirements. If we engage in acrimonious
debate over force structure, we may stumble into a strategy that
will not serve our national interests in the 21st Century.
In his Aspen speech, the President opened the door to a
total reexamination of America's role in the world and overall
U.S. military capabilities. The historical parallel is the
British reorientation in the first decade of the 20th Century
from strategic focus on colonies to Europe. It is very likely
that as a result of this new national security strategy, the U.S.
will start down the path toward splendid isolationism.
Notes
(1) Part of this section draws upon concepts first developed in
"Strategic Management for the Defense Department," by James J.
Tritten and Nancy Roberts, NPS-56-88-030-PR, Monterey, Califor-
nia: Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report, September 1988,
pp. 3-9. This section also draws upon my article "America Prom-
ises to Come Back: The President's New National Security Strate-
gy," Security Studies . Vol. I, No. 2, Winter 1991/1992, p. 173-
234.
(2) "Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment," A
paper by the Future Security Environment Working Group, submitted
to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy," Andrew W.
Marshall and Charles Wolf, Working Group Chairmen, April 1988, p.
18. It can also be argued that this state also defines our future
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leadership in technology.
(3) General Accounting Office, "Defense Planning and Budgeting:
Effect of Rapid Changes in National Security Environment,"
GAO/NSIAD-91-56, February 1991, p. 1.
(4) The movement has already begun. See, for example, Patrick
J. Buchanan, "Now That Red Is Dead, Come Home, America," Washing-
ton Post . September 8, 1991, pp. CI & C4
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